Yet ANOTHER runway incursion incident - KJFK 17/4/2024
The latest version of 'Runway Safety Programme – Global Runway Safety Action Plan' Feb 2024, lists the top contributing factors for runway incursion.
There is a specific section on US risk, page 40.
The FAA analysis uses a weighting based on proximities to fatalities and/or damage, allocating credit for saving lives and minimizing damage. Perhaps this is a contributing factor for the apparent inaction - the data indicates that 'we' are safe; … need to look out of the window, visit the local airport.
https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySa...2024-02-19.pdf
There is a specific section on US risk, page 40.
The FAA analysis uses a weighting based on proximities to fatalities and/or damage, allocating credit for saving lives and minimizing damage. Perhaps this is a contributing factor for the apparent inaction - the data indicates that 'we' are safe; … need to look out of the window, visit the local airport.
https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySa...2024-02-19.pdf
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Did I hear Swiss asking for an intersection departure to be told to expect it and then read it back as a line up instruction only to be told to hold short by ATC?
Food for thought.
Food for thought.
While SWR did include the phrase “line up 4L,” in his read back in response to ATC telling him to plan for a K3 departure at 4L, not clear if he actually intended to enter 4L as he did not use “line up and wait.” Regardless, ATC correctly noted the potential for SWR entering 4L and issued amended instructions to hold short 4L at K3. That’s how the system is supposed to work.
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They needed the intersection to avoid going back in a queue of 20 or so aircraft waiting for departure or they would have needed to refuel. You can understand that after being cleared for takeoff on a runway with 4 crossing aircraft they might have been slightly rattled... I wonder if wishing to depart straight away was the best idea, but on the other had you'd want to get out of the place that tried to kill you as fast as possible...
Originally Posted by Mike current
Yes it was a wrong readback and ATC spotted it and corrected it. That's what readbacks are for.
Originally Posted by Mike
I wonder if wishing to depart straight away was the best idea
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Originally Posted by Mike Current
Readbacks ARE the primary method of safe delivery of an ATC instruction. And it's the controller's responsibility to obtain a correct one.
What comes across loud and clear is that ATC (and flying in general )is a very stressful job !
with this number of aircraft operating in such a confined space incidents must occur more regularly than admitted.
With a simple lapse in concentration by an overworked tired controller ,or a misheard clearance by a stressed pilot operating possibly with poor comms in a strange language with local dialects ( possibly in poor visibility )incidents - accidents seem almost inevitable!
having aircraft on the same runway on different frequencies is crazy and surely should never happen?
new technology ,with fail safe procedures built in , must be the way forward.
would more training ( listening to ATC accents / local dialects procedures etc ) be useful BEFORE flying into a strange airport - so that pilots would be practised in what to expect?
with this number of aircraft operating in such a confined space incidents must occur more regularly than admitted.
With a simple lapse in concentration by an overworked tired controller ,or a misheard clearance by a stressed pilot operating possibly with poor comms in a strange language with local dialects ( possibly in poor visibility )incidents - accidents seem almost inevitable!
having aircraft on the same runway on different frequencies is crazy and surely should never happen?
new technology ,with fail safe procedures built in , must be the way forward.
would more training ( listening to ATC accents / local dialects procedures etc ) be useful BEFORE flying into a strange airport - so that pilots would be practised in what to expect?
Last edited by mahogany bob; 25th Apr 2024 at 05:54.
As a regular visitor to JFK, this is a pretty bad one, even by their standards. Having it set up so that two controllers can give conflicting instructions on the use of one runway seems like an accident waiting to happen to begin with. At a busy airport, different controllers for each runway can be necessary, if not ideal.
I have always wondered about the value of a landing clearance in the States. Why don’t ATC just give it to you as soon as you enter US airspace, as quite normally there could be an indeterminate number of arrivals, departures and runway crossings between getting the clearance and touching down?
I have always wondered about the value of a landing clearance in the States. Why don’t ATC just give it to you as soon as you enter US airspace, as quite normally there could be an indeterminate number of arrivals, departures and runway crossings between getting the clearance and touching down?
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I have always wondered about the value of a landing clearance in the States. Why don’t ATC just give it to you as soon as you enter US airspace, as quite normally there could be an indeterminate number of arrivals, departures and runway crossings between getting the clearance and touching down?
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 25th Apr 2024 at 12:25.
My simple mind says that after maybe 8 hours of being in your own safety protected bubble, in the crucial last couple of minutes, irrespective of visibility, you are thrust into a VFR see and avoid situation, where the controller stops being the one looking out for your safety.
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An active US controller could better explain this than me, but as far as I understood it , the first time I questioned this years ago , was that in the US, the FAA regulations authorizes controllers to give clearance to land if the expectation is that the runway will be clear by the time the aircraft will actually touch down ( or runway crossings are vacated ) It is more like a " continue approach " instruction than a guarantee .the runway is clear at the time the instruction is given as most of us do do in ICAOland. But waiting to be corrected.
As for whether the Swiss crew may have been rattled, this situation was recognized early on by the crew. It was not a high speed RTO. And the Swiss crew quickly negotiated jumping the queue by asking for an intersection departure in order to avoid refueling.
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@Lake1952 : I agree , we are basically discussing this here because there is nothing more serious happening and that spotters are nowadays posting audios and FR24 screenshots on line to make the Buzz. I am inclined to believe those incidents are not a new phenomena, but that they make headlines is new.
As to your remark :
Indeed ! but normally a TWR controller should not be put in that situation , the problem in JFK ( and in other US airports) is that they are massively understaffed and some controllers are doing more tasks that they should.
As to your remark :
not having received a landing clearance yet from a busy controller. It's not great having to ask for a clearance while over the approach lights!
An active US controller could better explain this than me, but as far as I understood it , the first time I questioned this years ago , was that in the US, the FAA regulations authorizes controllers to give clearance to land if the expectation is that the runway will be clear by the time the aircraft will actually touch down ( or runway crossings are vacated ) It is more like a " continue approach " instruction than a guarantee .the runway is clear at the time the instruction is given as most of us do do in ICAOland. But waiting to be corrected.
7110.65, 3-10-6a:
Landing clearance to succeeding aircraft in a landing sequence need not be withheld if you observe the positions of the aircraft and determine that prescribed runway separation will exist when the aircraft crosses the landing threshold.
In this incident, the LC cleared DAL668 to land on 4L at 5 miles using anticipated separation, correctly noting that SWR was taxiing on 4L at the time the landing clearance was issued. But the obligation of the LC to ensure that the required separation is maintained for the landing aircraft doesn’t change one bit if the landing clearance is issued at 5 miles vs 3 miles. Similarly, the level of vigilance for the flight crew to ensure that the landing runway remains clear doesn’t change with a landing clearance at 5 miles vs continue approach at 5 miles and cleared to land at 3 miles.
If the FAA were to transition to the ICAO scheme for consistency or safety, I have no complaint. But until then…
When I started out in ATC, doing aerodrome control training, in the very early 80s, it was normal practice for the ground controller to coordinate runway crossings for aircraft and vehicles internally (that is to say by using an intercom between the two working positions...or shouting across the VCR). The aerodrome controller then put a 'blocking strip' across the runway 'slot' on his/her stripboard. If you're not an aged controller, this may not make much sense to you but in simple terms, a physical space in front of the controller represented the runway and a physical strip was put in that place while the runway was 'given away' to someone else. A simple system which worked if applied correctly.
In those days the only person who usually could have full situational awareness of ground movements was the ground movement controller because aircraft were on one frequency and vehicles typically were on another (usually UHF) and so pilots couldn't hear vehicles and vice-versa. There were systems where the vehicle frequency was rebroadcast on the ground frequency but this often caused congestion on the GMC frequency. Back in those old days I think I recall seeing misunderstandings and recognised that it all those different communication channels were what I would come to know as a hole in the slice of cheese. After some, no doubt, egregious incident in the 90s (although I can't recall which), the UK introduced rules saying that everything happening on the runway had to be on a single frequency so as to provide everyone with potential for as close to full situational awareness as possible. At the time, I think it was a recommended practice in the ICAO SARPs. There was the predictable outcry from just about everybody - controllers didn't like the workload of all those frequency changes and the risk of congestion on the tower frequency, pilots similarly but to a lesser degree, vehicle operators about the expense of a second radio installation and training for drivers who would now be sharing an ATC frequency. But the rule was introduced and is now just day-to-day business. Problems were few and I doubt that a suggestion to go back to the old way would be viewed favourably by many, if any. How many events like the one starting this thread have been prevented I have no idea - how many incidents have occurred because of this way of working is maybe easier to evaluate from occurrence reports, but I am doubtful that there are many resulting from this way of working. It seems to me to be an easy win in terms of safety.
Arguments about the US being 'different' or busier than X, or ATC being short-staffed, are difficult to accept as valid reasons not to work the way that much of the rest of the world does, especially when one sees an incident like this. A proper evaluation of risks and benefits (rather than my vague recollections) would likely quantify identifiable safety benefits. It almost seems like the US is creating the environment for a serious accident and now it is just a matter of waiting for it to happen.
In those days the only person who usually could have full situational awareness of ground movements was the ground movement controller because aircraft were on one frequency and vehicles typically were on another (usually UHF) and so pilots couldn't hear vehicles and vice-versa. There were systems where the vehicle frequency was rebroadcast on the ground frequency but this often caused congestion on the GMC frequency. Back in those old days I think I recall seeing misunderstandings and recognised that it all those different communication channels were what I would come to know as a hole in the slice of cheese. After some, no doubt, egregious incident in the 90s (although I can't recall which), the UK introduced rules saying that everything happening on the runway had to be on a single frequency so as to provide everyone with potential for as close to full situational awareness as possible. At the time, I think it was a recommended practice in the ICAO SARPs. There was the predictable outcry from just about everybody - controllers didn't like the workload of all those frequency changes and the risk of congestion on the tower frequency, pilots similarly but to a lesser degree, vehicle operators about the expense of a second radio installation and training for drivers who would now be sharing an ATC frequency. But the rule was introduced and is now just day-to-day business. Problems were few and I doubt that a suggestion to go back to the old way would be viewed favourably by many, if any. How many events like the one starting this thread have been prevented I have no idea - how many incidents have occurred because of this way of working is maybe easier to evaluate from occurrence reports, but I am doubtful that there are many resulting from this way of working. It seems to me to be an easy win in terms of safety.
Arguments about the US being 'different' or busier than X, or ATC being short-staffed, are difficult to accept as valid reasons not to work the way that much of the rest of the world does, especially when one sees an incident like this. A proper evaluation of risks and benefits (rather than my vague recollections) would likely quantify identifiable safety benefits. It almost seems like the US is creating the environment for a serious accident and now it is just a matter of waiting for it to happen.
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In the Jeppesen charts for KJFK, the REF index, Overview/Weather there is a Statement:-
“ CAUTION : Possible Radio Interference or False Instructions may occur on Tower Frequencies “
“ CAUTION : Possible Radio Interference or False Instructions may occur on Tower Frequencies “