Korean A330 landing accident at Cebu, Philippines
 

This accident was reported a couple of hours ago: https://www.aviation24.be/airports/c...ional-airport/

Korean Air A330 off runway in Phillipines
 

It was a landing after two go-arounds. Many companies prohibit landings after the second go-around. A flight to their alternate would have saved the day.

Two approaches, 13 minutes apart, followed by 40 minutes holding and then the third and last approach.

RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding. The damage to the RHS suggests that CAAP may need to revisit the definition of" frangible". That could have been a lot more serious than it has been. The boys were lucky to not hit the tank trap head on, FO probably needs shoes re-soled. 1998 model -300, the insurance payout will be less than the repair costs. Write off is probably a good call by the pundits. The last approach is pretty much on speed and close to G/S crossing the coast, no gross error up to that point. passing the last high speed (TWY H) they are still doing 98 Kts GS, and they lose another 8 kts in the next ~ 3000'. That's about -0.02g deceleration, which is pretty much nothing at all. The CVR will be interesting, and the DFDR/QAR will also tell a story. Strange things occasionally happen, like HDA-323, so, determination of crew performance and decisions will be quite dependent on the facts, and they will be available at least to the operator. CAAP normally is nice to deal with, but accident reports are not one of their fortés. Things that can happen... FCTL-FLAP LOCK, etc... HYD SYS ....Hold onto the vegetables and eggs until the facts develop, as some of this looks like it was reasonably flown, yet didn't work to the expectation of the passengers, particularly those with bags in the forward hold. Lucky live animals are usually stowed in the rear holds.. Flap Config, Thrust reversers look curious for a cross country into the rough. :ok:

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....324d24e23.jpeg


The photos are taken some time after the "alighting", the spoilers may have bled down, or may have been stowed by the crew, even though there is no overwind exit door or windows.




It is quite an achievement to exit the far end with 80 knots, despite an LDA of 3310 meters.
I read on avherald that apparently they didn’t have anti-skid and also one reverser was not working.
my lido info of RPVM lacks a chart for an ils, but this plane went through a localizer antenna…(?)
Diversion might have been a better idea instead of holding for 40 minutes.

https://japantoday.com/category/worl...pines#comments


https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b74db0f89.jpeg

Whether intentional or not I would be very reluctant to criticize the crew until more details emerge. Tropical downpours, in my opinion, are a very underestimated threat, especially with no centreline lights or grooving. Visibility and braking action can change in a heartbeat. It only needs a few additional factors or system failures to go pear shaped. I feel for the crew they will be in a dark place at the moment.

Looks like mostly approach lights wrapped around the fuselage, but there may well be bits of LLZ antenna there too, given the proximity:

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....4e67c78042.jpg

It would be interesting to know what the weather was like at alternate/s

Mactan was always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Back to real basics. Always briefed "slippery when dry" :-)

<sarcasm> if you can't land after your second go-around, how do you get the plane on the ground? I has to land, even if it's somewhere else.</sarcasm>

According to a series of messages reported on AvHerald apparently from a passenger, it appears that the first approach was followed by a relatively normal go-around. The second approach resulted in a very hard touchdown which the author felt occurred just AFTER a go-around had been initiated. "I noticed he began to pitch back just before hitting the runway. Perhaps he noticed we had a fast approach? The impact was a single loud bang, louder than any rough landing I’ve ever experienced."

Subsequently there was an emergency landing briefings from flight deck and cabin crew. 3rd approach "touchdown, [which] was completely smooth, unshaky, and a buttery impact. Passengers began clapping at the seemingly anticlimactic result, since we were bracing for the worst."
Then "I did not feel any braking force. I could sit up straight without resisting a forward force. I did not hear the engines engaging, or revving up, for reverse thrust. I had my wife and I resume safety position just as the flight attendants started back with the shouted instructions again. Time felt simultaneously slow and fast. We placed the complimentary pillows between our heads and the seats just before we ran off the end of the runway. The grinding halt felt like it lasted roughly 5 seconds."

Entirely speculative of course: but could indicate that the impact after 2nd approach resulted in significant damage, holding was to diagnose issues, 3rd approach deliberately gentle touchdown to minimise further gear damage, but resulted in over-run?

The reported absence of both braking and reverse thrust could hint at an aircraft that doesn't know it's on the ground.

But as long as the pilots know....?

A ground/air sensor issue looks like a good spot to be considering. That is well recorded in both the QAR and DFDR data stream. Being KAL, there will be a lot of dialog as well back to Ops by SATCOM, and crew are likely still in one piece if not shorter than before. Ground/Air sensing has messed up landings on various aircraft previously, usually is memorably bad outcome. Smart planes don't behave well in that case, many items fail to function... like brakes (design dependent) ground spoilers, thrust reverse... just the stuff necessary to stop after landing.

FDR has a valid point. If you remember the Iberia 340-600 incident in Quito Ecuador, it suffered a very hard landing which led to loss of signalling from the main gears which then caused a lack of deployment. The aircraft was written off post removal. It is just possible that something like this happened here.

Knowing that their aircraft is on the ground is one thing. Being able to do anything about it is another ...

I don't know Airbus at all. Are you saying a ground/air sensing failure would prevent manual braking and manual reverse thrust application on the 330?

Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!

the local crews are through out the bank incompetent. This was just a typical korean **** up.
I worked there the last years of my carreer and the storries I could tell would fill ma y evenings

Braking may or may not have been possible (I don't know) but I suspect the A330 isn't among the few types that that have been certificated for reverser use while in the air (or while the aircraft thinks it's still airborne).

All conjecture at this stage, of course.

Does the spoiler handle move on an A330 with ground spoiler auto-deploy?

No it doesn't.

It's been a few years since I did any testing on a 320/330/340, but the brake system is under the manglement of the brake and steering control unit, (BSCU). The BSCU gets info from lotsa plaices. LGCIU 1/2, ADIRU 1/2, FCPC 1/2/3... (lé bus goes for FLA more than TLAs... ). The LGCIU's get the nose landing gear compressed signal, (NLG WOW for Bowing pukes) and the main landing gear L&R bogies in ground position, (MLG not tilted for Bowling dudes). The BSCU warning is actually inhibited IIRC from touchdown to 80kts on deceleration (phase 8?) which seems a little contrary. If Lé Plaine has broken the sensors for tilt on the MLG or reracked the BSCU, then switching off the Anti-skid & Nose wheel steering switch is expected to recover the brakes. you still lose TR and NWS, and as you have turned off anti-skid, then, that's fun. I just landed a jet w/o anti-skid and without normal braking system,in MNL last year, in the wet, took up all of the runway, barely touched the emergency brake system yet still had to replace all main tires, no ground spoilers and one thrust reverse cycle available... If the guys had a wet runway, no ground spoilers, no reveresers and no anti-skid, they duz got a a bit of a stopping issue.

all conjecture, but stuff happens. A crew deciding to do a G/A and then changing their mind has parked shiny bits in the weeds before too.

Never understood the warning inhibit rationale for lé Bus breaks, but then, golly, it is a wonderful advanced alerting system and everyone should have it as it is great and isnt it a shame that the dastardly B737 doesnt and well, golly, is that the grass coming up? But, I have the glorious advanced alerting system that B737 drivers can only dream about, and yet, there goes the approach lights, and, the LLZ antenna, and... whoops, lift your feet...

The auto brake function is triggered when selected, by the deployment of the ground spoilers... with MAX being modulated until the NLG WOW is made, assuming that the BSCU is working in the first place. Without the BSCU there isn't much B going along except for alternate W/O Anti-skid. The LDR for No ant skid, no spoilers, no TR is... a lot. No book handy, but it is usually at least 1.7 times the factored landing distance.

I can't comment on brakes, but it's pretty universal on high bypass engines to inhibit reverser operation unless "on-ground" is true (although the detail logic of "on-ground" is highly aircraft dependent).
If you're wondering why, lookup Lauda 767 accident...

"Louder 004" raised two things:
1. The failsafe autostow system didn't on the PW4060...
2. the modeling of controllability did not acurately account for the lift loss in the wake of the engine's reverse plume or the added drag from that cause.

A lot of negative comments were made early on about the crew's competency until the revised data was on hand, and that stopped much of the noise.A type I still fly has just dumped a plane in the dirt due to a TR deployment, they are not much fun, and the crews response when the system doesn't play ball is about the same as entering auto in an R22 with an engine failure, getting the N1 down to idle if the system doesn't is fairly desirable.

Actually, auto-restow actually contributed to the accident. Although we never positively identified why the Directional Control Valve (DCV) changed state from 'stow' to 'deploy', a mis-rigged auto-restow sensor (indicating the reverser wasn't stowed) activated auto-restow which opened the Hydraulic Isolation Valve - providing hydraulic pressure to the reverser so that when the DCV changed state the reverser deployed.
I was directly involved in the Lauda investigation (BTW, one of the most unpleasant things I've ever done - I could never be an accident investigator, I found it too painful). They'd actually done a flight test on a 767 when they deployed a reverser in flight - but they'd done it with the engine already at idle, at 10k/200 knots. Lauda happened with the engine at max climb, 24k/Mach 0.78. Although the FADEC automatically commanded idle, at those conditions it would have taken nearly 30 seconds for the engine to reach idle - by which time it was way too late and the aircraft was already starting to break up. I participated in a wind tunnel test with a deployed reverser at Boeing Vertol in Philly. There was a rather annoying Aero S&C type that insisted the aircraft was controllable and the Lauda pilots messed - at least he did before we started testing. After he started seeing the data, he got real quiet. Although there was a time when I might have understood all those controllability coefficients, after over 15 years of working engines I'd forgotten all that S&C stuff. However at the end of the test, we did a flow visualization using hundreds of yarn tufts. THAT just anyone could understand - with the engine at high power nearly the entire upper surface of that wing was separated :eek:. They never stood a chance.

The same guy annoyed me on the same issue. The crew of "Mozart" had a situation that was unlike any that had been trained, the simulator did not simulate the dynamics that existed.

One aspect of the design that concerned me was that the DCV could effectively be irrelevant if the NRV in the bypass line was defective, and permitted pressure to be applied from the bypass line.

University of Bielefeld (presumably Peter Ladkin's group) has a copy of the Lauda 004 report issued by Thailand. It is pretty brief for the event, and lacks much supporting data... but it is interesting/
https://web.archive.org/web/20110607...RPT.html#App_C

A surprisingly good precis of the accident is also found here:
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/...4-7ba96f9571bf


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....34702f42da.jpg
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....327924e24c.jpg




[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that.

Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?

etc,

should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?

The MD11F that missed the runway at Ted Stevens 2 times, having got to close to 360 kts at 3000' on the arrival into FAA airspace? With a constant litany of "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP", counting those was tedious. Apparently the FAA licensed foreign pilot never bothered to read §91.117. What got me on that was, when he got to 1 nm final with a bit of flap, no gear and doing 260kts, @ 800'AGL, he finally decided to do a.... something, I know not what. It was best described as a wobbly RH wiggle to return to the same place in space, at same configuration, speed, and altitude, and then finally did a formal go around. Same guy decided to take off with all 3 IRS' with warnings on check position, and lost all nav functions when he hit the go bar.

KAL is an interesting place, it has some of the best engineers on the planet. It does have some institutional issues with a punitive culture, which is in keeping with being in a state of war for 70 years, so, they take punishment to a different level to what the west is used to.

There are some really good Korean pilots out there, a couple of the best are now dead, but they were brilliant. There are some that would stand their ground anywhere in the world, and do. There have been some excellent foreign pilots there, and there were some that used P-51 pretty enthusiastically. A number of foreigners were treated poorly by KAL, but not that much differently to how KAL treated Koreans, other than those that had F-5A time... You might be surprised by the statistics of events/nationality, and the absolutely dumb as dog dirt events that were done by [insert nationality]'s.

As far as this crew goes, I would think it prudent to hold off until more information is at hand before commenting on a given nationality's competency. Remember, it wasn't Indonesians or Ethiopians that designed the B/S system that ended up killing 346 people

On saving the day, there is one particular case where that certainly is a true statement, involves Stuart AFB. KAL additionally had a number of events where the decision of the PIC of non Korean nationality took a lot of effort to be swallowed.

The best helicopter pilots I ever flew with were Japanese, Japanese, French and Australian, in that order. The most impressive CRM I have ever evaluated was by a Russian pilot. The most beautiful set of hands I have ever seen fly an aircraft were attached to an Ethiopian, one who was also well known in the system, and who on entry into a room could make those red necked pilots that spent their time talking about skin colour fawn obsequiously, they had been fortunate to have this gifted man do instruction on their jumbo's. I had the previlidge of flying with Bob Hoover and Bob Love in a T28 and P51 on the same day, to have done training with "airbum" in his Pitts, and the Ethiopian landed a B744 in interesting conditions into JFK that were more impressive. The best TRI I have ever flown with was an Indian... the most knowledgable pilot I have ever worked with on aircraft technical matters was an Iranian.

You are welcome to your opinion, I think there is more to see when eyes are open. :)

Hear hear!

Second that
 

A couple of great and informative posts

Kinda sounds like you were the one who f***ed up your career there chief.

Was it the culture or the food that inspired the move to Korea?

One of the photos doing the rounds shows the MLG doors are open, suggesting at the least, a green hydraulic system failure.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.

“RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding.”
#8 fdr

“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS

Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.

#8, from my last landing there, in 2021.

That would put them in a bad position without doubt.

Both T/Rs appear to be stowed, which is odd. The main doors if they are open is definitely indicating a Green system failure which is going to be a pain, but would have been manageable, assuming that the BSCU was working, and there were no other failures. The blue and yellow are the TR powers respectively for Left and right engines... and as they are not extended, on an overrun, and a very slow deceleration, that suggests the guys had a compound problem. The fact they landed on an airport suggests that it wasn't loss of all 3 hydraulics... so am thinking Green + BSCU (G/A Sensing failure) which gives open inner gear doors, no T/R's, no ground spoilers, and alternate brakes only without anti-skid. That would put the aircraft in the weeds in most cases, outside of maybe Edwards.

Losing a HYD and another sensing system may suggest that the second landing was less than stellar, but, if no one died in this, am gonna give some latitude to the guys. The second landing may have some echoes of Iberia's -600... Going to be interesting to get the full report.... except it is CAAP land. KCASA will have more on it probably.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....eb0ad388fa.png

I'm often surprised by the lack of empathy when topics such as this make their way onto the forum. I wonder if it's a matter of psychological relief, knowing statistically accidents will happen and that it was not to “me” that it happened? Could it be a deluded belief that there are no circumstances that provide a degree of complexity where I would run out of ideas before I run out of fuel?

There is no empirical evidence to show that this crew was less well trained or less competent than any contributor to this forum. Until we understand the complexity of the situation that this crew faced perhaps we should leave it at that.

I wonder if anybody understands what this crew is facing not just today or this week but potentially for the remainder of their lives. It is not surprising that most may not understand. These may have the luxury of an ”oops I'm sorry” if they found themselves in a similar situation. Comfortable in the knowledge that they would be cocooned by those who are concerned about their mental well-being, would be represented by those standing up for their employment rights, be defended by those who would stand up to the authorities for them, there would be those who would defend against cruelty from the press, and there would be those who stood in the community understanding that they did everything in their power to avert an accident but in spite of this an accident occurred.

What might it feel like to become the symbol of national shame, what would it feel like to be the individuals who let the company down, what must it feel like to be the people who spurred on the cruel assumptions about the competence of your fellow nationals, what might it feel like to let your family down, no longer able to look up to you in a position held in high esteem by society

It is the greatest failing of CRM that there are still those who believe that it is only the "other" who is subject to overload, and it is only the self who in the absence of any evidence is able to draw a reliable conclusion, is able to cast aspersions, and is fully in their right to demonstrate one of the core characteristics of a psychopathy; zero empathy.

Oops, if I offended you, I'm sorry.