Dan, #69, agree, and a similar dislike for RAAS, but why, yet there are some very good bits.
One aspect is that the ‘SmartRunway’ feature may be less accurate than pilot judgement, creating cognitive dissidence,- ‘do I believe this or not’ feeling, but of course it is installed to catch those conditions when the computation may be better than the human, but how might we know.
One question in this accident is if the alert was appropriate for the situation, i.e. proportional to the actual distance available and aircraft performance.
Another problem is that the ‘SmartRunway’ appears to be certificated as ‘advisory’, or at least that's the title of the system.
How can a regulator or airframe manufacturer approve a system which offers ‘advice’, requiring a high level alerting, but the advice given might not be the best option. The risk in this is passed to the operator, who has a choice for some of the functions and distances alerted, and in operation, there could be a choice for the pilot. Apparently none in this accident, follow the SOP, but what if the trigger conditions for the SOP are inappropriate. The crew would blamed for not following the alert, but also blamed for not ignoring it.
Then there is the interaction with the aircraft, TOGA. Who holds the responsibility for appropriate operation. The pilots should know but perhaps don't, the operator should but didn't think about any adverse reaction, the system manufacturer (RAAS), but is not his aircraft (and it only advisory), or the airframe manufacturer who ‘must’ know about TOGA, but didn't or did not have to know about add-ons (not my job), or didn't fully consider the interaction with an add-on installation.
What responsibility does the regulator have in this, certification, operational approval, do they talk to each other; problems of supplementary type certification (STC) ?
“Responsibility lies with those who could act but do not, it lies with those who could learn but do not and for those who evaluate it, can add to their capacity to make interventions which might make all our lives the safer.” Phillip Capper - ‘Systems safety in the wake of the Cave Creek disaster