Originally Posted by
sptraveller
They hit the ground at 125 knots.
I never claimed the crew didn't fail. The crew failed. Did I mention that the crew failed?
For the avoidance of doubt, the crew failed. Is three times enough?
I take issue with ascribing zero blame to the automatics.
The automation silently refused a command for thrust with airspeed above 125 knots without weight on all the wheels.
Instead of describing why the crew effed up (they did, that's four times), can anyone describe why the automatics were perfectly correct?
The automatics did precisely what they were designed to do nothing more nothing less. As such they were perfectly correct.
As you have said multiple times the crew failed to confirm power was actually increasing.
What you are really saying is
'can anyone describe why the automatics were designed like that?'.
That question should be followed with:
'Why is it necessary to have a button that does just what a competent crew could do with a straight arm and maintenance of control of the aircraft during a go around?'
then
'Why is it necessary to ensure that the button does not cause the engines to go to full throttle on the ground as a competent crew would not press buttons inadvertently?'
I put it to you that both of these questions are answered by 'the designers believed that they had to design the TOGA button for less than competent crews'.
What they failed to check for was the competency required to know the limits of the TOGA button.
Of course the design could have been that the RAAS operation automatically initiates TOGA regardless of weight on wheels. The automatics retract undercarriage once the aircraft is climbing with climb power then raise the flaps at the correct speeds, then fly the circuit using the uplinked trajectory from the ATC automation then autoland and taxi to the gate. But there were some designers that thought the crew would be competent.
