It's all very well in theory but unless there's a strong muscle memory associated with repetitive practice of a manoeuvre then the intuitive response under stress may not always be what you might expect. That we mentally associate thrust increase with TOGA switch operation on takeoff could short-circuit the mental process in this unpracticed configuration (coupled with a startle factor from the RAAS).
Touchy feely nonsense? Given there were two guys with normal backgrounds at the centre of this it begs the question of what proportion of a representative sample of "normal" pilots would have made the same error under the same circumstances. 1%? 20%?
The exact combination of factors happens very rarely so the data is not available; however I think there is a fatal gap in airliner auto-throttle logic (and not just in this respect) that is fixable yet remains unaddressed.
The comments about getting back to basics etc, while understandable, kind of distract from the reality that humans will always be the weak link and the systems can be improved.