PM, #91, I agree that pilots need an understanding the rationale behind systems operation, but modern aircraft systems are now so complex the task of describing them in piloting terms approaches practical limits of training, knowledge retention, and recall.
Thus the point becomes the depth of knowledge required to operate in the expected range of situations. This is often translated into training ‘mechanistic’ SOPs, where the background to the procedure does not need to be known.
Training now focuses on ‘what to think’ opposed to ‘how to think’ about operating aircraft, the latter providing some protection for the unexpected. And when the industry ‘discovers’ a new ‘unexpected’ situation a solution is to create another SOP or train for the exception, effectively doubling the training task with further dependance on the crew for recall and action.
There must be a limit to this, if not we will spend more time training than flying. Cost effectiveness will prevail, but when. Perhaps the time is right for operators to question the expansive demands of training and regulatory compliance; we need an alternative model.
Automation and SOPs should be seen as tools to aid flying, not the means of achieving safely; that requires thought which uniquely requires pilots.
Management have the better opportunities for thinking; don’t expect pilots to rethink a systems interface problem in the last few feet of a landing. Pay attention to ‘small’ changes - modifications, SOPs, training, they may suddenly escalate to big problems.
This accident illustrates the difficulties in this area, particularly the effect of ‘add-on’ equipment.
The aircraft manufacturer has a well proven procedure based on previous designs and operation - TOGA; the avionics vendor recommends the use of existing aircraft procedures, but who brings the two together and asks the difficult questions which are much clearer with hindsight.
Does the new equipment change the assumptions in the original aircraft design.
Will a ‘long landing’ call result in greater exposure for the use TOGA below 5ft.
What are the differences between a pilot judged need for GA vs a machine generated alert.
Will an automated call surprise crews, slowing their reaction and cross checking.
Who holds the responsibility for considering these aspects; perhaps this will be the crux of the legal action.
Last edited by safetypee; 22nd Aug 2017 at 18:03.