CFIT following VFR into IMC

Reasons for 'Getthereitis' not explored by the AAIB but why was a commercial organisation using a PPL to position a crew or have I got it wrong and it was just 3 mates who were going to split the costs between them?

You can read the AAIB report here


"
G-ATMT was operating below 1,000 ft in an area where the Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA1) was 2,200 ft. It was likely that the aircraft flew in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC2) below MSA for at least 1 minute 45 seconds before flying into some trees standing
on a ridge of high ground. The aircraft was extensively damaged and the pilot, the only person on board, was fatally injured."

In a previous post I had enquired whether the pilot was of the Norris family of Bournemouth Flying Club and Anglo American Airmotive Ltd. The latter was taken over by Meridian. It was I think confirmed that he was. This being the case I had thought that Dave held a professional licence at some time during his long career in aviation. There may well have been good reasons why he had swapped it for a PPL. All that matters is that he was a competent and highly experienced aviator. It was just not his day and he paid the ultimate price for his bad day. Only those who have had such a day and are still with us know what it means, to have a bad day.
By the way why should AAIB be concerned about cost sharing for a flight that did not take place.

Interesting to note that the pilot had not done a lot of flying in the last 28/90 days:-

Stokenchurch tower by the M40
 

Weather unsuitable for VFR. Local airfields clear of cloud, but fog has a habit of leaning against this particular slope. All too easy to get lost and disoriented.

It'd be interesting to see what he'd logged in the previous nine months. For a pilot with considerable experience and knowledge it's surprising that he wasn't able to assess his currency as being low, and too low perhaps for the conditions.

Mmmmmmmmmmm!

Totally unavoidable accident as CFIT so often is.

He could have prevented this "not being his day".

How, by staying in bed ?

Hindsight is well known to us all.

I was very sad to read here that it was Dave Norris who died in this accident. The Norris brothers played a key role in getting me back into the air after a 20 year break. If it wasn't for them I probably wouldn't have enjoyed another 20 years of flying and still counting.

Steady on. Whilst Council Van may have 'meandered' a little with his wording, I believe his intent was that David Norris, an experienced pilot, qualified in Instrument flying, already having pushed his luck in going below MSA in poor weather, should have made an earlier decision to climb to safety.

That isn't hindsight, that is applying the knowledge and requirements that make up the responsibilities of holding an Instrument Rating. The accident is a tragedy, of course, but there seems nothing to suggest that it should have been inevitable. For a pilot with that experience and those qualifications, this was sadly, but easily, avoidable.

"The pilot’s flying logbook contained no entries after 25 February 2016. The owner of the aircraft recalled that the pilot flew on 8 and 29 November 2016 for a combined total of 2 hours 35 minutes."

"The study argued that rules may be easy to apply when circumstances are clear-cut but more difficult to apply in marginal and uncertain circumstances where they might have the most benefit. In summarising their study, the authors commented:
‘The results suggest ... high uncertainty and dynamism constrain rule-based response, leading to rules becoming vulnerable, fragile or failing completely.’"

The thing I find really strange about this tragic accident is the aircraft’s track (Figure 1 in the report). The pilot tracked roughly south and ended up significantly east of Chalgrove and then for unknown reasons, turned left and not right.

The report mentions that there was a GPS on board and the Nav radio was tuned to the Daventry VOR. Turweston is very close to the radial that would allow a direct track to Chalgrove. It seems very odd that apparently neither of the available navigation devices was used.

I42, exactly, and it seems strange to me that there is no discussion of the navigation errors in the AAIB report. There are plenty of words about not maintaining VMC etc, but not why he found himself where he did. As you say there was ample nav capability on board. Was there some Track-up/North-up confusion? If there was any investigation into how he normally used the aids on board, there is no sign of it, and if there wasn't, why not?

CFIT accidents are mainly resultant from loss of SA.

I42`s comments about the track the aircraft took are curious. These can only lead us to speculation as to the reasons. The left turn could well have been intended to gain VMC and sight of the ground and position the aircraft at some instrument pre- computed fix for a visual straight- in finals approach.

No the first time this has happened in my local Chilterns.

I remember about the time i started instructing a WAC 182 went down on a ridge not far away from the one