18 years flying bizjets, including all models of the Bombardier line, never flew without a computer flight plan. The odds of both engines flaming out at the same moment due to fuel exhaustion is approximately zero, dual flameouts are so rare this is actually a unique event in truest meaning of unique.

You’ve never heard the term “dusty tanks” for out of gas? Really? There was more fire than empty tanks would produce. Ever see video of planes without fuel crashing? Pretty much nothing except flying dust and debris, zero fire.

Any TOGW below 39,000#, you can cruise at F400, no problem. Just a flight plan, 800# payload, KRSW as ALTN, 0+45 holding and 2000# extra fuel. TOGW is 36,000#, ETE 2+09. Pretty close to what they would have flown.

unusable fuel in the 604 would produce that amount of fire.

Have you heard about the former ntsb inspector speaking out how the penny pinching by these types of operators is the cause of this accident?

A very sad accident with the loss of two very experienced Pilots.
A great feat for the Stewardess to quickly open the rear baggage hold door as the escape route for her passengers.


This accident below, which pretty much has gone under the radar, also almost made it down on a Freeway.
In 1971 a Paninternational Airlines BAC 1-11 515FB airliner D-ALAR made an Emergency Landing on the Hamburg-Kiel Autobahn when both engines failed within 90 seconds of take off from Hamburg Airport.
Shortly after takeoff from runway 34 at Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Airport, as the aircraft climbed to 1000 feet on it's way to Malaga Spain with 115 Passengers and 6 Crew, both of the Rolls Royce Spey jet engines failed and the Captain quickly decided his only choice was to make an emergency landing on the Bundesautobahn about 4.5 km from Hamburg Airport.
During the forced landing, on the southbound carriageway to avoid heavy traffic out of Hamburg, Captain Hüls was just able to avoid a collision with a nearby high-voltage line.
An oncoming couple in a Fiat 500 managed to scurry under the plane safely.
The unpowered BAC 1-11 crashed into the road near Quickborn at 150 knots and ten tons over its permitted landing weight.
The nose and right main landing gears collapsed, causing the aircraft to deflect to the left and collided with an overpass bridge and multiple concrete pillars.
The T-tail was sheared off.
The left wing struck an emergency telephone and the guard rails, the forward fuselage with the cockpit separated ending up in a ditch.
The rest of the fuselage skidded to a halt, initially remaining intact resting against an oak tree, but subsequently caught fire and burned out.
A Cabin Crew member and 21 passengers were killed in the crash, while all other 99 occupants escaped.

CRASH OF A BAC 111-515FB IN HAMBURG

Probable cause:
It was determined at the subsequent Investigation that the tank for the Water-Injection engine thrust-augmentation system (used to cool the engines to increase performance for the high maximum takeoff weight of 47 tonnes) was that the contents of five canisters had inadvertently been refilled with a mix of water and Jet A1 Kerosene fuel, instead of with all Demineralised Water.
Spraying this additional jet fuel into the engines caused them both to overheat and fail shortly after take-off.

Crash on the highway - In German - Use Google Translate for English


https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....5ed6cf5f36.jpg

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....4d1eddd7ec.jpg

If the collector tanks ran dry, on each side you would get multiple CAS messages:
MAIN EJECTOR FAIL (White)
FUEL LO PRESS (Amber) Which would bring on both
FUEL PUMP ON (Green), rapidly replaced by
FUEL PUMP (Amber) as it detected no output pressure.
So finally six messages, accompanied by multiple chimes from the Master Caution
It would then be around a further 30 seconds before the engines actually flamed out, as the fuel in the lines is drawn in.
After the engines flame out, it is another 10 seconds or so before you get the ENG OIL PRESS red message and associated voice warning.
Since none of these are mentioned in the report I think we can rule out fuel exhaustion.

See post on EICAS messages that would post if there was fuel exhaustion. Which is what my manual confirms. I haven’t flown the 605 is years, so went thru it and there would be at least six messages in addition to OIL PRESS LO. If you have a hard-on for 135 Florida ops, fair enough, but stick with facts.

Despite what you think, unusable fuel in a 604 would not be near enough to produce a fire capable of destroying the entire airframe. Theres only a couple dozen gallons at most.

If fuel exhausion is eliminated - Unsupported by EICAS messages and perhaps by fire size
and
If accidental shut off is eliminated - Proven design with millions of flight hours on various types including PF in right seat
what is left?

I'm actually not impressed by "never happened in millions of flight hours". I used to work on Design Assurance Level A aircraft systems for which the acceptable probablilty of catastrophic failure was 10^-9. That's 3 orders of magnitude less probable than never in a few million.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AC_25....0(10%E2%80%935).

Agreed on “one in a million” but I don’t think independent DAL Level A includes throttles or pilot interaction with throttles. After all, we have to shut off the engines on a variety of cases and we can’t preclude ****ting them off. The 767 hs had accidental in-flight shut downs by crews as has the Global during test where a clipboard “did it”. Guards were 8nstalled on the Hlobal and Boeing re-designed the engine control switches in the 757/767 family.

FADECs I’m familiar with include a rapid restart to provides a means of restarting, if the switch moves rapidly from RUN to OFF and back to RUN.

I have not handled these throttles or the shut off interlocks so genuine questions -

How many hands are needed to intentionally shut off one engine?
How many hands are needed to intentionally shut off both engines simultaneously?
Has it been verified that an arm placed in the worst possible position behind the thrust levers can lift the unlock levers (triggers?) if thrust levers pulled to idle position?

Yes, flight test sometimes reveals issues that no one had ever considered. We were close to starting cert demos for the 717 when the flight crew reported a spontaneous change in baro setting. It was confirmed by data review and had the potential for causing a major delay in the program. Fortunately there were cameras on the flight deck and it was shown that the baro set knob had been rotated by the Jepp plates binder as it was passed over the glareshield. Glareshield was extended to guard the knobs and cert completed on schedule.

One, One, it’s been demonstrated in a YouTube video that an arm behind the throttles can be placed to unlatch the releases, one or both. But, it was suspected and done in the sim, not in the plane.

Nothing to say the previous messages didn't display. Report might only have disclosed the last two.

Most likely yes but here is another question. If I recall correctly (CL601-3AS/SN 5003/1990-1999) the fuel shutoff red throttle located "paddles" would not allow a normal 0r abnormal engine shutdown if you activated either one of those levers before the actual throttle was actually positioned to the furthest aft travel as possible. If you pushed that lever prior the throttle would not allow further travel to cutoff. So if that is true the throttles would have been moved to full idle, then the accidental encounter with the left seat pilots arm as he reached to the flap handle, then the right seat guy pulled further on the throttles in an attempt to be at idle. Any active CL pilots comments?

There is a YT video of an Endeavor CRJ-900 shutdown showing the FO first shutting down the #1 engine with one hand, then shutting down the #2 engine with one hand. My impression watching that video is that it would not be much of a “stretch” to actuate both red shutdown switches with the fingers of one hand while simultaneously bridging the thrust lever knobs with the thumb of the same hand and pulling both engines to shutdown.

Regarding “has it been verified…,” many CRJ and Challenger pilots (so claimed) across multiple forums have stated it is possible. There is also a video short that can be accessed on PoA that demonstrates the scenario (still available, watched just moments ago).

Two posters have referenced a video showing an arm can release the shut off latches but no links were provided. Any chance a link can be provided to one, or both, videos? My searches do not find it/them.

My reference comes from a link contained in the Pilots of America topic on this accident. It is a link to an iCloud URL so I don’t want to post it here. I’d treat it as “click this link at your own risk.”

https://m.youtube.com/watch?si=e6IDt...ature=youtu.be

There is nothing good about a fatal crash except the lesson learned. It can be stated that pilots in the right seat do not often fly the plane from the right seat except 121 and maybe with some frequency 135. For the most part 91 ops switch seats. At EAL I flew right seat DC-9 for nearly 5 years. I would advocate a “must do” on, an occasion, is to operate a complete flight with the PF in the right seat if you can. One night departing TEB for London as we waited for the passengers i moved the left seat full aft. That’s where it failed and there was nothing we could do to move it forward. We flew the trip with PF in the right seat. What a significant diversion from our otherwise routine ops. So in this case a new to the aircraft pilot in the right seat. Nothing bad about that. Considering the total number of CF34 engines on Canadair’aircraft there is an extreme frequency of PF in the right seat especially with the Commuters. I would imagine at the 121 level, training and actual, there may be those that teach with a caution to this possibility. Seems real. I still believe you would need to have those levers “on the stops” to go further to shutdown, inadvertent or on purpose.

Being cleared to land, tight on base to final for a US slam dunk visual, ask for full flaps as you retard back to idle to get a speed change/trend under way.., easy to be back on the stops at same time an arm is in the way..

I would agree. You could go back to idle with those CF34's and expect to get the thrust you need, when you need it. Given you are on approach, lower to the ground, almost all the drag you can put out there with the final flap call you will soon need some power to stabilize it all. I go back to what I said. A lot less frequency of PF's in the right seat in that type of operation except there was a new guy. If this is what happened why was he not in the left seat or just let the left seat guy be the PF. I further thought about the likelihood that things like this and perhaps well known by the 121 guys that flew or fly the CRJ's, but not the 91 guys. No "pass-thru" of that sort of valuable knowledge. Or did Canadair or GE ever put out a warning on that. I still think its certain that those throttles had to be back to the stops, then the call for full flaps (or thereabout the time) then the arm goes across then, for what ever reason, the PF pulls back on both throttles without knowing he was already at idle.

Several references to US "slam dunk visual" but base for this approach was about 5 NM from threshold. The FAF for RNAV 23 is 4.8 NM out.

Just how far out would you want base leg to be on a visual in this aircraft type?

Depends what his status was in the company.. if he with his low time in type is restricted to the RHS per their 135 ops manual, then thats were he will sit and fly.. just because you are PIC rated in a 91 sense doesnt give you right to sit in the left seat for 135. In my 135 and previous EASA AOC ops, we dont allow F/Os to fly from left until more experienced, as there is no tiller in the RH so you as PIC cant do nuthin if they decide to clip a wing going in and out of crowded FBO ramps.. My experience is also many Captains feel very uncomfortable acting as PM from the Left.. with handover of controls and taking them back after landing on the roll out.

The N605TR accident report documents Bombardier’s approved circle-to-land procedure: 1.5 nm lateral from runway on downwind, 15-30 seconds past threshold (~1 nm) before beginning continuous base-to final turn. N823KD’s flight path was well outside the dimensions for a circle-to-land approach; i.e., 4 nm lateral from runway, 5 nm from threshold rolling out onto final. Bit of a stretch to characterize that as slam dunk.

I occasionally see 121 jets turning inside the FAF for visual approaches at my local airport. Don’t think they’re slam dunking.

The thrust levers definitely have to be at idle before the catches are lifted to shut down the engines. If you reach the stop with them already lifted even partially the balk is still there and you cannot reduce below idle. There have been cases on other types with a similar arrangement of the balk being so worn that it didn't work, but I have never heard of it on a Challenger. Of course CRJs do many, many more sectors in their life so the possibility of a worn out mechanism is greater.
Which brings us to the video posted above. We tried to duplicate this in a 604 sim, and even intentionally could not get the geometry to lift both catches at exactly the right time. It was extremely difficult to do even one, and that required a very unusual seating position for the PM to have their arm in the position shown in the video.

Thank you for that.

Ground running an L1011, after start the throttle was moved just a little, but the engine accelerated towards T/O power; the cut off switch worked fine; RR stated it could not happen, but some months later came back with the FFR strip report that a failure had allowed full throttle internally.
I recall the cut off switches are a simple design much like you would have found in 1960 car dashboards with a sprung forward position for extra cold start fuel flow the guards were simple too, 1/2 moon type fences.
I was surprised from above B J J entry, to learn the throttles need to be retarded so achieve cut off on this Challenger, fire handles are a lot slower in my circumstances.
What need was there for these larger switch paddles on the Challenger beats me!

So to summarize: If they had actually run out of fuel, it would have been obvious on the panel and on the FDR?
Re the setting of the thrust levers: I was harassed by the FAA over a plane in a field with the fuel valves turned off. I mentioned a few times that is part of the emergency landing checklist for that airplane, got the guy to sound the 1/2 full tanks, and he went away. Would this have been intentional by the pilots on "short final" to the road?

MAIN EJECTOR PUMP FAIL (L/R), FUEL BOOST ON (L/R), FUEL BOOST FAIL (L/R), all due to no fuel pressure, ie no fuel. Where exactly the sensors are located, I’m not sure. The chances of fuel exhaustion at the exact same moment are very small, the two OIL PRESS lights came on within one second of each other.

The EICAS indications are recorded in the FDR.

My experience on small jets was older Citations...The TLs had triggers mounted such that you pulled up on the trigger to move the TL in or out of cutoff...So you had to pull the TL all the way back to the stop for shutdown...I believe the Challenger "paddles" work the same way...They're not fuel shutoff switches like the BUS or levers like Boeing...So in the event of a stuck TL the only way to shutdown would be activating fire fighting stuff...B

Thanks 1southernman, that explains a lot, most aircraft I have had the pleasure of working on, if you forgot to check the throttle levers were at idle before start, you would wonder why the idle was high :oh:.
Seems to me that Murphy's Law is the likely answer.

KPHL 2004 flying CRJ200 (CL65) - similar type. 10000 feet inbound for landing, 300 hour copilot slaps throttles back to idle. Single Engine oil pressure light illuminates as engine spools down. Declare emergency and proceed with engine restart checklist. Engine restarts and continue with normal landing and shutdown. Turns out throttle was rigged incorrectly. Missed clue that throttle had to be advanced slightly forward of idle stop to get a light off during startup. FCU did not meter enough fuel to maintain idle when throttles were moved abruptly back to the stop. Dual engine failure would be challenging at low altitude - took almost 30 seconds for restart on one engine. Note - Philly ATC put us back in line when we notified them of engine restart.

this is correct and crj’s. Have alot more cycles. There was a problem with the mechanism being worn and a service bulletin being issued. Unlikely in this case.

you are correct. A yellow caution would have occurred along time ago. But you must also know that with two engines shutdown a whole list of very confusing eicas messages would also occur. Was there any mention of the other messages(a full screen). No as the ntsb is witholding it.

that has been my experience as well. As a 121 captain i had this happen many times, never shutting even 1 engine down. You need to go to idle stop, lift the levers quite a bit, then go to stop. The youtube video shows a very unrealistic scenario. Go to idle. Lift levers and then go to cutoff. However anything is possible, it is a logical explanation and would solve alot of problems, but is not without problems of its own. How hard is it to do. Would you immediately advance to idle cutoff and punch ignitor a/b? I would. Would it restart? I dont know. I guess we will have to wait and see. If no low fuel messages, and no fuel contamination it seems logical. I still say not enough fire. Plus jet a you can throw a match in a 5 gallon bucket and it will
go out. The only thing that makes it explode is being mixed with air and compressed. However that would happen with 200 gallons left, just alot more fire.

Why would the NTSB withhold it?

They never say every message. It would appear from their initial report that fuel starvation has been ruled out, as there was no mention of lack of fire, low fuel warnings, etc…. so thats one answer. The cutoff is the most likely cause, but having so many flights in the left seat reaching around to grab the flaps, i just cant see it. But its all impossible until it isnt. The big problem i have is both engines being starved of fuel(for whatever reason) at the same time. Both cutoff is consistent with this. I guess we will find out in a year and a half when the docket is published.

I think your observation nearly connects the 2 dots I started out thinking. IF the collector tank was empty then no power and in that area less fire. Already commented however that tank is actually 2 individual tanks. So this theory/speculation might exceed all probabilities. In the end it is either system, pilot or a poorly designed failled part.