There is power in numbers. If everyone following this thread would ask their friends and family to sign, the petition would quickly pass 5000 signatures.

Thank you.

The Rescue Operation & a Question
 

I just posted my notes on the rescue operation. To me, it seems to have been more of a recovery than a rescue. For example, there was no crew to put out the fire, and the foam and water hadn't been re-stocked since the simulation a few days previous. In fact, I was assured that the rescuers treated the bodies of the victims very well.

I truly hope no one is learning about this for the first time via this thread or the petition site. If you are, please accept my apologies for this post.

My question is: what is the standard for an international airport? Please advise.

International Standards and Recommended Practices Volume I Aerodrome Design and Operations

To summarize, an airport must meet a Rescue and Fire Fighting standard based on the fuselage size of the aircraft. Based on the size of the MD-82, HKT is Category 7 minimum. (Where 10 is max.) Here’s the chart: http://www.geocities.com/profemery/aviation/ARFF.htm

Here are some of the ICAO standards of Fire and Rescue obviously failed in the rescue of OG269:
1)Insufficient foam and water due to training exercises 3 days before.
ICAO: Significant changes in the level of protection normally available at an aerodrome for rescue and fire fighting shall be notified to the appropriate air traffic services units and aeronautical information units to enable those units to provide the necessary information to arriving and departing aircraft. When such a change has been corrected, the above units shall be advised accordingly.
2)Massively insufficient firefighting personnel at the on-site fire station, necessitated crew and equipment arrive from town. Their arrival was 20 minutes after the crash – based on a best-case estimate.
ICAO: The operational objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding 3 minutes …. The ICAO standard for a category 7 airport is 2 fire and rescue vehicle. I do not believe the on-site fire station was staffed to man those vehicles.
ICAO: Any other vehicles required to deliver the amounts of extinguishing agents (specified in a chart) should arrive no more than one minute after the first responding vehicle(s) so as to provide continuous agent application.
3)Rescue call was identified as a non-emergency
ICAO: ICAO doesn’t seem to address the necessity to faithfully report the need for rescue.

Please let me know if this assessment looks right. If so, I'll post it to the petition site.

Thanks in advance.

Excellent,

Congrats for the good work InvestigateUdom, keep it up!.

Hate to deflate your sails as I agree with all the points raised very strongly. However, email or web petitions are not recognized as valid, only hard copy signatures can be accepted.:sad:

HotDog: Accepted by whom?

Everyone: Thanks for all your assistance and support. More happening right now. Will post when able.

The rescue and a synopsis are posted on the petition. Thank you for all those new signatures.

NTSB causes
 

Are there any examples of cases in which the NTSB documented glaring root causes of an incident?

For example in the case of OG269, a more accurate cause than "flight crew error" might be: "Systemic failures in oversight and airline management, safety and training leading to foreseeable flight crew errors."

Please advise.

Who is Grandmax Group Ltd?
 

The owner of HS-OMG (OG269) is Grandmax Group Ltd.
Does anyone know who they are?

Excellent. Was this an NTSB finding or another agency?
Thank you.

This report is from

So we will be breaking new ground with the NTSB. Excellent.
Thank you.

Just to clarify, when they said "diachronic" they meant "chronic". It is also a valid word, but just not idiomatic in English usage.

Track this one down from Transport Canada...

The F28 accident at Dryden, Ontario, in March 1989 is a good example of this model. Taken at face value, this was a clear cut case of pilot error. The immediate cause of the crash was the failure of the flight crew to obtain adequate protection against wing icing prior to departure. The inquiry yielded a 6 volume report; probably the most exhaustive air accident report ever. The conclusion:

"The accident was not the result of one cause but of a combination of several related factors. Had the system operated effectively, each of the factors might have been identified and corrected before it took on significance. This accident was the result of a failure in the air transportation system as a whole."

Got it. I'll post the letter once its written.

I missed Extreme P's post. Is that report available somewhere?
Thank you.

It's not actually an accident report but much more; Here is the introduction, and below, the ISBN information. The Report is not easy to find:

"This Final Report consists of three volumes: I (Parts One-Four), II (Part Five), and III (Parts Six-Nine and the General Appendices). The table of contents in each volume is complete for that volume and abbreviated for the other two volumes. Seven specialist studies prepared for this Commission ave been published separately in a volume entitled Technical Appendices; he contents of the Technical Appendices are given at the end of this volume."

ISBN # 0-660-14382-8 (Vol 1-3)

Here is the Table of Contents for Vol III, with partial listings for some chapters just to give you an idea:

PART SIX TRANSPORT CANADA

27 Organization
28 Conditions at Transport Canada in the Early 1980s
29 Economic Deregulation and Deficit Reduction
30 The Effects of Deregulation and Downsizing on Aviation Safety
31 Aviation Regulation: Resourcing Process.
32 Audit Program
33 Audit of AU; Ontario Inc., 1988
34 Operating Rules and Legislation :
35 Company Check Pilot .
36 Contracting Out, Waivers, and Spot Checks
37 Safety Management and the Transport Canada Organization

PART SEVEN HUMAN FACTORS
38 Crew Information
39 Crew Coordination and the Communication of Safety Concerns by Passengers
40 Human Performance: A System Analysis
The Fundamental Question
Human Factors
The Organizational Component
The Organizational Component
Lack of Operational Support from Air Canada .
The Potential Disruptive Impact of Mergers and Strikes
High Personnel Turnover Following the Merger
Lack of Organizational Experience in Jet Operations
Deficiencies in System Operations Control Practices
Lack of Standard Operating Procedures and Manuals for the F-28
Leadership of the F-28 Program
The Informal Culture at Air Ontario
Flight Attendant Training

PART EIGHT LEGAL AND OTHER ISSUES BEFORE THE COMMISSION
41 The Aviation Accident Investigation Process in Canada
42 Aviation Incident and Occurrence Reporting and the Issue of Pilot Confidentiality

PART NINE CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS

Thank you.

NTSB letter
 

Our letter to the NTSB is now posted.
As usual: www.InvestigateUdom.com "Press Information link"

Thank you.

Phuket runway strip
 

According to ICAO, a runway must be contained within a runway strip that is flat, firm and free of non-frangible obstructions. The runway strips must extend a minimum of 150m either side of the runway centreline and at least 60m beyond the end of the runway end (including any stopway).

I wonder if the embankment really is 150m from the centerline of 27. Does anyone know?

a single photo on google earth shows that the embankment is inside the 150 meters

We saw the same. Google earth is not always accurate (particularly if you aren't using the paid version). Any other thoughts on how to determine this? I don't suppose someone can run out there and measure? ;-)

Also, does anyone have a sense on whether this is a standard which is truly met at "category 1" airports?

Is someone able to label that image with the location of impact and/or where the aircraft came to a rest?

Any ideas on how to verify the distance from center line?

Here's a Google Earth picture of the runway. Maybe someone can mark this with the crash site:

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/e...__Lucan/og.jpg

I've more faith in Google's accuracy with horizontal rendering after reading on Google Earth's errors and algorithms. Just to be sure, I've posted the question directly to the folks at Google too.

If the "non-frangible" obstructions are within 150 m (as Google Earth suggests), Phuket airport runways 9 and 27:

1) Do not meet required ICAO standards
2) Played a significant part in the crash of OG269

Everyone: Thanks for all your help with the images and for helping us see this through.

(On a previous sub-topic: I'm rather pleased with the letter to the NTSB.)

PJ2: Would you be kind enough to add the 150m lines to both of your photos?

Thank you.

Parallel to the runway, along it's full length? Just wondering about accuracy, esp in the oblique view, (which isn't google). However, the runway width is 45m...

From the publicly-available photos, the first ground contact is on the other side of the large concrete drainage ditch from the runway, and the resting crash site straddles the ditch which runs parallel to and north of runway 27.

Didn't realize. (Graphics are not my strength.)

I'd like to end up with something marking the approximate crash location and the precise Google 150m line. The additional artwork and images are inessential, yet much appreciated.

My graphics work is lousy. I can't publish it. Looks like the runway strip to the right of 27 is clear of obstruction by less than 90m. The total runway clearance width isn't even 300m.

If someone can help with markers on the graphic, I'm very grateful.

(Since HKT has unusually high minimum visibility and increased minimum decision height, might this affect the ICAO standard on the airport? I couldn't find anything.)

Excellent. thank you.

image & Grandmax
 

The image is now posted. Thank you!

We've also learned the name of at least one owner of Grandmax Group, Lt, the owner of the aircraft. That's posted too.

In the Youtube video ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ewAQdvdDno ) of the crash scene, you can clearly see a "4" marker next to the runway at time index 0:40. This may help to pin-point the precise location of the crash:

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/e...n/AirCrash.jpg

150m...
 

Take a look at SAN - not 150m from the runway to nearby obstructions. I'd say it is not more than 50-60m from the runway centerline to Guatanamo St, Pacific Fwy etc...

ICAO played also a significant part in the crash of OG269. They strangely give an 8/10 to DCA in the surveillance obligations (2005 safety audit)
AuditReports1-CSA

So
http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b.../110634788.jpg

does anybody have information about the last 6 bodies found under the weackrage on 09-17-07?
Why did it take so a long time to find them?

1)does someone know the legal flight hours for a pilot in thailand?

2)does someone know rescuers of og269?

QI Yes.
Q2 No.