JC07,
I thoroughly endorse your comments, but have kept away from that subject so far. Some readers will be well aware of my views on it. However, FYI there was an AC accident in similar conditions (snow / low vis / night / minimal lighting ) in which the TSB picked up that point. See pages page 47 and 48 of the report, which is accessible at
1997 CRJ Go-around LoC on rejected landing Fredericton Canada | PicMA
Some years later Transport Canada published an Advisory Circular on the subject, and modified its Approach Ban criteria to allow operators using PMA procedures to have lower visibility limits.
http://www.picma.info/sites/default/...0239%20PMA.pdf
Remarkably, given the references it does make to other accident reports, this report makes no mention of either of these documents, nor of the Canadian Airlines B767 accident on the same runway, also at night in snow and poor visibility, where the runway slope was a significant factor.
As far as the 50' height loss is concerned, that was taken into account. Report page 2: "The MDA was calculated at 813 feet ASL, based on the published MDA of 740 feet ASL plus a cold temperature correction of 23 feet, plus 50 feet added to the corrected MDA, as required by Air Canada’s Flight Operations Manual (FOM)."
813 ft indicated altitude corresponds to an ISA altitude of 790 ft, vs. the true MDA of 740, which gives the required 50 ft height loss allowance . But according to my plot of the altitudes, the F/O call of "minimum, lights only" came after the aircraft had passed the calculated/indicated MDA where a decision should have made, and marginally below the true MDA. The callout takes approximately 1.5 second and the Captain's response of "Landing" was about 20 ft below true MDA, as he started assessing the cues. So there can be no doubt that had the Captain called for a go around instead of landing, it would still have been from well below MDA and obstacle clearance criteria would have been infringed.