Originally Posted by
Sqwak7700
Uh, you are wrong. 4 approaches into HKG. The 4th after a diversion and well into discretion.
But don't worry, the crew would have been taken care of in case of any mishaps.
It will be interesting to (hopefully) hear of more details.
In general aviation, many IFR accidents occur due to the pilot pressing multiple approaches to a destination despite an unsuccessful (properly flown) first approach and no substantial (or worsening) change in weather conditions. It's kind of like the old saw about the definition of insanity and expecting a different result. But obviously the G/A pilot THINKS that things will be different even though he or she has no reason to rationally expect this. And then perhaps gets in a bind due fuel or worsening conditions (or traffic) at the potential alternate. So the decision gets made for him or her and turns out poorly.
One would like to think professional air carrier pilots can become devoid of this thought process and can distance themselves from external pressures to exercise bad judgment. Then again the AA Little Rock accident would demonstrate it can creep in despite what should have been better judgment. When you're looking at a 'can of worms' this should be a warning signal that you might want to avoid the can and come back under a position of strength. After you poke a few hornets' nests (or hear of others' experience in poking hornets nests) the savvy aviator usually learns to avoid finding himself in this situation again--and in being proactive toward avoiding hornets in the first place. And that everything else is secondary to making the right decision from (solely) an airmanship perspective.
But it's tough to second guess what really happened without knowing all the facts in a dynamic situation. The goal is to get there if safe and go somewheres else if not.
I DO know the situation as presented sounds strange; if for nothing else from a passenger assurance perspective. Sitting in the back after multiple weather related go-arounds is at best disconcerting and doesn't inspire confidence that all is well or safe (hence the informal 'two and go' rule of thumb). Hopefully there was good information flow and sound decision making involved. And hopefully this sound decision making was devoid of commercial pressures and involved the 'right thing to do' from (solely) an airmanship perspective.
Guess we'll see.