P51 - may I assume you have read the archive thread on this accident and the report - in particular page 121?

Hoping you have, in which case, with particular reference to p121, in your 737 flying (line and sim), how many times have you heard:-

1) The Config Warning Horn?
2) The Cabin Altitude Warning Horn?

Jail terms in Athens for four people for the 'Helios' accident.
 

The below is from a Cypriot newspaper today and basically says that three managers / manager pilots and an engineer have been found guilty for manslaughter and will be given jail sentences of about 10 years.

Interestingly it says that the First Officer was 'weak in executing procedures' and 'the accused should not let him fly the aircraft' !!! It also says something similar for the captain. :confused:



A GREEK court yesterday sentenced three executives and an engineer from defunct Helios airline to 10 years in jail – pending an appeal – for the 2005 crash, which killed all 121 passengers and crew on board.
The four, Helios’ managing director Demetris Pantazis, flight operations manager Giorgos Kikkides, Bulgarian chief pilot Ianko Stoimenov and chief British engineer Alan Irwin, were found guilty of negligent manslaughter, a misdemeanor.
The court rejected a proposal that would have allowed the defendants to buy their way out of jail. Under Greek law, people convicted of certain crimes can convert jail sentences into fines.
The defence said it appealed the verdict.
The defendants were not present yesterday but they posted a €10,000 bail each to remain free until the appeal is heard.
The trial in Greece – the site of the crash -- began in December 2011, shortly after a three-judge criminal court in Cyprus had acquitted – by majority decision -- all five defendants charged in connection with the charge.
Apart from Pantazis, Kikkides, and Stoimenov, Cypriot authorities had also charged Helios executive chairman Andreas Drakos and Helios as a legal entity with manslaughter. But they had not charged Irwin.
The Attorney-general has appealed the Criminal Court’s decision.
“It is good that there are some guilty parties here, because in Cyprus no one was found guilty,” said Sophia Charalambous, wife of the ill-fated flight’s co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, 51.
The charge sheet in Cyprus said the two pilots were unfit to fly the aircraft and that Helios knew or should have known about this.
“This did not appear (in the Greek court). For us it was good because our own was not to blame,” Charalambous said in Athens, referring to her husband. .
Charalambous suggested political interests had played a role in the decision of the Cypriot court.
“We do not think it is right to put the responsibility on two dead men,” she said.
Eleni Alexandri, the mother of one victim, appeared somewhat satisfied but said that the trial (in Greece) should have been held at a criminal court and not a magistrate’s court, which cannot impose more than 10 years.
“They know very well that all these people are guilty and it is a shame that the trial took place at a magistrate’s court,” Alexandri said.
Lawyers representing the relatives in Athens said it was a fair and correct decision, affording the bereaved some degree of satisfaction for the first time in some seven years.
“Nothing can reverse their loss, given that human life cannot be measured in money, neither can it be covered by court decisions,” said attorney Apostolos Pantos.
The defence said it would fight the verdict, which they considered “wrong”.
It was not clear yesterday if the Greek court’s decision would have any bearing on the appeal procedure here, which is set to kick off in Nicosia next month.
“If the Supreme Court rejects the Attorney-general’s appeal, then Cyprus’ decision will become irrevocable, thus various issues will come up,” with the main one being whether the Greek court’s decision could be enforced, said Constantinos Mavroides, a lawyer for the relatives.
“But that is something that we will deal with in the course of things.”
The August 14 crash of flight ZU522 was the deadliest aviation disaster in Greece and Cyprus. The Boeing 737-300 slammed into a hillside at Grammatikos, near Athens, killing all 115 passengers and six crew.
In an October 2006 report on the crash, Greek investigators cited human error as the main cause of the crash, saying the pilots had left cabin pressure controls at an incorrect setting.
Passengers and crew were starved of oxygen due to problems in the cabin pressurisation, while the aircraft subsequently crashed into the hill after running out of fuel.
The report also cited Boeing for “ineffectiveness of measures”, since the same alarm was used for two different problems, resulting in the pilots misinterpreting the information.
A 2006 independent inquiry into the crash found that although the pilots were directly responsible for the crash, the airline as well as civil aviation officers were criminally liable.
The full findings of the inquiry, carried out by former judge Panayiotis Kallis, were only made public in December last year.
The 170-page report had been placed under the care of the Cabinet, the body that appointed the panel, and kept from the public eye since.
The panel was appointed back in 2006 to investigate both the underlying and immediate causes of the crash.

More stories

Interesting - neither pilot fit to fly the aircraft?? Was a transcript of the CVR released? If so, where can it be found?

Not sure there would be much to hear; seeing as the crew and passengers were all unconscious for much of the flight! :confused:

This may be of interest,my apologies if it has been posted before in relation to this thread."http://www.youtube.com/v/fC0aAY6oIjM...ilpage"><param

@Out Of Trim: I appreciate your point, but it was a serious question, as it would be interesting to listen to (uhh... read) how the flight preceding the excess cabin altitude was conducted (e.g. was it disorganized, organized chaos, or a textbook case of proper CRM?), particularly during the ground portion where the pressurization would be set up/checked.

A copy of the report can be read at http://homepages.pathfinder.gr/aas/Helios522.zip. u

ECAM - read the thread?

Isn't only the last 30mins saved?

Recording only begins at 1st engine start, no?

I think the main issue here is whether a manager can legally assume that if the pilots have their licenses and have done their sim checks/ CRM courses/ technical questionaires and all the other staff professional pilots have to do these days, they are 'suitable' to operate an aircraft.

These pilots had some bad comments in sim checks apparently (who hasn't ?) and some unfavourable reports from their colleagues. But they had completed all the required tests succesfully in the end, i.e., no-one was flying without all the licences and signatures as far as I know.

So after the accident someone can say that they shouldn't be flying because they didn't handle a problem well and the result was an accident. But how was one to know or decide before the accident? How many bad comments can declare a pilot 'unsuitable' if he passes the test in the end?!! :confused:

EK-Professional, nowadays two hour recordings are the norm and with the right tools the investigators are often able to unearth even more. Should be in the report which version they had, 30 min or two hours.

Confusing the meaning of the intermittent horn did occur before Helios.Several times.On paper, its a surprisingly simple and basic error for a flight crew to make.But it happened.The precedents mean the crew can not be characterized as "unfit".Pilot error is pilot error.And they have already paid the ultimate price.We should leave it at that.I studied the case and saw no real indication of company malaise.It was a one-off.A freak accident.

A freak accident!? Are you mad?
The phrase "freak accident" implies that it happened by chance, out of the control of the people involved. Is that really what you are suggesting?

Leaving the controller in manual during your pre flight checks then not checking pressurization at all during the climb and misinterpreting the cabin horn for the take off config while already in flight hardly seems like a one off "freak accident" to me.
Too many crashes over the last few years caused by complete lack of airmanship and ability, this would be one of them imho.

Engineer did his job, maintenance manual at the time did not specify returning the control to Auto. "Nice to know/ please do", No more than that, I am sure he wished he had, he does not deserve a jail sentence for this.
Capt, if I remember from a previous company, was not regarded as "ace of the base", but he passed all mandatory checks, as , I assume, did the FO. The guy who employed/approved their employment ? does he deserve a jail sentence ? I think not.
Finally, we can all have a "dull" moment, or a "dull" day, I have, early in my career, f*cked up a bleeds-off TO, we felt it in our ears, these guys didn't. We retreived the situation, they didn't. . . .am I smarter than them ? nope, I was lucky, I didn't "****-up" so badly to be found out/cause the masks to drop, but I did (royally) screw up. . .not proud, hands up Mea Culpa :(


There but for the grace of God etc.

Boeing (finally) acknowledged their "imperfections", I also, acknowledged mine, hopefully the Helios accident was public enough that it will never happen again.

Met the PIC, nice guy.

I know very little about this case, but I would like to add -

Is ruining four peoples' lives really justified in this instance?

This is food for thought for any technician that has ever worked on an aircraft.

Greetings All. I was registered here as TRIM-RUN but have not logged in in a long time.I have also changes my email address so can not recover my password, apologies to the moderators.

When I was a young engineer many years ago I had the pleasure and privilege of working with Alan Irwin. I was a fresh kid with my first type rating on my ticket nervous as hell about my first day on the job in a new company and country. Alan could see this and took me under his arm and brought the best out of me just like he had done with many guys before me and no doubt after me. His understanding of aircraft systems is second to none and there is no snag he can't rectify. Anyone who knows him will agree with me.

I am sick to my stomach with todays news and really can't believe it. I hope he is not in Greece but knowing him he probably is.

Personally I would warn any young guys or girls from ever getting into aircraft maintenance, you spend your life including nights and weekends pushing tin around the pan and chasing snags just to get shafted for doing your best.

Now I sell aircraft spare parts and make more a year than I did in fifteen years swinging spanners put together and thats the truth. anyone want an A+P and Part66 ticket ? screw it I will burn them instead.

Keep the faith mate.

He "failed" to reset a switch to the normal position. It was not mentioned in the maintenance schedule he should do so, he didn't, the pilots didn't check/notice. . . . . ultimately? pilots fault . . .spoken as a pilot. (nice if he had done so, but, who flies the damn thing/breathes (or not) if it is wrongly set?)

The legal proceedings here are all a bit 'third world', as is the way with many legal actions in Greece. Rather than conduct a sensible investigation to ensure it does not happen again, the route of many third world nations is to go for litigation and 'heads on poles' - you must always have a scapegoat after all. I am reminded of a similar approach to the biz jet colliding with the 737 over Brazil as another similar example of mishandling accident investigations.

As others have stated, if a pilot has passed his checks even after remedial training then he is 'fit to fly'. We can never go down the route of canning a pilot because he failed a check in order to pre-empt a crash. Clearly if there is a pattern and the individual shows no signs of responding to training, then that is a different matter. There is always a balance here and there is no evidence that I have seen to tell me that these pilots were not competent to fly the aircraft. There is no doubt they made mistakes on the day (have we not all done that?), but that is very different to saying they were intrinsically incompetent.

The investigation itself appears to be to a 1st world-country standard. The litigation side of things is a little different.

When are management finally liable for cutting costs in every area (apart from their own bonus schemes etc)? This may well rattle their cage and be a wake up call for every other goose out there that thinks they can keep cutting costs on training and safety, get away with it and claim to have increased efficiency.

The line has to be drawn somewhere and responsibilities must be accepted by those running the system. There is so much we can do when the system lets us down... I guess we could always leave..Perhaps.

Well said Trim Run I have known And worked with Alan some 20 years and is one of the most knowledgable engineers I have meat
The Greek authorities have insufficient evidence to convict the engineer however
There has to be a scape goat for the the friends and families of the victims
This is nothing but a kangaroo court and I think time the UK CAA and the AAIB we're involved.

alan irwin ia a first class engineer who’s knowledge of aircraft is second to none. The report on the helios crash shows he did his job correctly and iaw the amm as always. It would seem he is being blamed for being there and not for any failures. this growing trend of justices systems in many different countries to persecute hard working proffesionals just to try and prove that something has been done will lead to a lowing of safty standards due to the reluctance of all aviation personnel to speak out on any safty issue before or after an incident due to fear of self incrimination.

Has any of you received an aircraft from maintenance and always found all switches in the correct position? Don't we preflight the aircraft to ensure serviceably, check switch positions and function check items? When I accept an aircraft I assume some switches that should be either off or on are incorrectly set and it's my job is to make sure they are correct. Insane to charge the engineer for this.

It was a "freak" accident because so many holes in the cheese had to line up that day;

door report---switch left in manual after maintenance action---FO misses switch setting in pre-flight scan---Captain misses the same---horn at ten thousand cabin confuses not one but BOTH pilots-Equip cooling problem that is due to lack of pressurization SIDETRACKS both pilots from the real issue---Master Caution oxygen drop annunciation is missed due masking---Plane is light and quickly climbs to its cleared level 340---Captain is EAST German native and accent is strong---FO has just failed captain upgrade and is feeling resentful---they DONT like each other---Helios FA's and flt deck didnt brief together---who knew the code???--FA's remain sitting while plane climbs and climbs---would you sit in your seat while the plane continues to climb?

Who would believe such a scenario?It sounds like science fiction.Precedents of this type of accident (insidious failure to pressurize) have happened but there was always something that broke the chain eg,one flight crew member recognizes what is going on OR FA's making their way to the flight deck regardless of SOP.

If you factor in the old design of the B737 (one horn for 2 different problems) and the fact that failure to pressurize in a climb is insidious and could be a nasty trap,theres no doubt in my mind that this was a "one off" crash and that the flight crew were responsible.Were they unfit?No,pilots have taken off without flaps and stalled.Pilots stalled a 737 on final because they werent monitoring airspeed.Mistakes are part of human nature.

If the two pilots did not get on and were both viewed as weak under pressure,then I would have some measure of agreement in the accusation that they should not have flown together as a crew.But hindsight is 20/20.

In the light of the judgement, I (as an engineer) would have to think long & hard about working either on a Greek registered aircraft or one located there.

10 years for leaving a switch in a certain position & a European arrest warrant meaning you'll probably have to try & get help from your Greek jail cell......

This has shades of the carbon monoxide case, where resort reps were held responsible for a hotel's poor boiler installation.

Many holes in the cheese, indeed...


Akrivos Tsolakis final report :

Latent causes
1. The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits.
2. The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits.
/…/

Alan Irwin
 

Like Trim Run and TOON737, I have known Alan Irwin for a long time - almost 20 years - and can honestly say he is one of the most professional and diligent engineers that I have had the pleasure to work with.

His knowledge and experience on the B737 (and other aircraft types) is beyond reproach and, I can only reiterate other comments made here, that he is being made a scapegoat for, what is basically, 3rd world politics.

Fight them with as much as you've got Al and prove that you are innocent in this affair. It will mean fighting at a high level but you can do it and hit these :mad: where it hurts. There must be many LAE's questioning their job right now and the only way to stop this nonsense is to prove that following AMM procedures is not an offence - my best wishes are with you in this fight!

Such a lack of CRM...
 

Hi All,

This case is particularly pertinent to me and I have taught it a couple of times at work.

The fault in question was reported as "loud knocking noise heard from the aft (starboard) service door during flt" in the cabin defect log. That was transposed into the tech-log as "aft service door requires full inspection". Without getting into the nitty-gritty, the latter is a very different comment. Crew are advised to write symptoms into the log in order for the engineers to work out the cure.

This lead the engrs to carry out the incorrect task, however, the CAUSE of the pressurisation failure should have been picked up by THE FLIGHT CREW. The engineering checks do not require them to put the a/c back to a "standard flight" condition. As a consequence we (pilots) are generally pretty aware of switch positions post maintenance.

I did my training with Andreas Prodromou who was the number 4 steward and he had swapped onto the trip to be with his girlfriend who was the number 3. Andreas had a job starting with Astraeus at the end of the summer season apparently. He would have known what he was looking at when he finally got into the flight deck: we did our MCC on the 737 at Oxford.

The skipper was an incompitent autocrat who thought CRM was a hinderance.

Helios paid lip service to CRM with little formal training.

Jet2 refused to renew the skipper's contract and he ended up at Helios.

Another mate of mine flew with the skipper and when he heard who it was showed no surprise.

This accident could have been avoided had the captain (notice use of lower case "c"):

a) not had 12 jobs in 12 years. It is questionable whether-or-not the captain had covered all the a/c systems within a 3 year period as a result.
b) believed in CRM
c) levelled off when the "gear" horn sounded (the horn was in fact the cabin press warning).

The Hellenic investigators comment in the report:

"...There was such a lack of evidence of CRM that it was considered a major contributrary cause to the accident..."

Sadly, in my humble opinion, whilst there were failings with the Helios management hierarchy and it is right and proper that punative measures are taken, this accident would PROBABLY have been avoided with any other captain.

I strongly agree with all comments reference Engineers and pilots checking switches but think it is EXCEEDINGLY unfair to punish the engineers. This was solely, after the engineering checks, a flight crew related error.

My summary to the courses usually runs along the following lines:

Captains: write SYMPTOMS not the cure into the tech-log.

Cabin Crew: if the masks drop and you still carry on climbing, do what you can to get onto the flight deck

Cause: One switch was in the wrong place and it should have been picked up about 6 times before FL100.

CRM: As per the Hellenic board, "...there was such a lack of evidence of CRM that it was considered to be a major contributrary cause of the accident..."

Helios Trial
 

A few facts;

the CVR was 30 minutes so the last 30 minutes was recorded

it was ASSUMED the engineer left the PMS in MAN because it was found "past MAN" having been severely damaged in the impact and he was the last person who admitted touching it

there is evidence that he did return it to AUTO

there is evidence that it was in AUTO at impact but was moved by the impact

both bleeds were OFF before impact

both audio switches were to MASK


Alan Irwins comments to the investigation were "lost" then "found" but were not considered because they had not been "adopted" by UK AAIB.

The message - be careful what you say to investigators, you can never be certain it won't be used against you

You want me to go on or do you accept someone was stitched up!

AAIB Involvement
 

TOON737 - Alan Irwin is a first class engineer and did nothing wrong.
To answer your last remark, he did appeal to the UK AAIB for help when the Greeks "lost" his submission that showed he could not have left the PMS in MAN - unfortunately they declined to help him clear this up.
They had not appointed an accredited representative because "there was no UK involvement - Safety oversight by UK CAA/JAR 145 Maintenance organisation ATC Lasham/pilots checked out by UK TREs/Alan was a UK LAe/ etc etc - so could not participate in the investigation even though entitled.

Appears to come under the heading of all too difficult and the excuse was not getting involved in criminal proceedings - if Alan is right it is an air safety concern as the investigation has missed the real cause of this accident.

For insufficient, substitute NONE.

If the MM didn't specify that the switch should have been returned to a set position after maintenance, what can he be charged with?

Seems to me as though the Greeks have their scapegoats in a line.

This is a very interesting thread.

Very sad for all involved.

I have not read the details for a long time, but a few points that come to mind.

1. Press switch/knob not the clearest/ind/de-tents.

2. Press mode light/ind cluster as above, waiting to happen.

3. Boeing made previous hi-lights of the above. "Beware"

4. MM checks of this system did not state switch positions after checks.

From memory, some layover/nightstop aircraft would have the outflow valve closed for various reasons, I think method was often by putting selector to Man, run closed, pull aircraft power and then select mode to Auto, next power up all back to normal, no problems.

Thinking about item 2 above, did we not see a good example of this indicator type on a LH 747 at NBO (1975ish ???) that was poss external lighting issues, but even a filament or two failures may not be of help, again thinking back, I recall Green was Auto and Blue was Man ????

Lets hope some lessons are learnt and save others in the future.

I also find it hard to understand how the Engineer is finding himself in this position, what do they say about the law ??????

My last thought for the day, on turnaround/transit aircraft, check panels well, nightstop/layover aircraft check panels well, after maint performed check panels well, after cockpit cleaning check panels well. Don't use Autoscan, use Manscan and keep it interesting(rev scan using other hand works for me)

Cheers all.....

Does any one here have the original verdict by the Greek Judge, or is it not available on internet? I am really very curious to his/her motivation and the underlaying reasoning to convict these 4 seen the availability of proof in this case.
An other matter is offcourse the use of non-punitive information being transformed in punitive, a very very scary development and as such I presume a serious threat to flight safety as such. Forgive me if I am wrong, but I still did not see any evidence of gross negliance or willful misconduct in this matter by the 4 involved.

"Scapegoat...for 3rd world politics"
 

Post #27 inter alia

i) Interesting to compare this judicial decision with similar proceedings in Kingdom of Spain re Spanair accident at Madrid ?

ii) Very interesting to compare and to contrast this decision with likely outcome (no criminal proceeedings; natch?) for the yet-to-be-resolved investigation into the Cork accident, involving as it does a myriad of state supervisory and private organisations and companies [not to mention "ticket sellers"] registered in:

Kingdom of Spain
The United Kingdom
Republic of Ireland
(Banana Republic?) of Isle of Man
[plus overall "control" by the EU]

not to mention original manufacture in the US of A ?

How many "3rd world standard" procedure will that one reveal, I ask

Greek Registered Aircraft
 

Just to amplify a point made by Wenwe; the aircraft was neither Greek registered nor located there. It was a Cypriot registered aircraft based and operated from Larnaca.

This could happen to any of you who manage or work on any aircraft that operates into Greece from UK.

Greece was the State of Occurrence in ICAO speak and the State that conducted the investigation and the State whose legal system allows prosecution on evidence that would not apparently be acceptable in a UK ciminal court.

Airsnoop, very true! Remember the unfortunate Swissair DC8 crew at Hellenikon many years ago!

Yep, and decades later the Jepp still said "use minimum reverse consistent with safety". . . . that will be detent 3 then :D for the safety of my freedom.

ICAO Annex 13
 

I think its worth pointing out this extract from ICAO Annex 13:


5.4.1 Recommendation.— Any judicial or administrative
proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be
separate from any investigation conducted under the
provisions of this Annex.

We all need to think how we would react now if asked to 'co-operate' in an Air Accident Investigation when a European Court can take information from an Accident Investigation Report, which is not intended to apportion blame to an acceptable level to that of a criminal investigation, and use it as evidence of criminal guilt. Imagine what a Jury or non technical Judge could make from and Accident Investigation that was being used by the Prosecution and quoted from in order to apportion blame. Next then, think of the ease in which people can be extradited from the UK to another European State. Can I suggest we all lobby the BALPA and ALAE/Prospect Reps, maybe a joint BALPA/ALAE campaign might be the way forward?

Criminal Prosecution Insurance
 

Perhaps a question we should all be asking our Employers is whether the Company has us covered for Criminal Prosecution Insurance?

Many Airlines would not have this sort of cover to protect its Employees from and at around about an average of one million euros required to defend a person involved in a fatal Transport Aircraft crash its way beyond peoples personal means. Lets also not forget we are not just talking about Pilots and Engineers here but everyone involved in an Airline Operation, Managers, Trainers etc etc