Helios Crash
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Airsnoop, I know it wasn't Greek registered.
Unless I stop working for my (or probably any other UK) employer, I'm open to the same system should the unthinkabe happen.
The only thing I can control is not working on Greek aircraft.
Unless I stop working for my (or probably any other UK) employer, I'm open to the same system should the unthinkabe happen.
The only thing I can control is not working on Greek aircraft.
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Marvo999
Time was when the UK AAIB would have become involved in the investigation and would have protected the UK interest but it appears to be no longer the case.
Last edited by airsnoop; 24th Apr 2012 at 13:09.
Alan - a Good Guy
Just a quick line to add my support to Alan. He was our lead ground engineer when we were operating the old BAC1-11s and B737-200s at European Air Charter. What a good time we all had with EAC . . . lovely bunch of people and Alan was a super ground engineer. Very efficient, very skilled and totally reliable from a pilot's point of view. We wish you well, Alan.
By the way, TOON737, are you our old Geordie mate from EAC days ?
Regards to all ex EAC people.
By the way, TOON737, are you our old Geordie mate from EAC days ?
Regards to all ex EAC people.
Join Date: Feb 1998
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It was a "freak" accident because so many holes in the cheese had to line up that day;
incident" are only heard in politics where the involvement of
politicians was the sole cause of the event (ie they cannot pin
it on anyone else), not in real life. And definitely not in aviation
Almost all aviation prangs are full of lined-up cheese holes eg
SQ006 under the same false rationale could also be classed a
"freak accident", as could Lima, Helios, etc.
Join Date: Nov 1999
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Flight deck switch positions and Boeing SOP
Just a comment, if procedures taught by Boeing flight training are used, then the switch positions on the overhead are set/verified by the first officer, during the pre taxi check the pressurisation panel items are challenge/responded by the first officer whilst being monitored by the captain.
This procedure is based on areas or responsibility, at no point does the land. Asked engineer have any responsibility to position/verify/challenge/respond to the the status of the switches on the pressurisation panel, or indeed any other panel on the flight deck.
The incident was not the responsibility of the engineer, it was a consequence of poorly executed procedure and appalling CRM by the flight crew. Sadly, with regard to one of the crew members, this was, a known fact. Tragically when it was discovered no one had the b***s to bring the situation to a close.
This procedure is based on areas or responsibility, at no point does the land. Asked engineer have any responsibility to position/verify/challenge/respond to the the status of the switches on the pressurisation panel, or indeed any other panel on the flight deck.
The incident was not the responsibility of the engineer, it was a consequence of poorly executed procedure and appalling CRM by the flight crew. Sadly, with regard to one of the crew members, this was, a known fact. Tragically when it was discovered no one had the b***s to bring the situation to a close.
Parking Secuity requires outflow closed
After completing their O/N checks, Engineers are often expected to close the outflow valves for security and inclement weather reasons, especially for overnight parking.
Therefore, in my experience, it is not uncommon for Flight crew to find the control in manual; they are responsible to set up the pressurization panel.
Well wishes to Alan.
Therefore, in my experience, it is not uncommon for Flight crew to find the control in manual; they are responsible to set up the pressurization panel.
Well wishes to Alan.
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NOT the engineer!
I hope that the aviation profession does not turn its back upon this ludicrous plan to crucify the engineer. This is not just some isolated weirdo decision emanating from an equally weirdo foreign judiciary. Not only is it blatantly wrong but it is also a wake-up call for those around the world (and closer to home!) who would espouse a continental style of justice.
I have many thousands of hours in Seat 0A in Boeings. Never, ever, have I heard it even faintly suggested that switch positions should be set by the engineers. In fact, one expects almost quite the opposite – without casting any aspersions whatsoever upon the engineers – but (especially) when an aircraft arrives from the hangar one actually expects the switches to be in anything but the correct position. If you cannot be bothered to check your switches, you should not be allowed on the airport, let alone on an aircraft.
Is it too much to expect that responsible aviation companies might show sufficient contempt for this turn of events to call a boycott of the country concerned?
Prober
I have many thousands of hours in Seat 0A in Boeings. Never, ever, have I heard it even faintly suggested that switch positions should be set by the engineers. In fact, one expects almost quite the opposite – without casting any aspersions whatsoever upon the engineers – but (especially) when an aircraft arrives from the hangar one actually expects the switches to be in anything but the correct position. If you cannot be bothered to check your switches, you should not be allowed on the airport, let alone on an aircraft.
Is it too much to expect that responsible aviation companies might show sufficient contempt for this turn of events to call a boycott of the country concerned?
Prober
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Might be good practice EK..however it isn't always done that way. In any case this had nothing to do with the engineer and everything to do with the flight crew missing the switch position. There aren't too many things that will get you in trouble, but pressurization/flaps are two that will..pretty much any professional aircrew that I know checks these things on preflight, just before t/o and through 10 000'.
Can't believe the engineer is getting any blame here at all.
Can't believe the engineer is getting any blame here at all.
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I think EK Profesional is pretty accurate. Yes, the crew should have checked, but it isn't helpful to receive an aircraft back from maintenance this way. As good as the engineer is, I think he should have done better before the aircraft was released to service. A jail sentence though ? categorically no but then again Greek justice is cr*p and they are looking for their scapegoat.
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Sure it wasn't mandated by the AMM procedure, but isn't it good maintenance practice to put switches and systems configured back to the way they are found?
The setting of any switch or control on any of the panels identified as under the responsibilty of the flight crew by the Boeing operational manuals, comprises the operational configuration for which the engineers have absolutely no responsibilty whatsoever.
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Abbot and Sciolites........spot on.
We've all done first flight checks and found switches out of position after the engineers have worked on the aircraft.
Yes, it would be nice if they did put them back in the correct position but repsonsiblity for making sure that everything is in the correct position and is working when those thrust levers are moved forward rests with the flightcrew and ulitmately the person occupying the LHS.
On my current aircraft, pressurisation settings and switching is checked in the FD Safety Checks then the Before Start Checks then the ATO Checks (as well as my 'scan' after the FO has told me Safety Checks are complete and that dying 'art' called airmanship with a check of the pressurisation every 10000').
It comes down to training, supervision and company culture, all 3 of which have to be questioned in this case.
We've all done first flight checks and found switches out of position after the engineers have worked on the aircraft.
Yes, it would be nice if they did put them back in the correct position but repsonsiblity for making sure that everything is in the correct position and is working when those thrust levers are moved forward rests with the flightcrew and ulitmately the person occupying the LHS.
On my current aircraft, pressurisation settings and switching is checked in the FD Safety Checks then the Before Start Checks then the ATO Checks (as well as my 'scan' after the FO has told me Safety Checks are complete and that dying 'art' called airmanship with a check of the pressurisation every 10000').
It comes down to training, supervision and company culture, all 3 of which have to be questioned in this case.
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AMM Procedure
While your arguments about whether or not there is a requirement for the engineer to leave a switch in a certain position are great, please don't lose sight of the basic fact that:
---THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE LEFT IT IN MAN---
It was just assumed he must have done, because he was the last person known to have touched it before the pilots got on board!
---THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE LEFT IT IN MAN---
It was just assumed he must have done, because he was the last person known to have touched it before the pilots got on board!
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And another thing
In the Conclusions to the official report it is quite clear that the engineers actions were neither causal nor contributory to the accident.
Also the investigation found that the Flight Crew were Qualified, medically fit and well rested, and the aircraft carried no deferred defects.
It doesn't get much better than that, so where is the link between the management and the accident!
So what did cause this accident, and why were both audio switches to MASK and both air bleed switches OFF?
Also the investigation found that the Flight Crew were Qualified, medically fit and well rested, and the aircraft carried no deferred defects.
It doesn't get much better than that, so where is the link between the management and the accident!
So what did cause this accident, and why were both audio switches to MASK and both air bleed switches OFF?
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“It is good that there are some guilty parties here, because in Cyprus no one was found guilty,” said Sophia Charalambous, wife of the ill-fated flight’s co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, 51.
Any pilot should be able to step into his aircraft type with all switches and controls randomly disorganised or even every switch in the incorrect position and set up the aircraft correctly for the flight. These are basics.
The engineer should not be on trial, of that there is no doubt. But all the naysayers who argue against having maintenance procedures that strive to leave cockpit controls in their normal position should read up on the phenomena of "selective perception" and "Semmelweis reflex". These are real human factors and can significantly affect how we see something, particularly when seeing it one way (i.e. normal) is routine.
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It is instilled into Engineers that they must follow the Aircraft Maintenance or Troubleshooting Manual precisely & any Tech log entry should quote "IAW AMM /TSM" etc. Therefore if there was nothing in the AMM stating return switches to "normal", then how can the Engineer be blamed?
All Engineers should be made aware of this case, which highlights how they could be held accountable for their actions (whatever they might be).
All Engineers should be made aware of this case, which highlights how they could be held accountable for their actions (whatever they might be).