Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade
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Yes that's true, I mentioned it in an earlier post. The recording has been edited and that includes cutting the comms from the pilot's side during the most important part.
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Pretty much never. In this case it's not like they changed their mind halfway through taxiing, I think it's pretty much been established that the early turn was unintentional.
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Something needs to be done with pilot's selection in Europe. Some dad's money for the license and some good connections can get people killed.
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
This whole things reminds me a bit of this accident, another somewhat unintentional line up that time due to poor EFB terminology. 09#T1 instead of 09-T1 and they meant very different things!
https://avherald.com/h?article=48c78b3a
again on this flight, some concern was expressed on their performance capacity, but it was overruled. There was also a flight somewhere in Caribbean but I forget the details.
“The number of incidents is increasing”. Do you have a source for that claim? Although yes I would agree with you pilot selection and training can be improved; hopefully others follow BA, TUI and a few others lead paying for suitable cadets but I won’t be holding my breath
https://avherald.com/h?article=48c78b3a
again on this flight, some concern was expressed on their performance capacity, but it was overruled. There was also a flight somewhere in Caribbean but I forget the details.
“The number of incidents is increasing”. Do you have a source for that claim? Although yes I would agree with you pilot selection and training can be improved; hopefully others follow BA, TUI and a few others lead paying for suitable cadets but I won’t be holding my breath
Last edited by V_2; 22nd Feb 2024 at 20:00.
Indeed!
in this original post I added a screenshot with ADSB data, but that was removed by the Mods when merging two of my posts (similar, but different).
Here you can see, extracted from the pax clip, the crossing of the airport access road and while still in scud-running mode, it's well above 6m
And few seconds later in the clip, converging onto the highway just visible in the triangle between flap and track fairing, at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').
Both the AVHerald report and a Mentour.com article, still maintain to this moment that the E195 was on the ground till some 180, resp. 300 meters into the field beyond the airport fence.
Early on, the ADSB data already indicated otherwise and now the prelim report seems to indicate that the perimeter fence was not struck by the fuselage, at worst only stroked.
Here you can see, extracted from the pax clip, the crossing of the airport access road and while still in scud-running mode, it's well above 6m
And few seconds later in the clip, converging onto the highway just visible in the triangle between flap and track fairing, at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').
Both the AVHerald report and a Mentour.com article, still maintain to this moment that the E195 was on the ground till some 180, resp. 300 meters into the field beyond the airport fence.
Early on, the ADSB data already indicated otherwise and now the prelim report seems to indicate that the perimeter fence was not struck by the fuselage, at worst only stroked.
I am not clear that there is a material difference between striking and stroking in THIS context.
It seems clear from the images that the body of the craft was clear of obstructions as it passed over the highway.
It seems clear from the images that the body of the craft was clear of obstructions as it passed over the highway.
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Indeed!
Here you can see, extracted from the pax clip, the crossing of the airport access road and while still in scud-running mode, it's well above 6m
And few seconds later in the clip, converging onto the highway just visible in the triangle between flap and track fairing, at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').
.
Here you can see, extracted from the pax clip, the crossing of the airport access road and while still in scud-running mode, it's well above 6m
And few seconds later in the clip, converging onto the highway just visible in the triangle between flap and track fairing, at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').
.
I also thought it was the captain saying it, because I felt like I recognized the voice.
Something needs to be done with pilot's selection in Europe. Some dad's money for the license and some good connections can get people killed.
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
The problem is that EASA is under the influence of lobbies, flight schools, airlines, and will never admit the link between flight safety and money making.
That's the final report of one of the runway excursions this airline had, they had a couple more after this one
During the investigation the pilot training records were scrutinized to reveal potential gaps in the pilot training and checking process. The available information about the training process of the pilot involved in the serious incident reveals that the pilot had the Type Rating Training Course (Initial training) for the aircraft type BD-500 (A220) from September 1 till November 26, 2020. The course training records reveal some deficiencies of the pilot’s flight skills: incorrect manipulation with the sidestick, pumping of the rudder for the directional control, untimely and inadequate rudder pedals input to ensure directional control, unnecessary application of brakes, etc. In the first Latvian CAA Skill test and proficiency check after the Rating Training Course the pilot failed due to “Insufficient skills. Lack of time.” After the additional training the test was passed.
In 2021, the pilot had further Flight Trainings. The Flight Training Records contain remarks of the flight instructors, namely, periodical uncertainty in command of the aircraft and crew and lack of exchange of flight information with the pilot-monitoring [FO] when flying manually. The investigation has analysed the all available (provided) information about the training process of the pilot involved in the serious incident and suggests that there are potential gaps in the company pilots’ selection, training and checking programs, as well as in the information exchange and analysis by the airline's training department. The investigation has no access to the information on how the operator collects and analyses the information gathered during the training process.
There is a possibility that the pilot with obvious deficiencies during the training and checking period was authorized for line operations without having additional training or another means of mitigation to minimize potential risks. A similar situation with incorrect pilot actions during the landing in crosswind and gusty conditions occurred on June 21, 2018 at the Riga International airport with the airBaltic aircraft A200-300, registration number YL-CSC [Final Report No 4-02/1-18(4-19)]. The FDR data of the involved aircraft showed the application of the right rudder pedal with a simultaneous increase of the left brake pedal application. The higher brake force application on the left-hand side main gear wheels caused the aircraft deviation to the left with a subsequent aircraft side skid.
The investigation of this serious incident concluded, that the Root cause of the incident [21/06/2018] was related with uncoordinated asymmetric actions of the flight crew in controlling of the aircraft during the landing. Analysing the actions of the airline pilots in both situations, the investigators can assume that the repeated cause of the incidents was the improper handling of the aircraft by the crews to counteract crosswind conditions. It is likely possible that the airline pilot training program has not been updated considering possible deficiencies and the previous incident.
But I don't know what your definition of ravine is, so here is all relevant and reliable info regarding the slight downhill slope between the airport access road (so NOT the highway) and the airfield.
Given that the relevant 12R slope chart is limited to the airfield perimeter, I added as reference the 12L which starts from near the airport access road (elevations shown in meters)
Poorly readable (due to my bad image rotation software), but by the time it crossed the access road, ADSB indicated a 25ft (rounded to nearest 25) height gain in ref. to the runway, with also a marginal, but positive vertical speeds being reported since the RESA. So yes, initially I thought that the slight downhill slope was a main factor in the E195's wheels losing contact with the surface but the prelim. report seems to indicate that they even managed to clear the airport perimeter fence somehow, so terrain downslope (and clear of obstacles) was welcome, but not essential for becoming airborne.
... ... highway is on higher ground, so they were about 6m above highway (passenger saw the billboard - not this one, but one on the highway - almost aligned with an airplane). So here they are in ground effect, because ravine starts immediately after the end of a runway. Basically - ravine saves the day. They started climbing after this access road.
)
I leave it up to the audience to guesstimate the height flow above the E70 highway, but given the 1792ft/min RoC at that point (albeit one of the first indications that a solid RoC was being established), I don't think we'll hear much complaints about car rooftops being scratched
Interesting.
But I don't see how pilot selection is responsible for something happening to a captain, years after being hired.
Anything can happen to people, they can have any life accident which will reduce their ability at work. And it's not related to selection.
However what would be very much related to selection would be an accident in pay2fly conditions.
For example this one :
https://bea.aero/fileadmin/documents...0329.en_05.pdf
The following organisational factors contributed to the crew’s poor performance: ˆ the choice of flight crew recruitment profiles by the operator, motivated by economic considerations, and inadequate airline conversion, led to operating aeroplanes with crews that were relatively inexperienced on type and in their roles as captain or copilot;
But I don't see how pilot selection is responsible for something happening to a captain, years after being hired.
Anything can happen to people, they can have any life accident which will reduce their ability at work. And it's not related to selection.
However what would be very much related to selection would be an accident in pay2fly conditions.
For example this one :
https://bea.aero/fileadmin/documents...0329.en_05.pdf
The following organisational factors contributed to the crew’s poor performance: ˆ the choice of flight crew recruitment profiles by the operator, motivated by economic considerations, and inadequate airline conversion, led to operating aeroplanes with crews that were relatively inexperienced on type and in their roles as captain or copilot;
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Good for you that you're familiar. I'm totally not familiar.
But I don't know what your definition of ravine is, so here is all relevant and reliable info regarding the slight downhill slope between the airport access road (so NOT the highway) and the airfield.
Given that the relevant 12R slope chart is limited to the airfield perimeter, I added as reference the 12L which starts from near the airport access road (elevations shown in meters)
I leave it up to the audience to guesstimate the height flow above the E70 highway, but given the 1792ft/min RoC at that point (albeit one of the first indications that a solid RoC was being established), I don't think we'll hear much complaints about car rooftops being scratched
But I don't know what your definition of ravine is, so here is all relevant and reliable info regarding the slight downhill slope between the airport access road (so NOT the highway) and the airfield.
Given that the relevant 12R slope chart is limited to the airfield perimeter, I added as reference the 12L which starts from near the airport access road (elevations shown in meters)
I leave it up to the audience to guesstimate the height flow above the E70 highway, but given the 1792ft/min RoC at that point (albeit one of the first indications that a solid RoC was being established), I don't think we'll hear much complaints about car rooftops being scratched
In the old days you might have got away with it but most modern software tries to achieve the lowest thrust possible (for engineering costs) through multiple methods that only just collectively satisfy performance criteria. That reduces the margins if anything goes not according to plan, both inside and outside - an attempted stop even slightly above V1 will likely take you off the runway at some speed, for example. The same applies for takeoff.
There are technical partial solutions, such as RAAS (Runway Awareness and Advisory System), which if it had been fitted in this case might have cautioned them about the distance available, or generated a “CAUTION SHORT RUNWAY, SHORT RUNWAY" as they attempted to take off. There has long been talk of fitting TOPMs (TakeOff Performance Monitor) which would extrapolate current acceleration and runway left to warn if it didn’t look good, but I don’t know if any have actually made it into service with any aircraft types.
Well, I am familiar because this is my daily route, and also I have photographed lots of JAT and Air Serbia airplanes (TO/Landings). So, google anyway is barely just a reference. So - the road that goes to the airport is on the downhill after the runway, then it goes uphill till the airport building. So that part of the road you see in passenger video is in "ravine". They flew over it in ground effect. Downslope starts after the end of the runway, then there is a hole or ravine (you can call it as you want) for access road to airport. Highway is above that road, and they started to climb just before it. I don't have rights to paste the links, so I will do it gladly when I am able to do (maybe in 2 or 3 posts more).
If you don't like thread drift, please look away now.
A good investigation will keep an open mind and will consider all possible causes until there is evidence that it is not relevant to the accident/incident. Hopefully, time will tell whether pilot selection is in any way relevant to the AS/Marathon incident.
But the question menekse raises is interesting and can be applied to all parts of the aviation system. EASA appears to be an organisation that believes that rules make things safe; ergo, more rules equals more safe. This is easy to spot simply by reference to the Easy Access guides published by EASA, usually running to hundreds of pages of detailed rules to be followed. Some of these rules provide for flexibility and rely on service providers/operators establishing working methods to complement the rules. In truth, the rule frameworks are often pretty good, but are often let down by poor implementation and weak oversight by competent authorities.
Pilot selection and training is not an area with which I am involved closely but my understanding is that reduced modular training programmes, can result in a pilot operating commercial flights after some 250 hours of flying experience, are required to be complemented by further training by the operator. Presumably this operator training has the objective of providing the new pilot with a similar level of knowledge to a pilot who followed an old/classic/traditional career path and who often would find themselves in the right-hand seat of a commuter type of aircraft for a while before moving up to faster, more complex aircraft over a period of years. Identifying all of the knowledge and skills learned and developed during those formative years and 1500 hours or whatever is not easy. More difficult still, it transferring that knowledge to a new pilot. For those of us with many years of experience, it is very difficult to recall just how green and stupid we were in the early stages of our careers. So, this supplemental training needs to be provided by someone specifically selected for their understanding of effective training techniques, of what knowledge/skills the new pilot already has, and the gap that needs to be filled. Like I say, piloting is not my specialist area, so please tell me……who does get to do the supplemental training and how do they get selected?
There are a good many other questions I could ask, but I would offer a parallel from my days as a controller when a fair proportion of those individuals nominated to check the competence of us line controllers were quite probably the last people who should have had that responsibility 😊.
Originally Posted by menekse
Something needs to be done with pilot's selection in Europe. Some dad's money for the license and some good connections can get people killed.
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
But the question menekse raises is interesting and can be applied to all parts of the aviation system. EASA appears to be an organisation that believes that rules make things safe; ergo, more rules equals more safe. This is easy to spot simply by reference to the Easy Access guides published by EASA, usually running to hundreds of pages of detailed rules to be followed. Some of these rules provide for flexibility and rely on service providers/operators establishing working methods to complement the rules. In truth, the rule frameworks are often pretty good, but are often let down by poor implementation and weak oversight by competent authorities.
Pilot selection and training is not an area with which I am involved closely but my understanding is that reduced modular training programmes, can result in a pilot operating commercial flights after some 250 hours of flying experience, are required to be complemented by further training by the operator. Presumably this operator training has the objective of providing the new pilot with a similar level of knowledge to a pilot who followed an old/classic/traditional career path and who often would find themselves in the right-hand seat of a commuter type of aircraft for a while before moving up to faster, more complex aircraft over a period of years. Identifying all of the knowledge and skills learned and developed during those formative years and 1500 hours or whatever is not easy. More difficult still, it transferring that knowledge to a new pilot. For those of us with many years of experience, it is very difficult to recall just how green and stupid we were in the early stages of our careers. So, this supplemental training needs to be provided by someone specifically selected for their understanding of effective training techniques, of what knowledge/skills the new pilot already has, and the gap that needs to be filled. Like I say, piloting is not my specialist area, so please tell me……who does get to do the supplemental training and how do they get selected?
There are a good many other questions I could ask, but I would offer a parallel from my days as a controller when a fair proportion of those individuals nominated to check the competence of us line controllers were quite probably the last people who should have had that responsibility 😊.