Light aircraft down in the Lake District , Cumbria
 

Sadly pilot reported killed as lone occupant but very few details at present . RIP .
From the BBC ; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-54501995 .

Do we know if that photo was on the day concened? Low cloud, high ground?

Moe information has now been released:

https://www.nottinghampost.com/news/...tragic-4598966

Aircraft appears to have been Aerobat G-CIIR.

The plot on FR24 shows it as departing from Gamston, with a stop possibly at Netherthorpe before heading north.

Final position plot was approaching Ullswater, around 5 nm SSE of Troutbeck.

Nope - Google StreetView photo.

As reported, registration confirmed. R.I.P.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/243808

As per the photo link in the previous post.

update today.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-59345932

AAIB report...

I'm not sure I accept that the fatal crash force was "between 3 g and 4.25 g." (page 27 of the AAIB report), I expect a much higher number for a .45 to .75 stop from 55 MIAS? My very modest search for a calculation result suggests as high as 65 G. A friend of mine similarly crashed his 150, similarly stopping in about 12 inches, near straight down. The coroner told me that his stop was in the range of 200 G.

In any case, a nose down vertical arrival will likely be fatal, regardless of seatbelt use.

55 KIAS was the proximated forward speed of the a/c, it was said to have "entered the dive at about 50 ft agl", there is no speed mentioned at impact.

While I agree with you that the deceleration seems to be a rather low number this is acknowledged in Footnote 7 of the report, also there's a reasonable amount of data that we're not privy to (for example the video frame rate/position of a/c on horizon at different frames) which could cast a different light on things.

That said, if we take the stated 'g' my (literally) back-of-the-envelope calcs suggest an approx speed at impact could be as low as 6-8kn... I've allowed a 'fudge factor' to take into account some other variables such as greater initial deformation of the ground (described as soft) and the a/c itself before they both returned to a static state. If this is the case, and given the injuries described, then it seems to me the occupant would have had a [greater] chance of survival had he been more fully restrained (as he likely could have been).

While the inner engineer is interested in the physics I need to say that I was horrified to read this report. I had my head in my hands thinking of all the things that went wrong here, the people affected, and the lives irreparably altered. So sad, so unnecessary, but is there anything more we can do to stop this sort of thing happening again? Is there anything new to learn from the tragedy?

FP.

I also found the stated figures for decelerative g force to be unbelievable.

An object dropping from 50' (15m) arrives at Earth with a vertical velocity of 17ish m/s, or 40 mph. If stopped in 1 metre, that represents a deceleration of 150 m / s ^ 2, or 15g, in round numbers. Stopping in under 1m causes proportionately higher deceleration. The stated figure of 3 or 4g just doesn't make sense. 30 to 40g would be more accurate approximations.

Though a ground contact speed was not mentioned, it would not be less than the stall speed for the plane, as the plane contacted the ground near vertical. If the plane contacted the ground in a descent, something like a landing, then yes, the vertical speed could be a few knots, where the forward speed were still flying speed. In any case, the visible damage to the plane, zero ground marks showing deceleration at ground contact, and the fact that the pilot died, are evidence of a high deceleration force. I know for a fact that a 14+G forward crash is survivable with injury.

Nope.

Hopefully, discussing it, and impressing upon new pilots that there are things planes cannot do, or might only do, if flown with above average skill. Figure 6 shows a needlessly nose high pitch attitude, which would prevent acceleration to a safe flying speed. The pilot got it off the ground, which sounds like an achievement in the conditions. Lower the nose, and let it accelerate!

Is concerning. This should be recognized by the instructor, and, yes, reeled in! Some new pilots have unrealistic opinions of their own skills relative to airplane performance, and need to be "told" for their own good. If they will not listen, that's a big red flag. I've encountered a few such pilots, and had to take extra steps for their own safety.

It turns out that almost all of us have unrealistic opinions of our skills. This is the Dunning-Kruger effect, we usually take it to mean that dumb people think they are smart, but in fact it happens all the way along the performance curve, with only the very best underestimating their performance. And it has been shown to apply to a huge range of skills and comprehensions. Of course the gap is the most glaring at the bottom end of actual ability, but I suggest instructors need to be aware that everyone, including themselves, can be a victim of D-K.

(trust me, I am an expert in human psychology :rolleyes: )

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....473f0d9351.png

double barrel raises issues which all flight instructors have to deal with.
Whether age & success prior to learning to fly are factors here are matters for debate.
An attitude that the normal rules & protocols do not apply to you are interesting, if not disturbing.
I would describe such traits as a “loose canon”.

It reminds me of the Tariq Sharer accident in 1992.
The AAIB report on PA28 G-BNOD is on line & valuable reading for all authorising instructors.
After the 1993 FAI in Dumfries, the matter went to the High Court, Edinburgh some 7 years later.

I was ‘surprised’ that prior to PPL issue a solo navigation exercise had been authorised to Troutbeck and the understandable ‘concern’ of the airfield owner when this fact was eventually revealed.

Performance considerations v. safe operations should feature heavy in all pilot training.

The toxicology report that a “recreational drug” had been consumed a day or so before the accident is also worrying, although not directly regarded as an accident factor. Such drugs would appear to be prevalent if sample analysis by scientists of the Thames is any indication.
The CAA have highlighted such off duty activities to ATCOs are not compatible with ATC functions.

So once again ‘human factors’ & the Swiss Cheese model are present in this wholly avoidable accident.

Extremely sad for all concerned.

For those who sat their professional exams prior to 1988, a pass at Performance A gave you blanket exemption from having to sit any other performance group exam aeroplanes when a new type rating was acquired.
Then a (ex?)C130 driver flying a BN2 with parachutists abroad suffered an engine failure very close to ‘lift off’. He attempted to continue the take-off without success coming to a reasonably rapid STOP.
Subsequent investigation revealed a lack of understanding of what I think was a Performance C aircraft abilities.

Rule change: Performance A no longer gave blanket exemption & the appropriate exam for new types was now required.

Might the PPL performance syllabus/exam now be ‘beefed up’ & a stand alone paper be adopted given the circumstances revealed in this Troutbeck accident.

"Might the PPL performance syllabus/exam now be ‘beefed up’ & a stand alone paper be adopted given the circumstances revealed in this Troutbeck accident?"
I don't see any change to rules or examinations being relevant to this accident. Especially after the warnings before the flight attempt. He knew it was marginal. He failed.
(Many years ago, with a heavy pax, in a similar situation, looking ahead, I aborted after lift off and hit the fence. No injuries. Repaired and flew out solo a few days later. I might have continued and not succeeded.)

I worry that he did not actually understand that it was marginal. He had not learned to be afraid of being in that regime of flight. Very occasionally, one has no choice but to be in that regime of flight, but most commonly, there is a choice. Being afraid of high AoA, behind the power curve just after takeoff should be instinct, not disregarded as being over cautious.

Advise for Junior Birdmen et al
 

As an old hand once said to me as a new junior flying instructor at BAeFC PIK:

“Learn from other peoples’ mistakes, as you will never live long enough to make them all yourself”

The other piece of advice received concerned Aeroplane Performance:
If short field techniques are required, then the field lengths are probably inadequate.
Consider the increased risks associated, and whether the insurance is being put in jeopardy…

Quite probable, but even if he had understood it seems he was pushy enough to carry on anyway - given the airfield owner's actions one would imagine the pilot had been clearly advised not to carry on the flight.

I've put some thought into my earlier questions, I agree that's there's little new here, but in relation to "is there anything more we can do to stop this sort of thing happening again?" I think perhaps there are some simple things that could assist:

1. When I think back to my training I'm not sure there was much emphasis on the effect of soft ground, particularly coupled with short grass fields. That's not to say there was none (and my case probably had some unique circumstances) but I wonder if there's some value in being made to actually walk a field with a view to its suitability and effects on t/o and landing? Maybe this should be a syllabus item?
2. During training, is there any real explanation around a PPR? Understanding of this, and why people have such things, seems to have been utterly lacking. Yet again, should this be part of the syllabus? If it's already part of the syllabus does it need to be beefed up, with particular regard to understanding circumstances that might make an airfield unsuitable on a day-to-day basis (including why it might be unsuitable for YOU at a certain part of your career).
3. Is there value in a gradated licence? I don't know this airfield at all, but as I take it it's a private field requiring a PPR I suggest it could carry a higher risk than some other places. Perhaps the first xx flying hours of a new licence holder should be restricted to 'standard' fields, and/or an endorsement required for operation in/out of private fields? An endorsement that's more than just a tick in a box I add - let's check out the candidate's ground planning etc (incl understanding of PPR) as well as actual flying knowledge/perception.

Finally, I agree, Maoraigh1 , that rules by themselves may well not have prevented this tragedy, however I'd like to think that more (specific) experience might have made it less likely. The comments I raise above are around enhancing this, not so much about rules, although I acknowledge they'd probably require minor alteration...

FP.

I must say, as a recent PPL, I find this hard to understand. It's as though he thought the limits were bureaucratic rules rather than laws of physics, and the consequence of breaking them was a bollocking rather than death. If I read the report correctly, if the airfield owner had not insisted, he would actually have tried to take off with a passenger. It's not that he underestimated his skills, because what he attempted could not be safely performed by the most skilled bush pilot. I don't think more practice on shorter and rougher fields would help, wouldn't that just raise his confidence and reduce his anxiety? To me the key message is the need to properly plan, do the calculations with generous margins of error, and be guided by the result. That is not something that was hammered into me by my training, but I did pick-up on the caution from my instructors when operating in and out of marginal fields which made me preform those calculations very carefully, and having done that, I realized that even with a generous theoretical margin of error, a rough/short strip is never to be taken lightly.

A pointless and theoretically entirely avoidable accident. However hard we try, some people simply will not abandon their pre-conceived notions. Some overly self assured and confident individuals genuinely believe their judgement to be better than other people's - including , sometimes their instructors. This is possibly because they come from positions of authority. They are used to taking their own decisions rather than accepting advice from others.

Additionally, they quite probably have not before been in situations in which a succession of small errors and misjudgements can so quickly build up and kill you. Flying is very unforgiving of the careless or silly, more so than most other sports (though, say, mountain climbing, scuba diving and parachuting offer similar fast opportunities!)

Occasionally, when instructing, it has been important to wait until a significant error causes a scare in the trainee, to get that message through. Sadly, for some it never sinks in. I recall one Chief Instructor briefly all us instructors to carefully monitor one 'Bloggs'. He was good, but apt to overcook things, take too many risks and rely on his admittedly fairy good handling skills to get him out of the problems. Very frustrating to deal with. After many frights and near things he did seem to get the message and left light aviation. He killed himself on a motorcycle eventually. (Oddly, he was a misogynist and recognised it; he would not listen to or learn from our female instructors. " I just can't take orders from a woman" - he knew it was daft but just couldn't stop himself. Drove my wife mad !)

A saying I once heard/read went something like - "The sole purpose of some people's existence is to act as a cautionary example to everyone else. " Not a nice epitaph.

Biscuit is right on. This is an aspect which instructors have to be vary aware of, and be assertive as needed to change an attitude - of decline further training, for poor attitude, which I have done. Often, "successful" [men] decide to learn to fly. As Biscuit correctly observes, they pushed the rules to get where they are, so they think they can push flying too. These people are often very assertive and politely intimidating. A new instructor may not feel themselves at a station in life where they can assert back - but they must. So yes, allow the student to safely scare themselves, and if they don't recognize being scared, tell them they should be scared, I have done this a number of times, often repeating the unsafe technique at altitude, until it results in the inevitable spin entry, then handing it back to them for recovery. Usually, that gets the point across. Among this is to accept and consider the advice of others - particularly the master of the aerodrome! And, sometimes aerodromes are PPR - for a reason which might not be self evident - until you ask. In the mean time, they're private property - even type A people understand trespassing!

I've done a number of type checkouts on advanced complex singles (generally Cessna amphibians) and, anticipating a Type A personality, had a stern talk early on, as to what the training is going to be like. This usually sets the necessary tone. But, I'm content to be assertive to the extent required, I'm empathetic that a new instructor might be less so.

For this accident, the poor pilot attitude is evident, and it was certainly the major underlying cause. But, reinforcing this pilot's overly "can do" attitude, is the fact that he did get the plane safely airborne in less than ideal runway conditions. His mistake was not lowering the nose and accelerating to a safe climb away speed. That error is at the feet of his instructor. Candidates must be taught that pointing a plane up does not always assure a climb, and just getting airborne is the worst time to try for it! I have encountered this during training (and "real life") teaching on the water. We nearly never have a defined water takeoff distance, and teaching short field takeoffs on the water is necessary, along with decision making that it cannot be safely accomplished. Once we have agree that the distance is sufficient, and a takeoff is the right decision, (knowing that we have an obstacle ahead - trees on shore), I teach once airborne, to aim at the half height of the trees as though you plan to take the trees out with the plane. Keep flying at the half height until you just can't stand it any more, and then raise the nose just high enough to assure clearing the trees. This works pretty well. It should never be a needed technique on a declared length runway, performance charts, and appropriate calculations should prevail. But, once you're "away" with a plane, it's a better technique than dragging the plane toward the obstacle, having never achieved a safe climb speed.

I read it with disbelief. Ironic that someone in a senior role for a healthcare company can’t see the value of wearing his shoulder straps. His company web site says

Quote:

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We are at the heart of healthcare, data science and technology – providing advance data solutions to improve human health.

---



No, it was the pilot's own personal error.
Or you could blame his examiner, or the CAA, or his friend on the day in the other aircraft, the person who didn't physically prevent him from departing by blocking him in with a vehicle, society in general, or even the mud that partly blocked his starboard wheel from rotating.

Pilots with a normal attitude to learning, with the will to listen and learn from others and a sense of what they are actually capable of don't make a series of glaringly obvious basic mistakes such as this.

I've met quite a few pilots who said that and or behaved as if they were better than everyone else. Quite a few are deceased.

It is reported elsewhere that the passenger offloaded at Troutbeck before the fatal flight was the deceased pilot’s wife.

One of the problems with flight training is that it tends to be oriented towards passing the flight test, not necessarily teaching the the pilot decision making skills new pilots need. The short/soft field exercises are a particularly good example of this. The training is all about the aircraft handling skills, with little emphasis on pilot decision making.

My short and soft field ground briefing is 80% pilot decision making and only 20% on the hands and feet part. One exercise I really like is a demonstration high DA. I set power for what the engine will deliver at a 7000 ft DA. The students are invariably shocked at how poorly the aircraft performs on the take off roll and climb out. This experience carries over to the short and soft field exercises as they will at least have experienced the aircraft with marginal performance and see how important accurate and coordinated control inputs are essential

With respect to this accident, I would suggest that no amount of instruction would have saved him given the pilots attitude. I would suggest at the end of the day schools and instructors have to refuse to instruct people who have a fundamental and innate unsafe attitude.

As a bit of thread drift I did have PPL ME IR student who had driven 3 previous instructors literally to tears. He was the first person I had where the FISR method instruction was entirely appropriate. When he realized he couldn’t intimidate or BS me he got serious and did quite well. 2 years later I got a call from him. While cruising above a solid layer he lost 6 inches off a prop blade in his Twin Comanche. The vibration was so bad the AI and DG toppled and all the knobs on the radios fell off. . He identified and secured the failed engine and then did a partial panel cloud break by DR to a nearby airport and landed safely. He attributed my training as a significant reason for a successful outcome

The guy could be a bit of an asshat, but he listened when I talked and genuinely tried to be a good pilot. I would suggest that would have never been the case with the accident pilot.

During my early initial PPL training when I knew nothing; weight and balance was never routinely done. Two average men in a C152 with no luggage and maybe half tanks, is not often a performance limitation, I suppose - even on dry grass strips of adequate length. Whether my instructors did a perf calculation without sharing it with me, I don't know.

Having read the AAIB report, This pilot sounded either arrogant or stupid.

He frequently did not wear shoulder straps, and only did so when an instructor made it a condition of his instructing.

He did not seem to know or care about PPR, nor about limited grass strips.

He seemingly, did no pre take-off checks.

Having been told to back-track, he did not do so.

I suspect that on the fatal take-off, he struggled to get his speed up on the boggy grass, leading to a low airspeed and very marginal climb performance. And/or, he did not appreciate or compensate for the cross-wind from the right. This blew him left, heading straight towards the large stand of conifers, and he probably panicked. He either tried to pull the nose up to clear them, then realised it wouldn't work so tried to turn left away and got into a dive, or he stalled through over-pitching, and the left wing dropped.

Then towards the end of the AAIB report we learn about the cocaine in his body............

I don't know what to say, on several levels.

I hope that PPL schools encourage their customers/students to read the AAIB report and discuss it with others. Essential bedtime reading for pilots.

When I was learning to fly at Carlisle many moons ago, a student of my instructor disobeyed his solo brief, and ‘did his own thing’ returning safely.
A ‘mature student’ self employed gentleman.

The CFI was less than amused and suspended him for 2 months from all training. Lesson learnt & the jungle telegraph to all other students was ‘effective’ as well.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and even if the deceased had been terminated as a student by his school, then another school was more than likely to train him.
They are after all a business and unlikely to ask for psychometric testing before commencing training…

The Inquest, probably early 2022, will rely heavily on the AAIB report & evidence of their lead Inspector. It would come as no surprise if those mentioned in the AAIB report are also called as witnesses.

"do the calculations with generous margins of error, and be guided by the result."
With soft strips, the data to do calculations is guesswork.
Most people get their license on hard, relatively long, runways. I was asked to demonstrate soft field technique during a C172 checkout for rental in the US, on a long, hard, runway. No problem, but very different from the real thing - no feedback.
I learned the hard way that some runways need methods different from anything In the standard manual and textbook.

Thank you Pilot DAR.
That's a very good point of yours about the failure to accelerate away correctly after lift-off, not generally taught, though it should be for short field work. I used to occasionally fly a motor glider with rather limited prop clearance & low power from a notably rough strip. Our take-off technique was to hold the stick firmly back until unstick, then stick smartly forward to hold at 1-3 feet above ground in ground effect while we accelerated out of the back of the drag curve. Felt 'orrible at first but it worked, just like your obstacle clearance lake technique. No dinged props and safe climb outs past the obstacles at the end of the strip.

Ironically, the unfortunate pilot had a background in data analysis, and a BSc in psychology.

https://draperanddash.com/news/drape...owth-strategy/

He appeared to have had a successful career in the sales/marketing world. Having spent some time in the same occupation, I can vouch that it breeds a mindset of invincibility. Indeed, this outlook is positively encouraged by some sales trainers. It is not the mindset to apply to flying.

Haha, I was taught the same thing in the DHC-6 Twin Otter, with 30 flap. It would come off the ground in a few hundred feet, in a terrifying "hanging there on power" feeling!

The worthwhile discussion about student attitude should be considered a moral duty of instructors and even other pilots. It sounds like the aerodrome master was trying, I bet he's kicking himself for not being more assertive - next time he will be!

In my late 20's, the boss used to casually suggest that Mr. [180/185 floatplane/amphib owner] would be taking me for a $100 hamburger in his plane.. Okay, whatever kept the boss happy. In short order, I began to witness some sketchy flying and it began to register that Mr. executive, can afford the fancy plane, really couldn't fly it well. My boss was sending me babysitting.... I learned diplomacy, and the line where, when crossed, my personal fear said I should interject. Later in life, I left that decision a bit too long, but that's another story...

I don't know if this type of assessment is a formal part of instructing, but it should be. Then the diplomacy/assertiveness to make it effective. it is a duty we all have to our fellow pilots, and the safety of our pastime, particularly when passengers are involved.

Care to tell the story of the Lake in the lake DAR? Have always wondered what may have brought you undone, an example of how even the very experienced can be caught out, none of us are immune, NASA study of airline crews found they make an average of eight errors per flight, it's the ones that are not trapped that bite.

It is revealed that the deceased had a degree in psychology. Why did he choose this degree?
Did he recognise something in himself which was ‘unusual’?
A clinical psychologist (specialising in aviation?) could perhaps give an insight.

Certain regrettable characteristics present in the Sala accident scenario seem to occur here?

Without wishing to prejudice the Coroner’s findings in anyway, I would sum up the deceased conduct as ‘reckless’.
I attach no blame to any individual on the day who attempted to provide him with advice/guidance.
If he hadn’t kill himself at Troutbeck, it was probably unfortunately just a question of time…

Knowing the type of new pilot personality of the accident pilot, I doubt it.

Different human factors at work in these two unrelated events.

I don't agree. Careless, yes, reckless, no. "Reckless" includes: "without thinking or caring about the consequences of an action", and I do not attribute this to the accident pilot. I think that he cared, but did not understand, nor stopped to consider factors just outside his understanding. For my experience with this personality type, this is usually mentorable to better habits.

In the much bigger picture of primary pilot training, two less than ideal circumstances are colliding: It's getting more expensive, so attracting fewer candidates. Service providers try to keep the costs to a minimum by training to pass the test, rather than pass on all the skills, and, many of today's newer instructors have learned this way, so themselves lack more in depth and peripheral pilot skills. Though not a factor in this accident, there is also a shortage in type skills to train new pilot buyers in the type they purchase. Few instructors have experience on odd, and old advanced/complex types, so good training is hard for new owners to get.

Student pilots can help themselves by somehow realizing that these factors are colliding to affect the breadth of training that they may be offered, and seeking out more experienced instruction, and offering to pay what its worth. I'd done lots of advanced and type training on singles, for pilots who wanted advanced skills, so I have experienced candidate pilots with great learning attitudes, who are willing to pay the cost for comprehensive instruction. But, I agree that such advanced instructions can be hard to find, and is not affordable for all candidates.

It's a short story, which took a long time to drift into history; I was hired to provide Lake Amphibian type training, and a a seaplane rating to a Lake owner. He'd had the plane for a year, but not done any water operations in it yet. He flew really well, very caring and attentive, great attitude and learned. I did all the required training with him, no rush, no pressure, great conditions. I was having him land me into the dock, to practice docking, and drop me off so he could fly the five required solo water circuits, which I was required to watch. The dock was at my local airport, so if he felt uneasy, a runway landing was a choice for him. I was very confident about his skills, and simply not paying attention when he got a landing rather wrong. I remember looking out the right, and knowing that his great approach would touch the keel....... now......, and he did, but it went wrong after that. I have "fixed" such landings before, and simply did not this time, as I allowed myself to be a passenger, and relax. That was not what I was there to do. Life lesson learned.

We were both wearing the full harnesses, and both ripped them out of the plane as we were ejected, and we were both wearing life jackets, which saved us from drowning. And, I wisely was doing the training (and even passengering) at my local airport, where they were watching, and help was available right away. And to think of the training I'd done for years at nearby remote lakes, where there were no witnesses, nor help! That would have certainly been a fatal decision!

As my wife having a relaxed life is much more important to me than being in a plane, my flying no longer includes instruction. But, to continue to pay it forward, I do post the themes I train here when it comes up....

And it's much appreciated.

This thread prompted me to go back and dig out a thread I started before I got my PPL. Interesting to re-read in the context of this thread https://www.pprune.org/private-flyin...ht=short+field

Thanks,

Ever since I did my first checkout in a taildragger, I have realized the nerves of steel that instructors require, certainly for some operations anyways. As you know in my posts here and elsewhere, I am always looking for the solution of what did the pilot do that was wrong and what should I learn from it.

As a newbie to float flying over the last two summers(about 40 hours in a C-172 and C-180), I know that flying boat operations are different. But I still have a couple of questions.......

What does this mean? "I was having him land me into the dock."

When you say 'touch the keel', can you confirm your meaning of that and clarify if that is a good thing or a bad thing.

What did the student do that was wrong. Was it an input or incorrect recovery from a problem that had occurred after a proper touchdown?

After all, I do plan to get into flying boats at some point. Lake, Seabee, Widgeon....who knows.

Similar behaviours but with greater experience!

Totally different scenario, it appears.