Korean Air A330 off runway in Phillipines
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Johannesburg
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: behind the moon
Posts: 83
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
the local crews are through out the bank incompetent. This was just a typical korean **** up.
I worked there the last years of my carreer and the storries I could tell would fill ma y evenings
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
the local crews are through out the bank incompetent. This was just a typical korean **** up.
I worked there the last years of my carreer and the storries I could tell would fill ma y evenings
All conjecture at this stage, of course.
all conjecture, but stuff happens. A crew deciding to do a G/A and then changing their mind has parked shiny bits in the weeds before too.
Never understood the warning inhibit rationale for lé Bus breaks, but then, golly, it is a wonderful advanced alerting system and everyone should have it as it is great and isnt it a shame that the dastardly B737 doesnt and well, golly, is that the grass coming up? But, I have the glorious advanced alerting system that B737 drivers can only dream about, and yet, there goes the approach lights, and, the LLZ antenna, and... whoops, lift your feet...
The auto brake function is triggered when selected, by the deployment of the ground spoilers... with MAX being modulated until the NLG WOW is made, assuming that the BSCU is working in the first place. Without the BSCU there isn't much B going along except for alternate W/O Anti-skid. The LDR for No ant skid, no spoilers, no TR is... a lot. No book handy, but it is usually at least 1.7 times the factored landing distance.
Last edited by fdr; 25th Oct 2022 at 00:17.
If you're wondering why, lookup Lauda 767 accident...
1. The failsafe autostow system didn't on the PW4060...
2. the modeling of controllability did not acurately account for the lift loss in the wake of the engine's reverse plume or the added drag from that cause.
A lot of negative comments were made early on about the crew's competency until the revised data was on hand, and that stopped much of the noise.A type I still fly has just dumped a plane in the dirt due to a TR deployment, they are not much fun, and the crews response when the system doesn't play ball is about the same as entering auto in an R22 with an engine failure, getting the N1 down to idle if the system doesn't is fairly desirable.
I was directly involved in the Lauda investigation (BTW, one of the most unpleasant things I've ever done - I could never be an accident investigator, I found it too painful). They'd actually done a flight test on a 767 when they deployed a reverser in flight - but they'd done it with the engine already at idle, at 10k/200 knots. Lauda happened with the engine at max climb, 24k/Mach 0.78. Although the FADEC automatically commanded idle, at those conditions it would have taken nearly 30 seconds for the engine to reach idle - by which time it was way too late and the aircraft was already starting to break up. I participated in a wind tunnel test with a deployed reverser at Boeing Vertol in Philly. There was a rather annoying Aero S&C type that insisted the aircraft was controllable and the Lauda pilots messed - at least he did before we started testing. After he started seeing the data, he got real quiet. Although there was a time when I might have understood all those controllability coefficients, after over 15 years of working engines I'd forgotten all that S&C stuff. However at the end of the test, we did a flow visualization using hundreds of yarn tufts. THAT just anyone could understand - with the engine at high power nearly the entire upper surface of that wing was separated
. They never stood a chance.
Actually, auto-restow actually contributed to the accident. Although we never positively identified why the Directional Control Valve (DCV) changed state from 'stow' to 'deploy', a mis-rigged auto-restow sensor (indicating the reverser wasn't stowed) activated auto-restow which opened the Hydraulic Isolation Valve - providing hydraulic pressure to the reverser so that when the DCV changed state the reverser deployed.
I was directly involved in the Lauda investigation (BTW, one of the most unpleasant things I've ever done - I could never be an accident investigator, I found it too painful). They'd actually done a flight test on a 767 when they deployed a reverser in flight - but they'd done it with the engine already at idle, at 10k/200 knots. Lauda happened with the engine at max climb, 24k/Mach 0.78. Although the FADEC automatically commanded idle, at those conditions it would have taken nearly 30 seconds for the engine to reach idle - by which time it was way too late and the aircraft was already starting to break up. I participated in a wind tunnel test with a deployed reverser at Boeing Vertol in Philly. There was a rather annoying Aero S&C type that insisted the aircraft was controllable and the Lauda pilots messed - at least he did before we started testing. After he started seeing the data, he got real quiet. Although there was a time when I might have understood all those controllability coefficients, after over 15 years of working engines I'd forgotten all that S&C stuff. However at the end of the test, we did a flow visualization using hundreds of yarn tufts. THAT just anyone could understand - with the engine at high power nearly the entire upper surface of that wing was separated. They never stood a chance.
I was directly involved in the Lauda investigation (BTW, one of the most unpleasant things I've ever done - I could never be an accident investigator, I found it too painful). They'd actually done a flight test on a 767 when they deployed a reverser in flight - but they'd done it with the engine already at idle, at 10k/200 knots. Lauda happened with the engine at max climb, 24k/Mach 0.78. Although the FADEC automatically commanded idle, at those conditions it would have taken nearly 30 seconds for the engine to reach idle - by which time it was way too late and the aircraft was already starting to break up. I participated in a wind tunnel test with a deployed reverser at Boeing Vertol in Philly. There was a rather annoying Aero S&C type that insisted the aircraft was controllable and the Lauda pilots messed - at least he did before we started testing. After he started seeing the data, he got real quiet. Although there was a time when I might have understood all those controllability coefficients, after over 15 years of working engines I'd forgotten all that S&C stuff. However at the end of the test, we did a flow visualization using hundreds of yarn tufts. THAT just anyone could understand - with the engine at high power nearly the entire upper surface of that wing was separated
. They never stood a chance.
Spoiler
One aspect of the design that concerned me was that the DCV could effectively be irrelevant if the NRV in the bypass line was defective, and permitted pressure to be applied from the bypass line.
University of Bielefeld (presumably Peter Ladkin's group) has a copy of the Lauda 004 report issued by Thailand. It is pretty brief for the event, and lacks much supporting data... but it is interesting/
https://web.archive.org/web/20110607...RPT.html#App_C
A surprisingly good precis of the accident is also found here:
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/...4-7ba96f9571bf
Last edited by fdr; 25th Oct 2022 at 00:15. Reason: found the old Thai report
Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?
etc,
should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?
The MD11F that missed the runway at Ted Stevens 2 times, having got to close to 360 kts at 3000' on the arrival into FAA airspace? With a constant litany of "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP", counting those was tedious. Apparently the FAA licensed foreign pilot never bothered to read §91.117. What got me on that was, when he got to 1 nm final with a bit of flap, no gear and doing 260kts, @ 800'AGL, he finally decided to do a.... something, I know not what. It was best described as a wobbly RH wiggle to return to the same place in space, at same configuration, speed, and altitude, and then finally did a formal go around. Same guy decided to take off with all 3 IRS' with warnings on check position, and lost all nav functions when he hit the go bar.
KAL is an interesting place, it has some of the best engineers on the planet. It does have some institutional issues with a punitive culture, which is in keeping with being in a state of war for 70 years, so, they take punishment to a different level to what the west is used to.
There are some really good Korean pilots out there, a couple of the best are now dead, but they were brilliant. There are some that would stand their ground anywhere in the world, and do. There have been some excellent foreign pilots there, and there were some that used P-51 pretty enthusiastically. A number of foreigners were treated poorly by KAL, but not that much differently to how KAL treated Koreans, other than those that had F-5A time... You might be surprised by the statistics of events/nationality, and the absolutely dumb as dog dirt events that were done by [insert nationality]'s.
As far as this crew goes, I would think it prudent to hold off until more information is at hand before commenting on a given nationality's competency. Remember, it wasn't Indonesians or Ethiopians that designed the B/S system that ended up killing 346 people
On saving the day, there is one particular case where that certainly is a true statement, involves Stuart AFB. KAL additionally had a number of events where the decision of the PIC of non Korean nationality took a lot of effort to be swallowed.
The best helicopter pilots I ever flew with were Japanese, Japanese, French and Australian, in that order. The most impressive CRM I have ever evaluated was by a Russian pilot. The most beautiful set of hands I have ever seen fly an aircraft were attached to an Ethiopian, one who was also well known in the system, and who on entry into a room could make those red necked pilots that spent their time talking about skin colour fawn obsequiously, they had been fortunate to have this gifted man do instruction on their jumbo's. I had the previlidge of flying with Bob Hoover and Bob Love in a T28 and P51 on the same day, to have done training with "airbum" in his Pitts, and the Ethiopian landed a B744 in interesting conditions into JFK that were more impressive. The best TRI I have ever flown with was an Indian... the most knowledgable pilot I have ever worked with on aircraft technical matters was an Iranian.
You are welcome to your opinion, I think there is more to see when eyes are open.
Last edited by fdr; 25th Oct 2022 at 01:02.
Join Date: Mar 2020
Location: 2019
Posts: 8
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
Was it the culture or the food that inspired the move to Korea?
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 287
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
One of the photos doing the rounds shows the MLG doors are open, suggesting at the least, a green hydraulic system failure.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.
“RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding.”
#8 fdr
“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS
Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.
#8 fdr
“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS
Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.
“RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding.”
#8 fdr
“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS
Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.
#8 fdr
“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS
Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.
One of the photos doing the rounds shows the MLG doors are open, suggesting at the least, a green hydraulic system failure.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.
Both T/Rs appear to be stowed, which is odd. The main doors if they are open is definitely indicating a Green system failure which is going to be a pain, but would have been manageable, assuming that the BSCU was working, and there were no other failures. The blue and yellow are the TR powers respectively for Left and right engines... and as they are not extended, on an overrun, and a very slow deceleration, that suggests the guys had a compound problem. The fact they landed on an airport suggests that it wasn't loss of all 3 hydraulics... so am thinking Green + BSCU (G/A Sensing failure) which gives open inner gear doors, no T/R's, no ground spoilers, and alternate brakes only without anti-skid. That would put the aircraft in the weeds in most cases, outside of maybe Edwards.
Losing a HYD and another sensing system may suggest that the second landing was less than stellar, but, if no one died in this, am gonna give some latitude to the guys. The second landing may have some echoes of Iberia's -600... Going to be interesting to get the full report.... except it is CAAP land. KCASA will have more on it probably.
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: Europe
Posts: 7
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm often surprised by the lack of empathy when topics such as this make their way onto the forum. I wonder if it's a matter of psychological relief, knowing statistically accidents will happen and that it was not to “me” that it happened? Could it be a deluded belief that there are no circumstances that provide a degree of complexity where I would run out of ideas before I run out of fuel?
There is no empirical evidence to show that this crew was less well trained or less competent than any contributor to this forum. Until we understand the complexity of the situation that this crew faced perhaps we should leave it at that.
I wonder if anybody understands what this crew is facing not just today or this week but potentially for the remainder of their lives. It is not surprising that most may not understand. These may have the luxury of an ”oops I'm sorry” if they found themselves in a similar situation. Comfortable in the knowledge that they would be cocooned by those who are concerned about their mental well-being, would be represented by those standing up for their employment rights, be defended by those who would stand up to the authorities for them, there would be those who would defend against cruelty from the press, and there would be those who stood in the community understanding that they did everything in their power to avert an accident but in spite of this an accident occurred.
What might it feel like to become the symbol of national shame, what would it feel like to be the individuals who let the company down, what must it feel like to be the people who spurred on the cruel assumptions about the competence of your fellow nationals, what might it feel like to let your family down, no longer able to look up to you in a position held in high esteem by society
It is the greatest failing of CRM that there are still those who believe that it is only the "other" who is subject to overload, and it is only the self who in the absence of any evidence is able to draw a reliable conclusion, is able to cast aspersions, and is fully in their right to demonstrate one of the core characteristics of a psychopathy; zero empathy.
Oops, if I offended you, I'm sorry.
There is no empirical evidence to show that this crew was less well trained or less competent than any contributor to this forum. Until we understand the complexity of the situation that this crew faced perhaps we should leave it at that.
I wonder if anybody understands what this crew is facing not just today or this week but potentially for the remainder of their lives. It is not surprising that most may not understand. These may have the luxury of an ”oops I'm sorry” if they found themselves in a similar situation. Comfortable in the knowledge that they would be cocooned by those who are concerned about their mental well-being, would be represented by those standing up for their employment rights, be defended by those who would stand up to the authorities for them, there would be those who would defend against cruelty from the press, and there would be those who stood in the community understanding that they did everything in their power to avert an accident but in spite of this an accident occurred.
What might it feel like to become the symbol of national shame, what would it feel like to be the individuals who let the company down, what must it feel like to be the people who spurred on the cruel assumptions about the competence of your fellow nationals, what might it feel like to let your family down, no longer able to look up to you in a position held in high esteem by society
It is the greatest failing of CRM that there are still those who believe that it is only the "other" who is subject to overload, and it is only the self who in the absence of any evidence is able to draw a reliable conclusion, is able to cast aspersions, and is fully in their right to demonstrate one of the core characteristics of a psychopathy; zero empathy.
Oops, if I offended you, I'm sorry.