Did You Fly The Vulcan?? (Merged) [Archive] - Page 9

Pontius Navigator

7th Nov 2017, 13:17

MARINE RADAR RECONNAISSANCE

A couple of questions that have cropped up whilst trying to consolidate the information I have relate to No. 35 Squadron's role in Marine Radar Reconnaissance.

Firstly, were all aircraft equipped for the role, or were specific serial numbers used? Secondly, was this just a standby role or were there regular sorties carried out (and, if so, what did they entail)?

Your usual help would be much appreciated

Regards

Pete

One role modification for MRR was the addition of a 1:2,000,000 scale on the H2S to allow for a larger visible area. This was of course a special mod. While in Cyprus we occasionally did a MRR practice using the normal H2S. In UK in the late 60s this went by the name INSTOW. In NEAF is was PICTURE.

The idea was that we would observe for 15 minutes and then the AEO would transmit the report in a 'comms window' In the Med there were so many contacts that it could take the AEO 15 minutes to transmit one report (voice) and immediately begin the next!

Easier was when tattle tailing a task group as that was a simple short broadcast, but of course first find your task group and then be prepared to evade if you p***ed them off :)

Bill Macgillivray

7th Nov 2017, 20:39

PN

I remember it fairly well (8 May 73). We had the C-in-C as co-pilot, if my logbook is correct!! Happy days, regards,

Bill

Dorman

21st Nov 2017, 08:55

Hi
Ricky Crowder was my instructor in the Queen's University Air Squadron in 1967/8 and our intake is trying to have a 50 year reunion. We would like to invite our instructors which include Ricky Crowder, Bob Aitken and Paddy Cullen. Can anyone put me in touch with any, or all, of these lovely chaps?
Many thanks
Alan Dorman

pzu

21st Dec 2017, 16:48

Not sure if this belongs here?

Found this on FBook - origin unknown3847

PZU - Out of Africa (Retired)

Pontius Navigator

21st Dec 2017, 17:06

Dorman, contact Tankertrashnav

DaveReidUK

21st Dec 2017, 19:36

Found this on FBook - origin unknown

Watch as Vulcan bomber cockpit is dragged across the River Tees ahead of airshow (http://www.gazettelive.co.uk/news/teesside-news/watch-vulcan-bomber-cockpit-dragged-12962710)

RedhillPhil

21st Dec 2017, 21:36

Not sure if this belongs here?

Found this on FBook - origin unknown3847

PZU - Out of Africa (Retired)

Is that what is meant by "ditching"?

Petet

30th Apr 2018, 08:59

Can anyone identify the officers in the picture at the foot of this page. https://35squadron.wordpress.com/2018/04/29/1972/

I think it could relate to the handover of No. 35 Squadron from JB Fitzpatrick to KI Watson (1972) ..... but I need confirmation and to identify who is who.

Any thoughts?

Bill Macgillivray

30th Apr 2018, 21:00

Petet,
Ken Watson on the left, John Fitzpatrick on the right. I remember the picture being taken. I was Squadron pilot leader (QFI/IRE)

Bill

Petet

30th Apr 2018, 21:56

Thanks Bill; I have been typing your name on a regular basis over the last few days (listing the captains of aircraft) and hopefully I have spelt it correctly each time.

If you (or anyone else) have any copies of photographs / documents from your time with the squadron which could be included on the website (which is aimed at preserving the history of No. 35 Squadron) please could you get in touch via the Contact Page on the site https://35squadron.wordpress.com/contact/

Regards (and thanks again)

Pete

macwood

22nd May 2018, 22:44

Pontius Navigator

23rd May 2018, 06:45

Storey I heard and I haven't checked - was that President Nixon had this really good idea to encourage the Russians to put pressure on the Chinese to stop helping their Viet Nam chums during that war. He had the USAF nuclear armed fleet patrolling north of Russia and asked us to help by dispersing our nuclear capability to war state dispersals Unfortunately we had no method of transporting stores to dispersal units.
This is from memory so it might be all bull**** -what do I know ?!
ex crew chief Waddo 1965 -'75
I can say with complete certainty that this was not true between 1964 and 1974.

1. We certainly had the capability to move weapons to dispersal by road or air though it would not have been quick.
2. Dispersals did not have storage facilities.
3. The guard force for dispersed storage would have been much larger than we could manage.
4. Separating weapons from the delivery platform would make generation near impossible.

There is however a grain of truth as the Honington, Cottesmore, and Waddington bomber wings had from about 1963 (before the Vietnam war) a reinforcement role to support FEAF. This ceased in 1974.

Waddo Liney

8th Jul 2018, 20:37

A couple of old sweats (yours truly being one), who served on the Flight Line Sqdn. at Waddington during the mid-sixties, are having trouble recalling how the shift system worked when we were detailed to be on QRA. We remember that our tour on QRA was for a certain period of time; 1 week? or 2 weeks? not sure which. Also, that we were confined to the QRA site (Alpha dispersal) for the duration of our shift, (except for meals, when one person from each crew was released for the meal at the airmens mess), but we can't recall if a shift was for a 24 hour period followed by a 24 hour stand-down, or was it 2 days on and 2 days off? We do remember having to be there over a weekend, but not how that tied in with other days of the week. Does anyone from that era remember? If so, I would appreciate your input.

Timelord

21st Jul 2018, 21:33

I’m having a recollection problem as well. How were bomb and HRS steering demands presented to the pilots? I thought I remembered a simple left / right needle but looking at cockpit photos I couldn’t find it. Any clues?

Pontius Navigator

22nd Jul 2018, 06:10

The Mark 1s used the G4B compass system with the PBI (Pilot's Bombing Indicator) this was indeed a simple left/right in front of the LHS pilot. I think the bomb steer for the Mark 2s was fed directly through the MFS.

BEagle

22nd Jul 2018, 06:18

In the Vulcan B2, steering signals were presented to the pilots by azimuth director pointers on the MFS director horizon. You banked the aircraft to put the circular bank indicator over the ADP and kept it there, achieving the required steer when the wings had levelled.

The steering source depended upon the MFS selector panel (which had a 'bomb' position for the NBS steering signal) and the MFS / HRS switch. Beam compass heading demands were presented to the ADPs with 'MFS' and 'central' selected on the MFS selector, 'HRS' steers were generated by the Nav Plotter and displayed to the ADPs with 'HRS' and 'central' selected.

"Go to 'bomb', advise demand!" - I can still hear that today!

Timelord

22nd Jul 2018, 09:12

Thanks PN and Beags. B1 was well before my time. Could it be that I remember the left / right needle from the Hastings T5.
?.
Indeed ‘ go to bomb , advise demand”
”Hard left”
”Oh b***er - go back to HRS and central then!”

BEagle

22nd Jul 2018, 18:40

Or with a certain flatiron Captain and his crew running in to Tain ( I was flying, he was doing the map reading and MFS switchery):

"Pilots, Wings level for correction"
"Nothing seen, Radar"
"Must all be in line Pilots - follow the steer"'
"OK, wilco, Radar"
"White flag and distance to go, Radar"
"Keep following the steer Pilots, confirm bomb doors AUTO?"
"Bomb doors AUTO, Radar and steer still upright"
"YOU'RE NOT ON BOMB!!"
"Bomb gone...."
:\

Fortunately the Plotter's HRS steer had been so accurate that we didn't get a long bomb error. The Captain had been a nice chap to let me fly, but had dropped the ball with regard to MFS switchery.

Pontius Navigator

22nd Jul 2018, 19:24

The Advise Direction was after my time but I can see the sensible logic.

Following BEagles previous post i recall it was Go to Bomb, follow the director.

Certainly the T5 used the G4B and the PDI. We also had a PDI in a wooden box with a long cable on the nav table. Boscombe threw a wobbly as it wasn't approved.

DAC66

28th Jul 2018, 14:44

Hi all,

I thought it likely that some on this forum might have known my father Iain Calder who was a navigator on Meteors, Javelins and Vulcans in the 50s, 60s and 70s and I wanted to pass on the sad news that he died on Tuesday aged 85.

Best Wishes

David Calder

The AvgasDinosaur

31st Aug 2018, 20:14

Learned Contributors,
I have followed this thread in respectful awe, thank you all.
I have seen several mentions of B-52 time on exchanges but did any of you get to fly the B-58 Hustler ?
Thanks in anticipation for your time and trouble,
Be lucky
David

Petet

1st Sep 2018, 17:37

As part of my history of No 35 Squadron, I am working with one of the co-owners of XJ823 (Solway Aviation Museum) to piece together information relating to the squadron's use of the aircraft for inclusion on the display boards.

I note from my research that some of the contributors on here have flown in this aircraft whilst serving with No. 35 Squadron and wondered if it would be possible to have extracts from any log books (or tales from those flights) which could be incorporated in the display.

If you can help, can you contact me via the e-mail link on https://35squadron.wordpress.com/

Thanks in advance

Pete

Petet

4th Sep 2018, 16:52

Just recording my thanks to the one person (you know who you are) for responding to my previous post

Just flipping back to my post regarding Maritime Radar Reconnaissance, can anyone provide a list of the 35 and 617 Squadron aircraft that were adapted for the role (or were 27 squadron aircraft utilised for this purpose) and also, were all sorties flown under the command of SACLANT or were they also carried out for other commands?

Your usual help would be very much appreciated

Regards

Pete

Petet

4th Sep 2018, 17:02

Re Post 2023

David; a very belated acknowledgement of your post and I am sorry to hear of your loss.

The reason for posting now is that I have spent some time over the last week or so documenting No 35 Squadron's use of Vulcan XJ823 and you father's name cropped up a number of times and whilst looking back over this thread I spotted your post.

If you have any details, photographs, documents etc regarding your father's service with No 35 Squadron, I would be happy to include them on the website that I am creating, which is aimed at preserving the history of the squadron.

Regards

Pete

BEagle

5th Sep 2018, 07:34

I flew XJ823 only once, on 21 Oct 1977 during EX OCEAN SAFARI. 3:25 day and 1:05 night. Despite the title, this was not an MRR task.

35 Sqn used its own aircraft for the tedious chore of MRR ('boat-spotting') rather than those of 27 Sqn.

Waddo Liney

9th Sep 2018, 19:41

Some kindly aircrew input is requested.

In the process of writing memoirs of my service on Line Squadron at Waddington in the mid-sixties and on the Vulcan B1As that we operated at that time, I remember being on one of the starter crews on the ORP during the Battle of Britain Open Day, (Sat 19th Sep 1964, according to an earlier post by “thing”). We had a dress rehearsal a day or so prior and in briefing us, the junior engineering officer in charge of our party wanted us to sprint smartly to the side of the dispersal and form up in a line after our particular aircraft’s engines had started and it was on its way out onto the runway. From our point of view, this was suicide because the jet blasts from the other scrambling aircraft washed over the whole of the ORP and if we had done what he wanted, we would have been bowled over like so many tenpins, (dressed up as we were, in white overalls, we would certainly have looked the part). Instead, we all dived for whatever cover was available, sparse as it was. He was apoplectic that we disobeyed his order and insisted that we comply during the actual scramble on Open Day. Of course, we didn’t obey then either and heard no more about it.
However, my question is – approximately what percentage throttle setting was used to exit the ORP during scrambles? I realize that it wasn’t full power because that was applied only after the aircraft had swung around and lined up with the runway, but it seemed to be more than was typically used for taxiing from a dispersal during normal operations.
Thank you in advance.

Petet

10th Sep 2018, 22:50

Would anyone happen to have access to a listing which shows the serial numbers of the ten aircraft that were originally selected for conversion for Operation Corporate?

I think XL391, XM597, XM598, XM607, XM612 and XM654 were on the list, but not sure about the others

Your usual help would be much appreciated

Regards

Pete

NRU74

17th Sep 2018, 18:28

35 Sqn used its own aircraft for the tedious chore of MRR ('boat-spotting') rather than those of 27 Sqn.

Don’t suppose this is classified now....
Did the Vulcans do MRR over the Kola Penisula ?
(We did on Valiants in the early sixties)

Pontius Navigator

1st Dec 2018, 16:37

An article in a paper today jogged a memory.

Vulcans on QRA used to stand in one spot for days in end. The weight would create the effect of square wheels which gave a slightly bumpy ride on taxying until the tyres resumed their normal shape. While an aircraft could remain on state for 28 days it was the practice to move them every 7 days I believe if there wasn't a practice taxy first.

Not sure what the Blue Steel aircraft did.

Barksdale Boy

2nd Dec 2018, 06:05

I would have thought three or four days without a 02 was quite rare.

Pontius Navigator

2nd Dec 2018, 07:19

After a fire, I think engine starter, the force was grounded for a period. We didn't even have a 05. Eventually crews got so twitchy that we had to ask for a practice alert.

The same effect could be seen in the Suzana York film.

Blue Steel aircraft didn't taxy and there was also the combat available spare for QRA.

Pontius Navigator

27th Dec 2018, 16:04

Just a few notes on recovery procedures on bomber exercises in the 60s.

A Group exercise might see 45-50 aircraft flying the same route at 10 minute intervals with perhaps 100 - 150 on a major command exercise. They may have launched from 30 plus airfields but be recovering to just 9 all in the East of England at near enough the same time.

To enable safe recovery when the military radar units could be under pressure with recovering fighters and bombers procedural control was practised. Aircraft would be routed via a common Force Dispersal Point. Prior to reaching the FDP the would report. ETA and fuel state. At FDP they were handed over to the respective Groups and route to the GDP.

From the GDP each aircraft was handed over to its parent station and route to the appropriate Station Entry Point making good the time ordered. From memory the 1Gp GDP was over the North Sea with its station entry points over the North Sea. As the Coningsby Wing had been moved to Cottesmore they retained the original 3 Gp Station Entry Point over the Lake District.

Pontius Navigator

10th Feb 2019, 11:49

Regarding the descent paths from GDP to station Entry Point to overhead, a question about Gee on another thread prompted a memory. Prior to 1964 the bombers were equipped with Gee 3. Given the local range of Gee it was SOP to switch it off at TOC and back on at TOD.

This is where the EP to overhead came in. The descent track was aligned with a Gee lattice line that enabled very accurate navigation to the overhead and a correspondingly small safety height area. Cross track lines gave accurate distance to go enabling a very accurate descent profile.

Gee was replaced with Tacan in 1964 and I think I only every flew in a Gee equipped Vulcan on one or two trips. Our 'guest' plotter on the OCU (Wg Cdr King) said it wasn't a proper without Gee.

ian16th

11th Feb 2019, 09:57

The Valiant's had a stripped down version of Gee-H, with the 'H' bit removed!

Barksdale Boy

11th Feb 2019, 12:08

PN
Before my time on MBF, but i remember something similar at Nav School - along and across track?

Blacksheep

11th Feb 2019, 12:30

I would have thought three or four days without a 02 was quite rare.During my time ('66 - '69) I don't recall ever having to roll the tyres on QRA, but a seven day limit would sound right. We hardly went more than three days without a 02. As to the combat spare, while Waddington was still converting from B1A to B2 there would be a mixture of B2s and B1As on the QRA dispersal. We never used it while I was on QRA but I would imagine that if a B2 went U/S you could almost guarantee the spare would be a B1A and vice-versa. SNAFU as they say. ;)

Pontius Navigator

11th Feb 2019, 12:32

PN
Before my time on MBF, but i remember something similar at Nav School - along and across track?
Yes, in a way using GPI 4.

At Nav School we had two Gee homing exercises. One on the Varsity IIRC which was fairly gentle and a relief from the intensive log and chart work. The second was on the Meteor which was 'interesting'.

It was a triangular route with the first two legs being along straight Gee lines. The 3rd leg of the triangle led back to the descent point. This was not a straight track but one with a steadily tightening curve. If you pulled inside the track a gentle reduction of bank and we would slide back on to track.

If however you slipped outside the curve you could eventually end up on a 90 degree bank and still not get there as one stude found out.

Pontius Navigator

11th Feb 2019, 13:09

BS, I think flat tyres was a particular issue with the Blue Steel. It also happened about 1965 at Cottesmore. We had a period of over 10 days when engine starts were prohibited, I think there had been a starter fire.

I can't remember details but I think the fleet was grounded. Anyway the effect was all Start Engines or 02 were cancelled. The Bomber Controller went one further and cancelled 05 too.

Crews got increasingly twitchy as the time since the previous alert increased and we didn't have the pressure relief of a call out.

We told the controller that there was not a problem for cockpit readiness and so random alerts were called again.

Waddo Liney

3rd Mar 2019, 17:00

New book announcement
I am pleased announce that the print and ebook versions of my new book, 'Vulcan On The Line' is now available on that well-known website that begins with "A" and ends with "n". The book is written from the point of view of ground crew members on the Flight Line, mostly at RAF Waddington, during the Cold War days (including the Cuban Missile Crisis). I invite one and all to visit the above hinted-at website and type in the book title for a preview.

macwood

18th Apr 2019, 09:30

Ref the rear crew scape.
A crew chief mate (Vince Braithwaite) designed a simple mod that would isolate the nosewheel retract system.
Seemed a good idea at the time having just lost 2 chiefs at Luqa.
Vince /Lynn has departed- avoiding the nose gear...RIP

Barksdale Boy

18th Apr 2019, 11:22

Mac

How did that "simple mod" work? It was good to see you in HK some twenty-odd years ago. I can't believe that you are 85! RW.

Pontius Navigator

18th Apr 2019, 12:34

Mac

How did that "simple mod" work? It was good to see you in HK some twenty-odd years ago. I can't believe that you are 85! RW.
Not sure what benefit, as stated, that that would have given. We didn't need to isolate the retraction, we needed to get the wheel up.

I know that once it was blown down there was no possibility of retraction and I am not sure the state of the undercarriage at Luqa. Certainly as he intended to land he would not have wanted to retract it first. It really was one of those impossible situations.

I don't recall the detail but didn't he think the aircraft could be landed successfully?

Barksdale Boy

18th Apr 2019, 13:24

I seem to remember that, perhaps in part, it was the cross-wind that did for them.

Pontius Navigator

18th Apr 2019, 14:42

I presume you meant on the first landing, very firm, massive fuel leak, visual circuit, and catastrophic fire. They hadn't realised the damage from that landing.

Same predicament as the Cottesmore crash with no reaction time at all.

Timelord

18th Apr 2019, 15:15

And an 18 inch (?) lip on the end of the runway.

Pontius Navigator

18th Apr 2019, 17:23

TL, thanks, we had in incident at Luqa in the 60s too. Landed, starboard main, IIRC, jammed, tyre worn to rim, and rim worn down too. We dug a deep gouge in their brand new runway. They said the captain must have had his foot on the brake because of rudder application in the cross wind. Wrong foot so it wasn't feet on pedals.

Wheel was so worn that we could not get the boggie Jack on. Then we found they only had two main jacks (or Jack heads) on the island. We finished up with the port wing tip practically on the ground.

Pontius Navigator

18th Apr 2019, 18:04

Timelord, there is another thread running elsewhere so I googled and found this:

https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20051017/local/vulcan-crash-at-zabbar-was-avoidable.74993

Seems very interesting.

bjacko

7th Jul 2019, 07:20

I along with most of the Avro staff at Woodford were witness to the most spectacular display by two Vulcans. They were practising for the Farnborough show in 1960 or maybe 1959. They took off simultaneousley one form each end of the runway then climbed underside to underside vertically before rolling over over the end of the runway they started from. Later we learned that the Farnborough people would not have a bar of it! It was a very strange feeling watching it especially when they were heading for a head on meeting on the runway.

bjacko

8th Jul 2019, 06:07

A Vulcan once broke the sound barrier (no doubt accidently!) at Woodford while on a company test flight and smashed most of the windows in the greenhouses at a Poynton nursery.
I was assigned to XA893 for 3 months at the Experimental section at Woodford and we had the MK2 AC system fitted as an extra system with a huge bank of resistors etc in the bomb bay. It did not fly very often but it used to ground run for days on end and when the tail was towards the airfield centre it blew a huge hole in the ground which used to fill with water until the next ground run and it would empty the pond. It left a massive arc of brown mud from the pond on to the grass. One day with the tail towards the farm the postman came down the back road into the airport on his bicycle and the cockpit was advised to reduce power but he got caught and he his bike and the mail got blown about! Never knew what hit him but he was not hurt. The CSD units were fitted up the walls in the engine bays and pigs to replace. Didn't help with engine changes either. Towing the aircraft up the hill from the hangar we had to walk behind with chocks behind the main wheels because of the snow/ice.
When the first set of ECM was fitted, to a MK1, they decided to test it in the middle of the Woodford airfield and all the radio, radar, TV etc went off air for miles around including Manchester Airport. The press put it down to a sun spot!
I see someone in a post above says the Tony Blackman book was a good book. Pity about all the mistakes in it and his display of stupidity in demonstrating the 748 in South America bragging about flying in adverse weather when the locals had more sense, and how clever he was to get through it. That is why Airline pilots get more pay!
He was also a "cowboy" at Farnborough telling his crew after watching the Victor demo "we will show them a real demo".
One day he took XA892, I think it was, on test and a hydraulic line broke in the bomb bay and he lost hydraulics, so elected to land at Boscombe. He had reecntly got married so 'borrowed" an Anson to get back home. He arrived at knock off time and taxied the Anson down between the hangars scattering everyone who was walking to the car park.

Hughb

1st Apr 2020, 15:46

My father Squadron Leader Brian Butterworth flew XL318 at the Glenview Airshow in 1964.

Petet

24th Aug 2020, 12:57

A question on squadron based training ..... 1960s to 1980s (if I may)

Was training solely based around the BTR Scheme (or its predecessor) or was additional continuation / operational training carried out in parallel?. If it was the latter, what sort of training was classified as Continuation Training and what sort of training was classified as Operational Training?

Any help would be much appreciated

Regards

PeteT

Timelord

24th Aug 2020, 14:51

In my time (1973-79) the BTR scheme ruled pretty much every trip. I’m trying hard to think of anything we did that wasn’t dictated by ticking BTR boxes but can only think of some dedicated Co-pilot upgrade trips (ICC
?) that we rear crew had to endure. Of course we did Group exercises where the sortie content was tasked externally but we still ticked off the BTRs we had achieved afterwards.

Pontius Navigator

24th Aug 2020, 15:57

Time Lord has answered the question in a different way from What I thought. As far as training in flying he is correct. A sortie was put together by the plotter to meet the requirements of each crew member, a low level route, a number of attacks, fighter affiliation ,time for pilot training etc.

I would answer differently and consider ground training. Operational training was very much an individual crew thing and quite separate from BTRs. Target study was one hour per target per month. Crews were subject to no notice examination by wing staff using a Command authored questionnaire every 6 months and potentially for every target. Prificiency and safe handling of nuclear weapons was tested annually by an MOD Team that would examine all aircrew charged with nuclear weapons safety. Weapons engineers and security staff were also checked. The responsibility for on-sqn training for this was vested in a Wing Train ing Officer. Then each crew woukd be checked annually by a Group Standards Unit. Sqns were responsible for ground training programmes to meet the rigourus examination here. This was done through regular ground training sessions by leaders in the sqn.

Whilst the standardised aka 'the Trappers' were generally feared their searching questions were also intended to impart updated knowledge.

A crew failure with either weapons checks or aircrew standards could reflect badly on the San execs.

As an aside,a question that produced a WTF response was "how often does the R88 camera take a (radar) picture on a bombing run?"
7.5 seconds - correct.
"looking at the film you notice that the picture interval is not every 7.5 seconds why? "
"The camera firing pulse used the same 28b J-line as the Scan Tilt Up command"

Apart from the FFS response the reason for the question was because someone had reported a fault.

Timelord

24th Aug 2020, 16:45

PN,all true of course. I was just talking about flying. Not sure what Petet is interested in. WST was, of course, an absolute joy!

Pontius Navigator

24th Aug 2020, 18:02

PN,all true of course. I was just talking about flying. Not sure what Petet is interested in. WST was, of course, an absolute joy!
Yes, it was, after a week in Malta followed by one in Germany I had a week in Cyprus. But we were just approaching our block leave period and I had 6 weeks leave with our next examination in Cyprus. I told my boss I would stay in Cyprus. Rules being rules I had LOA while on my 6 weeks leave, stayed with a friend on 9 and borrowed a flat in Kyrenia from a previous acquaintance at the hospital. I met the future Mrs PN and had 5 weeks holiday before becoming engaged the following year. :)

Petet

24th Aug 2020, 22:26

Thanks for the responses.

I am trying to find a way of summarising "squadron" activity throughout the year. I currently have the following, which you may like to adapt (as I would like to get it right).

Ground Training
Flying Training in accordance with the Basic Training Requirement [BTR] Scheme
Airborne Checks and Classifications
Crew / Squadron / Station / Group Exercises documented in the Record Book during the year included:

This is then followed by the activities recorded in the Record Book such as Station Exercises, Air Defence Exercises, Rangers, Bombing Competitions, Displays / Flypasts etc etc

Barksdale Boy

25th Aug 2020, 00:30

PN

Try as I may, I do not recall 6-monthly checks by wing staff (even yourself!) on specific targets.

Pontius Navigator

25th Aug 2020, 07:09

BB, combat rules, you just might have been lucky. No notice check and if only 2 crew members present they still got all the questions to answer. I remember one uncomfortable interrogation by Joe Sievright, I just did not understand the question "how would you get to your target"

Few wing staff took that responsibility seriously. It was certainly mandated. Jock McColl was more interested in golf. Joe Quinn didn't get involved. Bill Cooper did until he managed to lose the responsibility. Dick Emerson and John Stanley didn't know there was a Vault. Spike Hughes was too busy doing his multiple secondary duties and his replacement, Digger Booth just kept his head down.

In Cyprus we still did target study and had two or three keen wing staff. IIRC we only covered 3 targets as there was no QRA and no sqn detachment plan.

Barksdale Boy

25th Aug 2020, 08:24

Bill Cooper was a very good O/C BNS, as was his successor, Ian Topping, and his, Gordon MacLachlan, - you felt that they were on your side.

Timelord

25th Aug 2020, 09:36

Petet:

PN has summarised the ground training which included:
Target study,
Intelligence reading and study,
Weapons Standardisation (Nuclear weapon knowledge and procedures both academic quizes, training / tests on a rig and actual procedures around a real aircraft)
Aircraft systems knowledge - examined both airborne and academically by the Group Standardisation Unit

Any and all of the above was additionally examined by external and NATO examiners during the roughly annual Taceval process.

Flying was largely driven by BTR requirements but since you ask about a typical year, and since I am bored at the moment and have my logbook to hand here is 1976 flying:

January BTR + Double Top (Bombing Comp ) training. this, of course counted towards BTRs
Feb More Double Top training, some of which was flown from Bedford during a dispersal exercise (Index)
March Double Top training
April BTR + Ranger to Malta including 2 Italian low level routes, again, counting towards BTRs
May BTR + Ex Scorer ( Group sponsored I think, including BTRs Low level route, 2 x LL targets, EW run and First Run Attack on a UK range)
June BTRs including another Bedford dispersal and fly off
July BTR + 3 Co pilot ICC trips. I must have offended someone that month!
Aug BTRs at Goose Bay
Sept BTRs including Ex Blue Moon (Can't remember what that was)
Oct Goose and Offutt ranger -including 3 low level trips - all counting to BTRs
Nov BTR
Dec BTRs, Convex training on posting to a new Sqn and Crew.

So, to summarise, Some flying crew planned to achieve BTRs, some flying externally directed (exercises, rangers etc) but still designed to achieve BTR.
The crew classification scheme can perhaps wait for another day.
What is the interest petet, writing a book or just curious??

TL
PS. Sorry AEOs, I forgot EW training. Trying to identify various squeaks and groans heard on the warning receiver as given radars and systems (Fiddler, Big Nose Ash!!) You guessed it, this too was a BTR!

Pontius Navigator

25th Aug 2020, 11:41

TL, he has a website for 35 Sqn.

Pontius Navigator

25th Aug 2020, 12:33

Bill Cooper was a very good O/C BNS, as was his successor, Ian Topping, and his, Gordon MacLachlan, - you felt that they were on your side.
Ah yes, Ian T. He was an instructor at Lindholme. Interesting tale about first night dates but I won't spill the beans so to say.
He next tour was at a NATO HQ in Denmark. That of course in the days when the RAF would be wearing blues when crisped and no tin hats. Come exercises the Germans would run around with coal scuttles. One said "Why do you British not wear helmets?"

Tapping his head, Ian said "We British have thicker skulls, that is why we won the war."

Pontius Navigator

25th Aug 2020, 12:55

A problem with sortie planning, especially at Cottesmore was the aircraft fit would drive the sortie plan often causing a complete replan after a late aircraft change. A full 'standard ' training sortie with high and low level navigation and bombing might suddenly have to be changed to accommodate a mandatory ECM monitor run at 112AT Stornaway. As this was essential to the operational mission it overrode everything else. Or the aircraft might be loaded with 100lb Practice Bombs and a mandatory T4 bombsight calibration sortie, again secondary operational necessity. Worse was being given a fatigue limited aircraft necessitating cancellation of a planned low level trip.

With the change to low level operations aircraft fatigue became a major problem. Fatigue management centred around controlling fatigue life consumption until the next major service. Fatigue meters were fitted in the rear cockpit and G readings recorded after every flight. From memory any G was clicked off against letters A to H on the meter. A was a very small amount of G and could click up quite merrily. For G you might not even get one count in a sortie. I remember one flight over a Greek island where we hit a standing wave and there was a real crunch. We clocked an H count or two and I think the aircraft had to be checked out.

Petet

25th Aug 2020, 13:55

Timelord

As PN says, I am in the process of documenting the history of No 35 Squadron (1916-1982) [non-commercial / educational project] so that it can be preserved for future generations. It's a labour of love, driven by the fact that my partner's grandfather was lost whilst serving with the squadron in 1945.

I update the website (currently about 1500 pages) as and when I can (and I provide families with details about their relative's service with the squadron) ...... at the moment I am trying to drill down on the post war era, learning as I go along, so help from forums such as this are invaluable.

If I can get the "generic" headings correct, it makes it easier to drill down, and, more importantly, it ensures that I get the history documented correctly, hence my earlier question

Regards

PeteT

Timelord

25th Aug 2020, 15:35

Good luck. I was never on 35 but happy to help if I can. (50 and 44 1974-79)

TL

Petet

25th Aug 2020, 16:28

Based on feedback, the Activity section on my 1982 page now reads as follows (although I am not sure targets were relevant at this point in time)

Aircrew Training Programme

Ground Training Programme (including subjects such as Targets, Intelligence, Weapons and Aircraft Systems)
Flying Training Programme (in accordance with the Basic Training Requirement [BTR] Scheme)
Ground / Airborne Checks and Classifications

Flying Activities documented in the Record Book during the year included:

Rangers
Navigation / Bombing Competitions

Red Flag 82-2 (January / February 1982)

Note: In support of the above, engineering personnel (who were on strength of the squadron and who continued to receive training in their designated trade) carried out (a) operational ground activities and (b) first-line rectification of faults, on a day to day basis

Am I heading in the right direction?

(It is worth noting that the squadron disbanded in February 1982, hence the lack of flying activity)

NRU74

25th Aug 2020, 20:19

Flying Training Programme (in accordance with the Basic Training Requirement [BTR] Scheme)

Not sure I’ve read the whole thread but I’d never heard of BTR. I was on and off V Force from ‘63 to ‘81 but not on Vulcans and not on ‘bombers’. I remember having to get ‘ticks on boards’ but it didn’t seem very rigorous on PR or on Tankers. We had to do the equivalent of Target Study but that often involved playing cards in the ‘vault’.

Pontius Navigator

25th Aug 2020, 21:34

BUT a replaced the Classification scheme in the late 60s. As its name implies, it was supposed to be the minimum events to maintain crew proficiency. It was a one size fits all approach. The previous scheme was based on an average of 300 hours per crew per year but ranged from 320 for a new crew to 240 for a Select Star crew. Many of the latter's hours could be overseas rangers. In contrast the BTR set out the same number of navex, bomb runs, approaches of each type.

As with the previous scheme combat grades were largely dependent on bombing results.

A failure of the BTR system, and it was not confined to the V-Force, was the need to tick all the boxes by the end of the 6 month period. If for instance the requirement was 6 ILS approaches logic would suggest one per month. If at month 5 you were 3 short what as the benefit of squeezing in 3 more when basic requirements were one a month?

Other aspects on the ground training side would cover egress drills, fighter drills, para landing drills, annual refresher training and annual combat survival exercise.

Of these latter we were a precious resource and our fitness could not be jeopardized by risky exercises. Our CS at Cottesmore was a day out, construction of a shelter, and cooking on a fire. The Sqn was bused to Folkingham airfield and we got out with a rat pack, parachute and some bits and pieces. We were in a,partially wooded area of an over grown bomb dump. After a by The of foraging we got a suitable pitch, created a suspension para teepee, found an old radio crate, found some coke, and soon had a good cooking fire going. At endex we cleaned camp. The following year we reclaimed our pitch, 30 minutes later we had the radio crate cooker back in use. I wonder if it's still there.

Petet

20th Oct 2020, 14:11

Does anyone have a photograph of the Bristol Siddeley Trophy.

I have photographs of it being handed over to 35 Squadron (1975 to 1977) but I don't have one showing the trophy detail

Can anyone help?

Petet

19th Jan 2021, 22:06

Can anyone enlighten me on why "in-flight" refuelling training was introduced in May 1964?. Was it linked to the introduction of low level attacks in February 1964 or was it for other reason(s), or was it ..... just because

Any help would be much appreciated

Regards

PeteT

Pontius Navigator

20th Jan 2021, 08:50

Pete, short answer, it wasn't introduced in Feb 64. Flight refuelling was introduced much much earlier with record breaking flights to Africa and Australia. There had also been trials for airborne alert.

The reason for introducing inflight refuelling to the Vulcan Mk 2 force and specifically the Coningsby Wing was for the Far East reinforcement role. The V-Force had two reinforcement operations: the Near East where two squadrons would be based at RAF Luqa, and initially this was assigned to the Waddington Wing and the Far East where it was assigned to the Cottesmore/Honington Wing.
In Malta a purpose build apron was built. At Tengah two purpose built sqn complexes were built.
The Far East plan required the rapid reinforcement by two sqns of 16 aircraft. Flight refuelling offered the opportunity to deploy the two squadrons in 24 to 48 hours. It would require the Valiant tanker force to deploy and set up the route with tankers at El Adem, Khormaksar and Gan. I don't know how many tankers would be required but they would have been on a continuous rotation to meet the bombers. The Coningsby Wing assumed the role in September 1964 before it had worked up to an IOC. The grounding of the Valiants put an end to the Valiant/Vulcan training. In April 1965 the Cottesmore Wing deployed 2 squadrons via Akrotiri, Bahrein (I think) and Gan without flight refueling.
The Victor K1 limitations precluded a similar operation and the planned draw down from East of Suez ended the need.
The grounding of the Valiants, the planned withdrawal of the Victor and the withdrawal of the Mk 1a Vulcans reduced the UK contribution to SACEURs nuclear arsenal and the Government (Harold Wilson) was under pressure not to reduce our contribution further be having a permanent detachment in the Far East.

Petet

20th Jan 2021, 10:21

Thanks, as always, for your comprehensive response. In terms of timings, I should have said why did 35 Squadron start in-flight refuelling training in May 1964 .... but your post explains that quite clearly, so I have got the information I need.

Going back to some of our previous discussions, I am still struggling to establish when BTR was formally introduced and whether there was a name / term for its forerunner .... but I am still working on that one

It all keeps me out of mischief!.

Petet

3rd Oct 2021, 15:56

In late 1964 / early 1965, the Flight Simulator Instructor at Cottesmore appears to have flown 3 operational sorties with No 35 Squadron. Does anyone know if this was normal practice (or does anyone have any thoughts / comments on the matter)

Regards

PeteT

Pontius Navigator

3rd Oct 2021, 16:05

Do you have a name?

I think at that time the Sim Instructors were qualified Vulcan pilots though around then things were changing. Pilots not deemed suitable for a Captaincy were posted away from the V-Force and similarly end of Service pilots might be posted in to the Sim slots.

Petet

3rd Oct 2021, 16:14

He was a qualified Vulcan Pilot with 83 Squadron prior to the posting to Cottesmore as Instructor .... as I say he (Conway) then appears in the 35 Squadron ORBs as 2nd Pilot (possibly as a fill in over the New Year period???)

Pontius Navigator

3rd Oct 2021, 16:27

Going back to some of our previous discussions, I am still struggling to establish when BTR was formally introduced and whether there was a name / term for its forerunner .... but I am still working on that one

It all keeps me out of mischief!.

Looking at my Log Book I was Select Star on the 31st Dec 65. My next rating was Combat on 1st Jul 66 and Senior on 1st Jan 67. I think it safe to say that the new system of BTR was introduced on 1st Jan 66. A similar progression was true on my 2nd tour where we were Combat at the end of the first 6 months. There was certainly a name for the system before BTRs but I have no record of it.

The training criteria was similar between the two systems with each crew member required to complete a number of evolutions in that period. Some were not logical.

Of the bombing stats, which of course concerned my directly, the early system was based on a 50% score from a minimum number of attacks. If you failed to get, say, 2 out of 4 inside the 50% accuracy you simply continued and dropped a few more to correct that.

Under the new system you still had an accuracy level but one not based on 50% but a specific number within the zone. For instance it might be 6 out of 8 within 400 yards. Now if you got 2 out followed by 6 in that was sufficient. However if you got only 6 out of 9 you had to continue until you had a 6 out or 8 tally. One crew in Cyprus wee determined to achieve Command status (they did in the end) but had to make some 16 attacks to get the magic sequence. That rather defeated but the BTR and the Command system.

The early system was based around an annual allowance of 300 hours but new crews could expect to get extra sorties to around 320 and the Select Star crews maybe 280 or less. Under the BTR system it followed that the minimum continuation training requirement, say one simulated double engine failure after take-off (DEFATO) had to be done by all crews regardless of experience. Hours were therefore allocated equally.

Pontius Navigator

3rd Oct 2021, 16:29

Petet

5th Oct 2021, 09:56

That might have been Barry. Grabbing hours of keeping current was not unknown then.

Thanks, as always, for your interest

This is the information sent by the original enquirer on the 35 Squadron Facebook Page "Does anyone know anything about my father, Flt Lt Louis Bernard James (Jim) Conway? We moved to Cottesmore in 1964, were there for 2-3 years. I believe he was involved with the Vulcan simulator?".

Subsequent information provided by the enquirer via a PM states that he served as a Captain on 83 Squadron prior to the posting to Cottesmore

Beamr

30th Oct 2021, 09:42

I've spent best part of my spare time of the past weeks reading through the thread, absolutely fascinating.
Would I be pushing buttons by asking what was the story behind XL390 accident that was so heatedly debated 15 years ago on this thread?
I've exhausted my interweb search skills trying to find the final chapter but to no avail.
Would anyone in the know be willing to shed some light on this? I believe that the 30 year mark passed us 13 years ago.

megan

30th Oct 2021, 13:10

Crashed during an air display. The crash occurred after a possible stall at around 400 ft (120 m), during a wing-over. The plane crashed into a landfill just north of Willow Road to avoid surrounding residential areas. Photo of the aircraft at Glenview a few moments prior to the crash. Another discussion.

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/125259-vulcan-xl390-12-august-1978-glenview-nas.html

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1342/19780811_vulc_xl390_1510_f1ff46d4487952a5aaaf5afb991506b4fcb 1d012.jpg

Beamr

30th Oct 2021, 13:36

Thank you megan, actually I did read that thread earlier but it did not enlighten any more than the apparent stall.
What led to the stall and what were the findings of the (inevitable) investigation are the questions puzzling me (as were apparently the core of the debate years ago).

Edit: to give reasoning for my query to those that have not read or have forgotten what was discussed in this topic in 2006, there was a lot of debate on this thread of the accident, but many stated that they will not open the case any further until 30 years have passed since the accident. It's been 43 years now, and I am kindly asking if more details may be told now.

Timelord

30th Oct 2021, 16:54

I was a Nav Radar on a Waddington squadron at the time, and our crew did the Chicago display the next year. I think it is uncontroversial to say that the rules for selecting, training and supervising display pilots at that time were a lot less rigorous than they are now, and were tightened up partly as a result of this accident. This crew had the Squadron Commander as the Nav Plotter. The aircraft was based at NAS Glenview but the display was over the water in front of downtown Chicago. They flew the display with a four man crew whilst the plotter (Sqn Cdr ) went to the display site. For whatever reason the crew elected to do an impromptu display at Glenview before proceeding to the display proper. It went horribly wrong during a wing over and a rate of descent developed that meant they could not recover.

I believe that the Board also highlighted possible fatigue as a result of their Scampton - Glenview itinerary. As a result we had a very leisurely time the next year. Everyone we met spoke extremely highly of the deceased crew and there was a memorial plaque in base ops.

Beamr

30th Oct 2021, 17:35

Timelord, thank you for the explanation.
Was it ever established what caused the stall at wing over? I read somewhere a speculation that two engines may have been on idle and turning towards powered engines caused the descent.

And I want to emphasize that I am in no way looking for anyone to blame. I would just plain and simply like to understand what happened.
I have no malicious intent.

Yellow Sun

30th Oct 2021, 18:39

Beamr,

I had left the Vulcan force when this accident occurred, but I knew the captain well. It happened a long way away with little resource on site for some time. I would not for a moment suggest that the investigation was in any way cursory but it was hampered by the time delay in getting RAF investigators to the scene. Factor in that this occurred nearly 50 years ago, investigation techniques were less well developed and that the aircraft carried no flight recorders and you will immediately see the difficulty in coming to a definitive conclusion.

As Timelord points out, this was an impromptu "display" and we cannot be entirely sure of the sequence of manoeuvres or the pilot's intentions. If you wish to try and understand how a large aircraft can be put in an unrecoverable situation in a display manoeuvre then I suggest that you read this report on the loss of Nimrod XV239 at Toronto (https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19950902-0) in 1995. However I must emphasise that there is no way of knowing if this bears any relation to what happened at Glenview. The answer in that case is that we shall never know as the evidence wasn't there at the time and certainly won't be found now.

YS

Beamr

31st Oct 2021, 02:37

Yellow sun, thank you for the answer, it is very much appreciated.

Commander Taco

31st Oct 2021, 03:07

Nimrod XV239 accident in Toronto. I was there that day and remember it well. Absolutely dreadful to witness.

Nimrod XV239

megan

31st Oct 2021, 03:27

Timelord, any idea why some posters on Pprune have been so trenchant in their demands that the XL390 accident not be discussed?
It's been 43 years now, and I am kindly asking if more details may be told nowThe record was to be released in 2008 I think it was, question is where to access it, Kew or DOD?

Beamr

31st Oct 2021, 06:56

Barksdale Boy

31st Oct 2021, 07:54

Megan
I think there were two main reasons: all the people that needed to know had been told; and out of respect for the family members of the dead.

Timelord

31st Oct 2021, 12:17

Megan, I think that what YS and I have posted is about all there is to know for sure. .Everything else is speculation, and that is a bad thing where fatalities and families are involved.

Beamr, Not sure about Vulcans ever “going vertical” ,and as for “ fast and low” , 415kts was the absolute airframe limit “ on a once only operational basis” . With the WE177 weapon all the releases were level releases at low level and escape was by continuing in a straight line! Would we have survived? Who knows. Did we care? Not really, because there would certainly be nothing left at home by then.

All the targets I ever saw had theoretical recovery bases but they would all certainly have been targeted by then so we never took that bit of the plan very seriously. The only way we would ever have reached a “comfortable tropical island” would be by heading West after take off rather than East!

Beamr

31st Oct 2021, 12:50

Thank you again Timelord, so it was a straight line escape.
I probably misunderstood a bit regarding the blue steel that it would've required a pitch up to separate the bugger properly from the ac?

I realize that the tropical island part was stated in a bit tongue in cheek (and a quick glimpse at the world map confirmed that), it just caused some chuckles to read of that cunning plan presented by another ppruner years ago.

On a more light note this story really made me laugh out loud (my bolding on the story)

All this talk of jettisoning canopies and stuff brought to mind Waddo in the mid 70's. Sat in the 50 Sqn crewroom probably "syphing on somebodies donk" when loud explosion type noise was heard from the direction of the threshold of RW 21. Flt Cdr Air's (Sqn Ldr John P******x) No 1 and 2 engines had just suffered catastrophic failure on run up to brakes off. Sh*t and flames every where. This has clearly got everyones attention, not to mention Fg Off Geoff D****n, the screen Nav Rad, who decided that this was definatley not for him and so he blew open the crew door and climbed out with the intention of "f*****g off in fine pitch" up wind of the pretty impressive conflagration which was rapidly getting more intense by the second. Only one small problem however, which was that he had forgotten to disconnect his umbilical cord (imbicile cord in his case) and so there is this hillarious picture of Geoff running into wind, pulling the largest parachute you have ever seen. His legs seemed to be doing 90kts IAS, body 1kt groundspeed ! Funniest thing I have ever seen! :{ Anyone know where the little wart is these days?

And 3 Putts again!

All in all, as stated, this thread is absolute gold, both in stories and knowledge shared by the ones in the know. It has existed for 18 years (who would've imagined it at the time?), but I hope it survives at least another 18 years for the next gen also to read, learn and laugh.
p.s. thank you for the mods for not deleting this over the XL390 dispute. :ok:

Barksdale Boy

31st Oct 2021, 13:02

Beamr
What you should know is that many of us enjoyed it enormously.

Beamr

31st Oct 2021, 13:44

I truly believe you sir, it comes across through the texts.

megan

1st Nov 2021, 03:24

all the people that needed to know had been told; and out of respect for the family members of the deadAn interesting approach to accident investigation, all accidents are just repeats of something that has happened previously, so perhaps don't publish the results of any of them, likewise where there are casualties, less publication upsets families. The fuss made unfortunately gives the impression that there was something untoward being hidden. Thank you both for your explanations.

Wader2

23rd Nov 2022, 21:14

I read also about different attack profiles (2H etc) and sneaking in fast and low, going vertical and release at whatever height. Then there were the crew specific unofficial escape plans which apparently varied from picking a suitable target to take with the ac to try and reach a comfortable tropical island. Officially I believe the instructions were to find a friendly country and contact air attaches et al in case there was nothing to return to (discomforting thought).
However, were there any preferred/proposed flight profiles with most likely chance to evade the blast after release? In a very short summary: V-force goes in fast and low, a bit of manoeveuring, climb and release and what next?
Or was it more a case of "every crew for themselves, best of luck boys"?
At the risk of repeating something, before the WE177 and the 2F lay down attack we had to drop the YS2 from a pop up manoeuvre. This procedure applied to Victor 1 and Vulcan 1/2 Freefall and Victor and Vulcan BS in unpowered release

The 2E was a low level approach, a popup at about 15 miles and a pushover to level flight at 11 000 feet. It was led refined than the 2H and in training crews often were level at 11 000 feet too early.

The Research Branch scientists devised the 2H for the Vulcan and BS unpowered release. The 2H involved a low level approach to a pull-up point at 350kts, a smooth rotation over 5 seconds, to a precise pitch angle with weapons release at 10 500 feet in the climb.

The distance of PUP to target varied depending on aircraft, engine and weapon. The Mk 1 had a pull-up at over 21 000 yards and the Mk 2/301 engine FF at 18 000 yards. Each type also had a precise pitch angle. I think the Mk 1a was 12 degrees and the Mk 2/301 was 14.

In training and trials release these were I readjusted with the Mk 2 PUP at 18 450 yards and 15 degrees. Release at 10 500 would give a detonation at 103 seconds from PUP.

Immediately after release on 2E or 2H all aircraft were to make a 140 degree turn at 1.75 g while climbing before wings level.

Planned egress routes to NATO territory would pass near specified RV points on the event of bailout. Typically there might be 2 points for any route. Crews were to get to within 1.5 km of the RV and remain there but could forage out to 5 km. In one particular country there were 10 such RV. That is all we were told.

Wader2

23rd Nov 2022, 21:25

The foregoing was the official procedure, especially as Mk 2 ballistic computer lower limit was 17 000 feet. The Mk 1 computer lower limit was 7 000 feet. Some Mk 1 crew used the ballistic computation and achieved much more accurate results in training though some reached the automatic bomb release point when they were too low, 8 900 feet or so.

Subsequent research years later (book due out next year) showed that research branch said that much lower release heights could enable weapons function and sufficient time for successful escape.

Two final points related to the previous post. To achieve the 15 degree pitch angle the attitude instrument was modified. And to achieve accurate timing for the rotation the Navs Plotter were issued with Lemania chronographs. It was not long after that Navs Rad were able to blag them too.

Beamr

24th Nov 2022, 09:33

Wader2; thank you very much for taking the time to explain this!

Immediately after release on 2E or 2H all aircraft were to make a 140 degree turn at 1.75 g while climbing before wings level.

Planned egress routes to NATO territory would pass near specified RV points on the event of bailout. Typically there might be 2 points for any route. Crews were to get to within 1.5 km of the RV and remain there but could forage out to 5 km. In one particular country there were 10 such RV. That is all we were told.

The foregoing was the official procedure, especially as Mk 2 ballistic computer lower limit was 17 000 feet. The Mk 1 computer lower limit was 7 000 feet. Some Mk 1 crew used the ballistic computation and achieved much more accurate results in training though some reached the automatic bomb release point when they were too low, 8 900 feet or so.

Subsequent research years later (book due out next year) showed that research branch said that much lower release heights could enable weapons function and sufficient time for successful escape.

Two final points related to the previous post. To achieve the 15 degree pitch angle the attitude instrument was modified. And to achieve accurate timing for the rotation the Navs Plotter were issued with Lemania chronographs. It was not long after that Navs Rad were able to blag them too.

Timelord

6th Sep 2023, 12:37

Many here will be sad to see that Eric Macey’s death was announced in today’s Times aged 87. He was my Stn Cdr when I was a first tour Nav Rad at Waddington and despite the fact that I served for many more years he remained my favourite Stn Cdr. The notice in the paper refers to “ all those who worked, laughed and played with him”.
Indeed.
RIP sir.

Chairborne 09.00hrs

6th Sep 2023, 16:35

Subsequent research years later (book due out next year)
.

Any update on the book, please?

Barksdale Boy

7th Sep 2023, 01:21

A similar thread is running on "Where are they now?"

clockman

25th Dec 2023, 11:57

I have photo of the 593 Vulcan Aircrew from Alan Baxter's book "Olympus The Inside Story" page 138, but not the later Aircrew for the RB199 FTB. please find!!

2AV8,

Apologies that this response is over 2 months old but I was researching something when I came across your posting.

I worked on XA903 in both OLY593 and RB199 configurations during the 70's as an engineer at the R-R Flight Test Centre at Filton. However, I regret that I don't have any photographs of the cockpit - mores the pity!

I assume you have tried the Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust at Bristol and, in particular, Alan Baxter (assuming he still takes an active role in things - you'll have to excuse me but I'm a little bit out of touch with things at the RRHT) who was the Flight Test Engineer most associated with XA903.

If I can be of any assistance please send me a PM and I will do the best I can. Thankfully, I am still in-touch with some of those remaining from the halycon flight testing days at Filton.

mbriscoe

6th Jan 2024, 10:46

The original ticking box was the WB400 then replaced by the WB1400 (http://www.ringbell.co.uk/ukwmo/Page213.htm)

mbriscoe

6th Jan 2024, 10:59

Former US president Richard Nixon ordered a worldwide secret nuclear alert in October 1969, calling his wartime tactic a "madman strategy" aimed at scaring the Soviets into forcing concessions from North Vietnam.

It didn't work.

SALT talks started in November 1969.

So you see, the US had barking mad idiots at the helm even then!

A book that I have, SIOP, described the procedure in the event of there being a nuclear alert. All new Presidents read it and signed to say that they had read but for the first time one (Clinton or Carter) said they have should a dummy run. On the alert the first available helicopter was sent to the White House to collect POTUS but was nearly shot down by the Marines who had not been warned.

I was in the Netherlands on a student exchange in 1968, our accommodation was on the bypass and I was awoken in the middle of the night by military convoys going past,

mbriscoe

6th Jan 2024, 11:10

Anyone interested in the Cold War might like this new bookBubbleheads, SEALs and Wizards (https://amzn.to/3NUjXap)America’s Scottish Bastion in the Cold WarDavid Mackay (https://www.whittlespublishing.com/David_Mackay)It starts with Project GENETRIX at RAF Evanton, the SSBNs in the Holy Loch, Kirknewton, Edzell, Thurso (Forss), ASW, Machriahanish etc.

Doctor Cruces

7th Jan 2024, 12:55

Looking at the US Mil flights into and out of PWK on a regular basis, there is still condiderable US interest in Scotland.

DogTailRed2

8th Jan 2024, 13:26

Don't want to drag this thread too far off topic but as I have a Vulcan question maybe it's sits here nicely rather than raise yet another Vulcan thread.

My question "What caused the Vulcan howl" ?

The reason I ask is that I never heard it with the shows I attended after it returned to the sky but always heard it during it's military displays and often when it was in the hold.
Best case in point one of it's last West Malling - Great Warbird Displays when it circled behind the crowd and seemed to be calling out like a lonely whale.

BEagle

8th Jan 2024, 14:03

The 'rutting dinosaur' howl was specific to aircraft with 200-ser engines, due to the intake geometry and occurred at particular combinations of power setting and speed. In normal operations, the howl would normally only be heard during 2-eng go-arounds until power was reduced to 93%. On 4-eng go-arounds we were only supposed to use 80%.... But out of sight of the grown ups it wasn't unknown for crews to fly a practice diversion to go-around, then climb out with all 4 at max chat. THAT caused a most satisfying howl! I once got the attention of most of Wichita doing that after a fly by at McConnell AFB!

300-ser engined aircraft had a larger compressor intake, so didn't howl. Hence '558 would howl, but '655 at Wellesbourne Mountford can ROAR, but not howl.

ex82watcher

8th Jan 2024, 22:53

Reading this thread caused me to remember an unpleasant encounter I had with a former Vulcan pilot almost 3 years ago.I was assisting my brother who was working on a friends house in Dorset,and part of the work involved installation of weatherboarding to the side wall of an ugly garage built from breeze-blocks,in order to render it more aesthetically pleasing.However,one wall of this building abutted the stone wall of the neighbouring property,and access to the top of the garage wall was only possible by leaning a ladder against this neighbours wall.The neighbour objected to this,and told my brother,who was at the top of the ladder,that he was going to get a hose pipe and start watering his bamboo hedge,the implication being that he was going to give my brother a soaking.
I told my friend for whom we were working,about this,and she said that he was rather obnoxious in several ways,and that he also liked to let it be known in the village,that he was a retired squadron leader and former Vulcan pilot,presumably thinking this would afford him some status in the community.
She told me his name,which I won't disclose,but I'm sure that some people on here will recognise him when I relate what I discovered after entering his name on google.
According to google,in 1975,while a Vulcan co-pilot,he attempted to land at Luqa,in Malta,and botched it big-time,pushed the undercarriage through the wing,but got airborne again,the aircraft then catching fire.According to google,he and the captain then ejected,leaving the 2 nav's,AEO and 2 crew-chiefs to crash and burn,along with one civilian on the ground.There is B&W news footage on the aftermath available on-line as well.Oddly enough,he omitted to mention this event when revealing his officer status to the locals.
However the following day,when he again began making complaints,about the ladder leaning against his wall,and stating that there were principles involved,and that we should have sought his permission before resting the ladder against his property,I asked loudly,of my friend standing nearby,"Fiona,do you think that the principle of a Captain going down with his ship is carried over into the world of aviation"?
There was a moment of silence from the neighbour,while he stared daggers at me,then he asked if I knew anything about aviation? I said "a bit",then he asked if I was a pilot? I said "maybe" ( which I was,though only a PPL,but also a retired ATCO).Then there was a pause,before he snarled " you were a bloody navigator,weren't you! I said nothing more to him,but ever since,I have referred to him as 'Squadron Leader Heavy-Landing'.

reynoldsno1

8th Jan 2024, 23:21

I watched that whole incident unfold as I was based at Luqa at the time - we knew something was amiss whilst the aircraft was on final. I know who you are talking about. He and the captain were hospitalised after their ejections. Shortly after being discharged the co-pilot was seen strutting aroud wearing his Martin Baker tie. It didn't go down well.
The rear crew couldn't get out of the aircraft as the nosewheel assembly had buckled and jammed the escape hatch. To be fair, the pilots ejected at the same time the fuel tank exploded and the starboard wing detached.

BEagle

8th Jan 2024, 23:38

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_%C5%BBabbar_Avro_Vulcan_crash

Timelord

9th Jan 2024, 07:46

I was a Nav Rad on a different Squadron at Waddington at the time and it says much that as my age advances and I have more and more trouble remembering names I have no problem bringing that individual to mind. Further to the Martin Baker Tie; The funeral for the rear crew was a big event in “Bomber County” and the subsequent wake equally big. This individual turned up at the wake wearing his Martin Baker tie! Several rear crew members, after a beer or two, gave him “advice” on his attitude and he was never seen around the V force again. I believe he went to Pumas.

Liffy 1M

9th Jan 2024, 13:14

There's further material on the crash of XM645 here. As with most aviation accidents, there was a combination of factors at play.
https://raf-luqa.weebly.com/xm645-crash-oct-75.html
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/the-vulcan-tragedy-over-zabbar-30-years-on.331187

Timelord

9th Jan 2024, 13:54

I think this has all been addressed somewhere earlier in this thread but neither of those reports cover two salient issues:
1. There was turbulence from the hangars when the wind was from a certain direction which caused the co-pilot to loose speed late on finals and land heavy and short.
2. There was an 18 inch lip on the end of the runway so as the aircraft rolled forward after the initial impact one main undercarriage leg (starboard I think) was ripped off. The aircraft then bounced heavily on the other leg which punctured fuel tanks and started a fire. By this time the Captain had full power on.

I’m not sure about the nose leg buckling and causing the door to jam. I don’t think it touched the ground but:
With 7 aboard plus luggage there was little room in the cabin to stow the ladder and it was speculated that it had been left on the door which impeded exit for the rear crew. Whether the pilots ejected or “were” ejected when the aircraft broke up was not, I think, determined.

pulse1

9th Jan 2024, 16:51

Years ago I was at a business conference and got chatting to another attendee. It turned out that he had been a Vulcan pilot and I said that he seemed a bit young to be an ex RAF pilot. He told me that, when people asked where he was when he heard that Kennedy had been shot, he would never forget. He was at 40,000' over Liverpool and just after the news came over the radio, an engine fire alarm went off. An engine was on fire and had to be shut down and this was successfully carried out. The captain decided to return to base even though the weather was now below limits. They started an approach (presumably PAR) and at about 1000' they had another fire alarm and had to shut down a second engine while maintaining the approach. After a successful landing, he went straight into the boss's office and resigned his commission.

I have no idea if this story is true but I wondered if, on a thread designed to attract Vulcan crews, someone might remember an occasion when a Vulcan crew had such an adventure resulting in the resignation of a co-pilot. You never know he might even be here himself.

Timelord

9th Jan 2024, 17:02

Hmm, sounds a bit dubious. The news of Kennedy’s death came through on a Friday evening so everyone would have been in Happy Hour. If you had an engine fire over Liverpool I’m not sure you’d take it back to base but divert somewhere and finally if a double engine fire warning, which while not routine was not exactly unheard of, followed by a safe landing caused him to quit on the spot then he certainly didn’t have the right stuff.!

Mind you, I might have gone into the boss and said I’m not flying with that captain again; engine fire and presses on to base where the weather is terrible?