Slast: I agree with your sentiments. Crew actions at & below MDA were very dangerous. I've read the final paragraphs of the report including the consequential actions by AC. What still seems to be missing is an SOP requirement to X-check ALT v DME during descent from FAF. They seem to have adopted most of TC's recommendations, but that one was not mentioned. It is very scary to read about the inside workings of AC & TC. The discrepancy between AC's FCOM & SOP manual were glaring, yet approved. That casts shadows on the quality of TC's oversight and true understanding of what they were approving; and AC's own in-house FLT Ops dept that they could produce two such differing documents. It also is scary that they could produce such lax SOP's for such a critical manoeuvre. Their whole philosophy seems gash compared to those we use in EU. One would naturally think that AC was of the same quality standard as all other national carriers in EU & USA. Apparently they operated well below. The airmanship mindset in FLT OPs is surprising.
In EU there is an approach ban based upon VIS/RVR. In Canada they could even make an approach, in some circumstances, with a reported vis 50% of that charted?? They could continue below MDA with a call only of "LGHTS". What lights? It could be the carpark of motorway?? They had no SOP to monitor the ALT v DME during descent towards the concrete stuff?? Astonishing. (And a friend on B767 tells me it's the same there and they don't use FPA). The captain is PF in bad weather, rather than monitored approach. (a matter of debate, I know). They had an SOP allowing them to continue below MDA if lights were seen in the belief that the runway would become more visible. OMG. There was no calculation of DA/MDA taking into account the length of the ALS, so that the height above the runway at MDA coincided with the visibility and lighting system. This can encourage press-onitis below MDA if a LIGHT is seen in the belief that more lights will become visible. Considering the harsh conditions that Canada can present I would have expected ultra-cautious procedures, even if that resulted in more GA's even diversions.
It was all an astonishing eye-opener, and if I read the conclusions correctly the vertical path monitoring by raw data is still not in SOP's. It does make one wonder about the thinking in FLT OPs & TC that this behaviour could be promoted. It also make one wonder about the individual pilot's self survival instincts. The hairs on the back of my neck are very twitchy if nothing is seen at +100. To continue below MDA, still without the runway/full approach lights not in sight, would be beyond my courage. It's like driving down the road at a speed where the braking distance is greater than the visibility, in the hope that no other nutter is out there in such bad Wx.
One wonders what other scary gems are hidden in AC's SOP's. Is it a coincidence that their name is in lights a few times quite recently on what seem to be basic airmanship hiccups?
Does anyone on the inside have any more information about changes in operating culture? Is Canada going to move closer to FAA & EU procedures/philosophies/techniques.
Last edited by RAT 5; 28th Oct 2017 at 10:38.