Thanks Roland, I've seen lighter vehicles (Land Rovers and the like) loaded onto a palletised flat floor, but as the pallet restraint itself is (IIRC) rated to only 10k lbs in most a/c, that doesn't sound like the "belt and braces" restraint you would see applied to these types of heavy items on a mil. freighter (at least one operated by a NATO air arm).

Guam, your reply left me somewhat puzzled.
Your Reply: Absolutely!

OK, I'll ask a different way: what operational limit is the standard departure?

Your explanation that you use a standard departure is understood.

EDIT: I got a few insights in this thread at tech log. I also noted from someone above that there's ample room on departure.

Lonewolf, what's your question and point?

I commented on plenty of area to depart normally without any special maneuvers.
your curiosities and questions must have all been met here from all the excellent posts by all that have added to this thread.
we operate NADP 2 and 1. 2 being standard. 1 would be a good choice in OAIX.


The loading issues are never rule of thumb, the MRAPS require a minimum of 70 straps per unit, the pallet config is standard military, adjusted from a civilian config.

The crew did follow the recommend procedure on that flight. They were alternating between spiralling and straight ahead arrivals/departures. In this case they performed a straight ahead departure, basically a max. thrust V2+10 climb to 10K. Sods law had the insurgents at the right time at the right place.

*Corrected from A330

A factory built 744F has a restraint system on the main-deck capable of securing 20ft pallets weighing up to 28.757kg (63.400lbs) each. This is using the locks installed on the floor only; no additional restraints required. Depending on the operator and their willingness to adopt a somewhat creative interpretation of the Boeing WBM, it is possible to do floating positions, whereby additional weight may be carried provided additional restraints are used (e.g. straps).

When following such a procedure, there are two different schools of thought. One will have you using additional straps only to secure any weight above published max, e.g. you're loading 15 tons on a position rated for 10 and use additional straps for the extra 5 tons only. The other thought, which is the one I've been brought up on and have always followed, tells you to use straps to secure the full load of the cargo (i.e. all 15 tons in the previous example), and to consider any fixed restraints (locks) as "nice to have" only.

If, however, you are placing your load without using ULDs, the WBM manual will provide you with very detailed, and also quite complicated, instructions on how to place straps, at what angle to the floor, and at which floor stations. That section of the WBM manual alone cover some 50-odd pages, and it's very difficult to access unless you have a lot of time on your hand - and time is a precious commodity in the airfreight business.

Regardless, straps and locks can fail - particularly if not engaged/installed correctly.

From post No.9

A perfect example of an apparently aviation aware eyewitness report that is utterly devoid of meaning...

Do all swept wing aircraft "pitch" left at 1200ft in a stall? I didn't know that.
But they can apparently "pitch" right too. Fascinating!
It seemed like the pilot tried, did it? Funny thing for him to do but without being on the flight deck how could you possibly know?
It headed for the ground just before impact! Crikey! What was it doing until then? Stalling horizontally while "pitching" left and right?

No wonder the meeja write such nonsense if they have to base it on incoherent drivel like this!

Don't know if the video footage has been posted before...

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c32_1367332518

You can fit 6 MRAPs on a -400BDSF (same as aircraft involved in accident) with clever use of available floor space. Some operators will load 5 others 6.

Considering a MRAP weighs upwards of 25000lbs / 12000kgs one breaking loose and sliding aft on its pallet could result in a disastrous CG aft of limit condition.

Look closely at the video, 22 second mark. Landing gear is definitely extended.

Latest info is that the aircraft was loaded with 5 MRAPS and crew reported possible load **** after takeoff.

Agaricus...
 

I think the "poster" in question did a great job in bringing us an "eyewitness" account of what (he/she) saw.
I think we can all agree that it wasn't a perfect example of analytical observation, devoid of injecture. ( is that a new word?). He brought us just an eye-witness account. I am grateful. How many accidents have to be pieced together from fields of scattered parts and recorders?. Without him we would be filling post after post with conjecture about Taliban involvement, ect.
I guess what I am saying is that I ( maybe it is an acquired skill ) can read past part of his post on "see" what he was seeing, and not have to condemn him or his post.
Service member, or contractor, He is over "there", and I am safe here in Miami ;). I am grateful for him AND his post.

Nicely said Firststep :ok:

watching the rather pronounced yaw to the right, one wonders if they were trying to induce a roll to lower the nose as is taught in nose high upset recovery training...

Guam
After digging a bit more, the answer to my question looks to be "no, you don't use an operational limit." No big deal. As I mulled over the standard procedures you replied with, I better understand the typical departure under discussion for this mission.
Not sure who "we" is but it doesn't matter. Thanks to our brief discussion, I dug up some standard Boeing procedures that look to be universally applicable. Learned something new today. :ok: Thank you for your patience. :ok:
Thanks for that as well. :)
EDIT: SMT, thank you for the explanation on the loading. :ok:

As a fellow skipper my heart goes out to these guys.

In the same position I would be VERY keen to get out of SAM engagement territory. It is just possible they were rather too enthusiastic with the pitch and precipitated a situation that was irrecoverable.

Fellow skipper of what? Do you seriously think a professional crew in a 747 pitched up too far, in VMC, and stalled because they were too eager to get away from the ground? So you are claiming these guys, who you do not know, were absolutely incompetent? Please think before you post about something you obviously know nothing about, operating large aircraft.

I see the gear was still down at impact. That could mean that they experienced the problem early, (shortly after rotation) and were concentrating on control.

A DC8 out of MIA experienced a load shift and crashed shortly after take off. Seems like that crash would have prevented a crash like this. There is not much data yet on this crash so hopefully the cause will not be repeated.

agree pj2 sorry i was posting as you did
 

the landing gear is still down at impact.

just my own obs below...

whatever event(s) that caused the extremely high AOA bringing on the subsequent stall would likely to have occurred very soon after leaving the ground giving no time for the crew to make the normal timely retraction of the gear after a pos rate of climb call.

by impact point the gear would have normally started to clearly retract had everything been OK straight after leaving the ground...

yes/no?

the other scenario for gear down still was planning for cooling the brakes of course

edit pj2 posted same as me above

On some types, lowering the gear has an effect on your pitch. Is this the case on B744? Could the crew have lowered the gear again in an attempt to lower the nose and aoa?

Perhaps both pilots were both trying so hard to push the yoke through the instrument panel to stop the nose rising they didn't have a spare hand to raise the gear.

Brilliant observation.

Are there any actual flight crewmembers left on this forum?

No and no.

4 NTSB on the way
 

A post under John Croft's name on the Aviation Week blog states that

:mad:for those who missed it. previous link wasnt working for me, found a different link
RAW FOOTAGE National Airlines 747-400 Plane Crash - Apr 29, 2013 - YouTube

From my view it looks like they are re-extending the gear. It is hard to tell around the 21-22 second mark whether the camera frame speed is making the gear look half extended or if the gear is actually extended.

Short of a load shift/CG problem the only other possibility would be runaway trim/incorrect trim.

I have watched the video several times and still sit here trying to mentally hold the damn plane up in the air until they get control.
Tough to watch.

Mungo
 

The internet is full of plane, car, bus crashes for children to look at.

VFD, extending the gear after it had been selected UP would be the last thing on any pilot's mind at that point nor is it a procedure to ever do anything on takeoff with the gear except to retract it.

If a load shift caused this crash it probably happened as the aircraft rotated and left the ground. At that point the nose would have continued to rise beyond the 11-1/2 to 12 degrees of normal pitch and at a much more rapid rate of pitch increase than is normal.

The PF would have attempted to arrest the increasing pitch rate and increasing pitch attitude with as much forward pressure on the yoke as he could muster as well as applying nose-down trim.

Most likely, the PNF would immediately also help by trying to push the nose down and possibly applying nose-down trim as well.

There would have been no time, no free hand and no thought of extending the gear in this tragic and preventable situation.

These guys were fighting to get the nose down and avoid stalling the aircraft. It looks like they tried valiantly.

I pity the investigator who has to listen to the CVR once it's located and subject to it being usable. Very harrowing video.

Looking at the youtube clip (that does not have the graphics on screen which obscure the first 5 seconds) it appears to me that the right wing dropped ahead of the above description. Note that windscreens can distort the image and create subtle anomalies.

RAW FOOTAGE National Airlines 747-400 Plane Crash - Apr 29, 2013 - YouTube

What was the rate of descent on impact?

High AOA, one wing starts to stall 2nd stalls hard. Loadshift makes sense. Only the DFDR will tell if there was a pitch over command to fight an un controllable stall due to load given the high aoa.

I remember FineAir Miami, drug the tail prior to rotation due to load shift and went in tail first. on a DC8 you can not walk the deck to do a lock inspection, the 744 is quite different

Small picture, but its the only one I could find showing the MRAP locked and strapped into position.

As previously mentioned, they use upwards of 70 straps for each MRAP.

To my knowledge World was the only operator that after some clever thinking managed 6 MRAPs per -400BDSF.

And as confirmed previously, the aircraft involved in the accident was carrying 5.

Picture below is of a atlas -200F

http://image.automobilemag.com/f/fea..._atlas_747.jpg

Lurking;

Re, "I was wondering if a video like that is of actual use in the investigation, or would it just roughly corroborate"

Video is always helpful in an investigation. But how helpful in this accident depends upon the condition of the flight recorders, (DFDR & CVR) and also if all the required parameters were functioning correctly.

grounded27;

Re, "on a DC8 you can not walk the deck to do a lock inspection, the 744 is quite different "

Yes, I used to fly freight on the DC8 and was always wary of the locks. Even on passenger a/c, the load sheet would verify that 'all locks were up', meaning boarded pallets couldnt' slide fore or aft in the non-occupied positions.

I wasn't aware though that one could inspect the locks on a B744...is that the case?

yes it's true, even more so on the military config, there is about a two space laterally down the center. a person can walk the entire length of the ship and see all the locks.

On the B744 freighters I flew, (pure freighter, not BCF), it was possible, in most cases, to walk down the port side of the a/c and look at the cargo carried.

checking the main deck before departure
 

You can walk around the freight on the main deck of a 744F/BCF, depending a bit on the size of the pallets. I'm pretty skinny and can almost always do a complete round. Heavy size guys have trouble in the front and rear.
We check the main deck before departure; it is especially important with a partial load to check if the freight is in the proper position, and securely locked or strapped.
You can see the locks between the pallets from the side.

But in this case, with large vehicles, the strapping and locks would have been easily visible.

I understand a (the?) loadmaster was among the crew. It would be surprising if he didn't check the load, that he probably loaded himself. Perhaps one vehicle got loose somehow and took the others.

Sad day for the freight community.

It is always hard to see fellow pilots die in the line of duty.
I sure hope that this video may help NTSB finding the causes for this accident. Until the last second I can only imagine them fighting against the odds...
But another thing calls my attention: have you noticed that the guy inside the car filming these dramatic events, never made a sound or even an exclamation during the whole process, except for quietening his dog? Odd, very odd.

I cannot tell you just how mind boggling horrific it is listening to some of those tapes can be. Very, very sobering and makes one want to go the bar at the first chance.

We were required to listen to some CVR tapes while I was in accident investigator's school. I'll not list the the accidents we listened to out of respect for the families and friends of those lost in these tragic accidents.

But every time I listened to those tapes, I thought, "But for the grace of God..."

Makes one very humble and thankful to have completed a 42 year career without having others listen to a tape of me in such a situation.

And don't think that I have not thanked God for allowing me to screw up on occasion and never put a scratch on any aircraft I ever flew.

The video will provide some valuable information to the NTSB investigators I'm sure, but I suspect that the CVR will provide the best clues.

This is what I know, after all I had a hand in the transportation of almost 200 of those MRAP's to Afghanistan some years ago.

It is highly unlikely that they were carrying any thing more than 5 MRAP's as the addition of the 6th would have required substantial ballast in the forward of zone F (the upper deck barrier) or a significant amount of ballast fuel in the center tank.

That was the primary reasoning behind the military scrubbing any further trips with 6 as they did not have sufficient cargo to transport at the time and carrying 25000kgs of ballast fuel plus was not considered feasible at the time.

The key question here is what else was being carried as with with only 5 MRAP's the aircraft would have been outside of the aft center of gravity envelope so generally the support equipment was used to balance the aircraft to within trim, occasionally additional ballast was required.

IF the MRAP's were secured in the best possible manner the were loaded on top 22 military pallets joined with a T2 coupler and shored on 4 specific build shoring blocks that distributed the weight evenly and then secured with chains to the pallet. Locks were then relocated within the Cargo Loading System for the best possible alignment in the center of the aircraft both forward and aft of the pallet. They were then treated as floating pallets and secured to the aircraft structure using straps. The number of straps I don't recall offhand but it was close to 50 per vehicle.

Using this method of securing them would render the probability of any load shift remote at best.

However I am not sure if this was the method used to transport the vehicles as some carriers opted to utilize the industry standard 16 or 20 foot pallets and shifting the MRAP's towards the aircraft center line to allow space for other cargo.

There is also one factor that no one that I have seen mentioned yet, on the newer type of converted freighters they have done away with the "Big Wheel" type of Power Drive Unit that were used in the past and moved to the smaller tray mounted retractable units. The only problem with those is that IF you have a shift in load those units do not offer any friction and the cargo is free to roll in either direction.

my 2 cent's worth.

mariner...after I saw the video, the first thing I thought of was load shift, stall/spin. thank you for your first hand insight.

but who really knows...and , I guess I will be a tiny bit sceptical about the video.

it did look like the nose came down...too close to the ground though.

If a part of the load broke loose, what are the chances of the next item behind it holding it, at least for some time? I know polyester straps are rated to a certain load, but having run a test rig in the past certifying polyester webbing slings (testing to destruction), they are easily capable of some incredible overloads before total failure. I used to test webbing safety harnesses with both the harness and webbing rated for 1000kg, to well over 2000kg before total failure.
Also, if the rearmost cargo shifted, is there a rear bulkhead that would stop it's movement and if so, how close to that rear bulkhead would the load carried by this aircraft have been placed to that bulkhead?
I understand that load shift seems most likely, and there was probably a cascading effect if one of the forward vehicles broke loose and broke the strapping of vehicles behind, but I wonder if initially trim was incorrectly set and the subsequent pitch up started the cascading failures? I would guess it's unlikely and would assume this aircraft and crew have carried this load many times before.