Airsnoop, I know it wasn't Greek registered.

Unless I stop working for my (or probably any other UK) employer, I'm open to the same system should the unthinkabe happen.

The only thing I can control is not working on Greek aircraft.

BigFrank,

Sice when was the Isle of Man a "Banana Republic"?

Marvo999
 

Time was when the UK AAIB would have become involved in the investigation and would have protected the UK interest but it appears to be no longer the case.

Alan - a Good Guy
 

Just a quick line to add my support to Alan. He was our lead ground engineer when we were operating the old BAC1-11s and B737-200s at European Air Charter. What a good time we all had with EAC . . . lovely bunch of people and Alan was a super ground engineer. Very efficient, very skilled and totally reliable from a pilot's point of view. We wish you well, Alan.

By the way, TOON737, are you our old Geordie mate from EAC days ?

Regards to all ex EAC people.

"Freak accident" and its sister cliche of convenience "isolated
incident" are only heard in politics where the involvement of
politicians was the sole cause of the event (ie they cannot pin
it on anyone else), not in real life. And definitely not in aviation

Almost all aviation prangs are full of lined-up cheese holes eg
SQ006 under the same false rationale could also be classed a
"freak accident", as could Lima, Helios, etc.

Flight deck switch positions and Boeing SOP
 

Just a comment, if procedures taught by Boeing flight training are used, then the switch positions on the overhead are set/verified by the first officer, during the pre taxi check the pressurisation panel items are challenge/responded by the first officer whilst being monitored by the captain.

This procedure is based on areas or responsibility, at no point does the land. Asked engineer have any responsibility to position/verify/challenge/respond to the the status of the switches on the pressurisation panel, or indeed any other panel on the flight deck.

The incident was not the responsibility of the engineer, it was a consequence of poorly executed procedure and appalling CRM by the flight crew. Sadly, with regard to one of the crew members, this was, a known fact. Tragically when it was discovered no one had the b***s to bring the situation to a close.

Parking Secuity requires outflow closed
 

After completing their O/N checks, Engineers are often expected to close the outflow valves for security and inclement weather reasons, especially for overnight parking.
Therefore, in my experience, it is not uncommon for Flight crew to find the control in manual; they are responsible to set up the pressurization panel.
Well wishes to Alan.

NOT the engineer!
 

I hope that the aviation profession does not turn its back upon this ludicrous plan to crucify the engineer. This is not just some isolated weirdo decision emanating from an equally weirdo foreign judiciary. Not only is it blatantly wrong but it is also a wake-up call for those around the world (and closer to home!) who would espouse a continental style of justice.
I have many thousands of hours in Seat 0A in Boeings. Never, ever, have I heard it even faintly suggested that switch positions should be set by the engineers. In fact, one expects almost quite the opposite – without casting any aspersions whatsoever upon the engineers – but (especially) when an aircraft arrives from the hangar one actually expects the switches to be in anything but the correct position. If you cannot be bothered to check your switches, you should not be allowed on the airport, let alone on an aircraft.
Is it too much to expect that responsible aviation companies might show sufficient contempt for this turn of events to call a boycott of the country concerned?
Prober:ugh:

Sure it wasn't mandated by the AMM procedure, but isn't it good maintenance practice to put switches and systems configured back to the way they are found?

EK Profesional(sic)
Sure you are?

I agree with EK Professional

Might be good practice EK..however it isn't always done that way. In any case this had nothing to do with the engineer and everything to do with the flight crew missing the switch position. There aren't too many things that will get you in trouble, but pressurization/flaps are two that will..pretty much any professional aircrew that I know checks these things on preflight, just before t/o and through 10 000'.

Can't believe the engineer is getting any blame here at all.

I think EK Profesional is pretty accurate. Yes, the crew should have checked, but it isn't helpful to receive an aircraft back from maintenance this way. As good as the engineer is, I think he should have done better before the aircraft was released to service. A jail sentence though ? categorically no but then again Greek justice is cr*p and they are looking for their scapegoat.

Within the context of this thread, that is a ludicruous comment. Are we going to blame engineers for aircraft suffering loss of control because the flight crew failed to set the rudder trim properly?

The setting of any switch or control on any of the panels identified as under the responsibilty of the flight crew by the Boeing operational manuals, comprises the operational configuration for which the engineers have absolutely no responsibilty whatsoever.

Abbot and Sciolites........spot on.

We've all done first flight checks and found switches out of position after the engineers have worked on the aircraft.

Yes, it would be nice if they did put them back in the correct position but repsonsiblity for making sure that everything is in the correct position and is working when those thrust levers are moved forward rests with the flightcrew and ulitmately the person occupying the LHS.

On my current aircraft, pressurisation settings and switching is checked in the FD Safety Checks then the Before Start Checks then the ATO Checks (as well as my 'scan' after the FO has told me Safety Checks are complete and that dying 'art' called airmanship with a check of the pressurisation every 10000').

It comes down to training, supervision and company culture, all 3 of which have to be questioned in this case.

AMM Procedure
 

While your arguments about whether or not there is a requirement for the engineer to leave a switch in a certain position are great, please don't lose sight of the basic fact that:

---THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE LEFT IT IN MAN---

It was just assumed he must have done, because he was the last person known to have touched it before the pilots got on board!

And another thing
 

In the Conclusions to the official report it is quite clear that the engineers actions were neither causal nor contributory to the accident.

Also the investigation found that the Flight Crew were Qualified, medically fit and well rested, and the aircraft carried no deferred defects.

It doesn't get much better than that, so where is the link between the management and the accident!

So what did cause this accident, and why were both audio switches to MASK and both air bleed switches OFF?

Whilst I sympathise with all the bereaved families left behind this quote more than any other really illustrates what is going on here. 'We must find scapegoats' Surely her late husband, and the Captain are the two people most culpable for the accident. Maybe the Cyprus court did not convict because nobody else could reasonably be considered criminally responsible.

Any pilot should be able to step into his aircraft type with all switches and controls randomly disorganised or even every switch in the incorrect position and set up the aircraft correctly for the flight. These are basics.

The engineer should not be on trial, of that there is no doubt. But all the naysayers who argue against having maintenance procedures that strive to leave cockpit controls in their normal position should read up on the phenomena of "selective perception" and "Semmelweis reflex". These are real human factors and can significantly affect how we see something, particularly when seeing it one way (i.e. normal) is routine.

It is instilled into Engineers that they must follow the Aircraft Maintenance or Troubleshooting Manual precisely & any Tech log entry should quote "IAW AMM /TSM" etc. Therefore if there was nothing in the AMM stating return switches to "normal", then how can the Engineer be blamed?
All Engineers should be made aware of this case, which highlights how they could be held accountable for their actions (whatever they might be).:confused:

Another note of support for Allan.

When I was an active mechanic (and flight instructor) we used to say that the person who died after signing the fewest things, wins (partially with this type of mess in mind, and partially with the more typical regulatory mess in mind). The corollary in General Aviation was to tell those whose planes you worked on to carry the airplane logs on board :uhoh:

Now that I'm a semi-active attorney, I see these cases on rare occasion. Should have been dismissed [at least against Allan] long before a verdict.

If the captain was well known as a CRM disaster waiting to happen [as some have implied on this forum], maybe some charges could stand against the management--that's a very fact intensive determination and tough to do in the politicized environment after a crash. I'm personally not prepared to take a stand one way or the other on the management, but the mechanic should never have been charged.

''If the captain was well known as a CRM disaster waiting to happen ...'' then he shouldn't have passed his last LPC because CRM is assessed during LPCs nowdays, isn't it??

Absolutely. However, how do you know in which position they were found by the Engineer?


Again, the report states that there is no evidence that the switch was left in the Manual position.

It is an assumption!:ugh:

There for the grace of...etc.

Every time I climbed into a Sim (military) the instructor had been there before me and put a fair number of the switches/dials/levers in the "wrong" positions.
Big smack on head if not picked up by me.

-sigh-

At 10,000 feet, if you have Pressurisation issues i.e., the press warning, then STOP CLIMB - Tell ATC - mayday if you will, consider: continuing the flight at that level FL100 or divert or go back. "we`re unable above FL100". Pan-pan-pan if you like, most advisable - Mayday, if you want so long as MSA is ok and FL100 is momentarily ok, Traffic, important, obviously ATC will give you a new squawk, probably, might even be 77. simples. But don`t go sailing up to cruise alt where TUC will get you. How come all the pax got the message and put their masks on but the crew did not - it did not seem to click. There is an an SOP.
Don`t climb.- and if you have to get back down again and, needless to say, get onto oxygen be as quick as possible. There is no oxygen drill in this whole flight, except from the cabin & pax who are more switched on than most. How much evidence did the crew need - "whats that?!" "Press bell/siren/noise"- "ok, stop climb, don oxygen masks and look for a lower than FL110 level, MSA? Pan or Mayday, job done - also one would be aware of what traffic is around and where it is

- again.

Gents, before we get into an engineer's vs pilots switch responsibilities, it should be noted that for the most part maintenance manual procedures are just that.

I.E they are procedures written for us maintainers to use, and very often are written with our safety in mind, hence switches do get left in positions other than normal operating position.

For example, we generally do not leave ground spoilers armed, but pilots do,
we do not leave thrust reversers armed, but pilots do. I could go on, but as others have said, ultimately the flight crew are responsible for doing their checks.

Reading some of the comments on this thread, and others, I can't say I'm tempted to throw the old 'Flightsim pilots' comment, as there are a load here who would probably be downchecked by Microsoft.

This really is a joke. In my current lot, we always laughingly say that when the 'Bus comes back from a quick MOT and oil change, if any setting is where it was before, it obviously relates to something that hasn't been checked. That's the way it's been for all my airborne life, but so what?

It's not up to the ground crew to set the flight deck up. It never has been, nor (pray God) will it ever be. Anyone who assumes every setting is going to be the way they left it is someone who has no business being there in the first place, or who has very minimal experience of real life. Switches and settings the way they were before? Before what? Quite a few would be in the wrong position for departure, as they would have been set for an approach and landing. Whose 'fault' is that then?

If an angineer has sat in the seat, do you not think to adjust it again to suit you? Or do you hit something solid, then blame the engineer because you weren't able to reach the controls?

Sympathies, as before, to everyone who suffered from this dreadful (and avoidable) tragedy. However, like it or not, the blame (as has been properly proven) lies front left and front right.

Hardly worthy of a response but yet I must.

By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't. They are human, fallible and flawed. If they weren't, systems like EGPWS, TCAS, configuration warnings, stick shakers and many, many others would not be needed. Neither would regulations - we'd only need one - thou shalt not crash.

You must be a great deal of fun to fly with - being so perfect and all. :suspect:

"By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't."

That's way God made checklists.

A little drift, but think it's worth a mention.

An old captain I used to work with many moons ago would always make sure his F/O could locate and operate the press contol panel in the correct fashion by touch/feel, no eyes allowed, his point being, vision/smoke/stress issues during flight, he wanted to know his F/O could operate panel blind.

He has long retired now, but not forgotton by many.

"Hardly worthy of a response but yet I must.

By your way of thinking, pilots should be perfect, every time, all the time. As has been proven time and again, they aren't. They are human, fallible and flawed. If they weren't, systems like EGPWS, TCAS, configuration warnings, stick shakers and many, many others would not be needed. Neither would regulations - we'd only need one - thou shalt not crash.

You must be a great deal of fun to fly with - being so perfect and all."


Obviously my CRM must be bad, because I never seem to be able to get my point across here.

No, we're not all perfect. I'm far from perfect, which is why I give so much credit to the right seat.

My whole point is that nobody is perfect, so to expect your steed to be delivered from engineering with the config perfect is as dumb as hell.

Just don't get some of you people. Nobody is perfect, that's my basic point. I'm sure as hell not, but nor is anyone else, that's why I take it as basic fact that I will need always to carry out standard checks.

Not bloody hard, is it?

Reminder
 

As it has slipped back down the thread, let me remind you:

There is NO EVIDENCE that the engineer left the PMS at MAN
There is evidence that he probably didn't
There is NO EVIDENCE that the aircraft took off with the PMS in MAN
There is evidence that both Audio selectors were at MASK
There is evidence that Both engine bleed switches were OFF
There is evidence that the PMS was AUTO at impact
There is evidence that the green manual light was out at impact

What does that indicate to those of you who know the system?

At the airline I was working for at that time (B737NG fleet), there came an order after the accident that we had to use the pilot´s preflight and shut down checklists to set the switches after maintenance. Now some rather complacent pilots had the opinion that because us engineers set the switches, they wouldn´t have to check for themselves.
The order would be ok if it was for the purpose of creating another line of defence against mistakes (another layer of cheese), but it will be absolutely be no help if the pilots then think that we should set up the cockpit for them.

Edit: Spelling

Aviation Safety Suffers Further Setback Following Helios Conviction -- HOOFDDORP, The Netherlands, April 26, 2012 /PRNewswire/ --

I think this is related

Ten Years for Alan Irwin....Insane
 

No I don't know the guy...but I know many like him and I am apalled at the thought he was charged, let alone convicted....

During my Apprenticeship as a 17yr old it was a "FAIL" to not have Power On checklist switches set correctly before putting power on an aircraft...No-one assumes anything when it comes to safety...let alone something done by someone else that has not been observed and cross checked...So how a non aircrew member can be made responsible for a Cockpit Switch is simply insane...pullng the wires off...now that is an offence:ugh:

Recently I have been told I must be more tolerant of "Southern European Culture"...Probably better simply not to go there anymore....

Airsnoop...any chance of some more info/evidence of what you are implying...PM will do...

BTW...I always thought the Pressurisation Horn went off at 15,000ft....but maybe confusing different aircraft/regulations....

Wasn't a SwissAir crew jailed after they departed an Athens (old airport) wet runway, due to extreme amounts of rubber at the rollout area? This was 10-15 years ago, I think. The people making these judgements are very misguided...it seems, in Greece, someone always gets it in the end.

More like 33 years ago! It occurred on the 08th October 1979.
At a trial in 1983 the Captain and First officer were found guilty of multiple charges including manslaughter with negligence, causing multiple bodily injury, and obstructing air traffic. The Captain received a sentence of 5 years and the First Officer 2.5 years. After an outcry from IALPA they were released on bail, and an appeal resulted in the prison sentences being substituted by fines.

Wow time flies! Thanks for the correction.

Yes Indeed
 

Hello Idle reverse Yes I can confirm I am the EAC Geordie engineer from the good old days.

GO TO ABAT4t2's LINK
 

Have just read the link ABAT4t2 introduced above - please go to it, read it, and take action before you find yourselves in a Greek prison.

Time for all of you who fix or fly into Greek airspace to go to your top management and get them to decide whether it's really worth it.

A last thought in this post - can someone name and shame the judge as her decision is detrimental to air safety and is a latent condition that could be causal in a future accident :=