My points - in no particular order.
F3's hosing off unguided AMRAAMs is a very dangerous thing, as anyone who knows anything about AMRAAM will tell you. They better be sure there are no friendlies forward of their 9-3 o'clock line when they do it.
I was a Freddie during the Sierra Leone operation. Whilst ths SHAR faced no air to air or serious SAM threat, it did prove its usefullness in that kind of limited warfare scenario (one in which UK goes alone without US / EU support). It was able to provide visible air presence that deterred rebel forces from coming out to play. The SHAR's admittedly limited recce capability was good enough however to provide photographs for land based forces to make maps from (if I remember rightly Sierra Leone had not be mapped since 1953) and provide the low level intelligence that was needed.
Now the SHAR cannot utilise PGM but it was not designed to, it is a maritime fighter, with a capability to drop dumb bombs. If we wanted to use PGMs we had a GR7 squadron on board, which is designed to do precisely that. The argument that the FA2 cannot drop PGM is irrevelant. Would you scrap the F3 today because it cant drop Paveway 3? I think not.
You can always count on the French / Italians / Spanish when they need us. The rest of the time forget it.
IMHO the FA2 deployment to the Adriatic was largely political. I remember Ark Royal sailed for the Adriatic for the first time just a few days after the first UK soldier was killed in the former Yugoslavia. The politicians wanted to show that something was being done as the first body bag came home. They wanted some air assets, however limited in capability, in theatre that the UK could use to attack people putting British troops under fire, without host nation support or permission. And that is probably the reason that the UK had a CVS in that theatre for so long (that is the true flexibility of an aircraft carrier - to roam the sea just of the enemies coast, behold to no one, able to strike at a time of its own willing and move to stay in good weather and evade the enemy).
With regard to remaining unlocated at sea, during Saif Sereaa 2 off Oman (or however we spelt it) I was still a Freddie with the CVS. The Illustrious CVS group remained undeteced for nearly two weeks (and we had a major RN ship with significant ESM fit looking for us). We went back to cold war style ops. Radars off or sector blanked, minimal radio useage, deceptive lighting, hiding amongst merchant shipping etc and it worked very well. If you want to keep your CVS hidden you can.
The SHAR has gone. Having been on the "inside" when 3 Group and Joint Force Harrier was conceived I can say it is no coincidence that the FA2 was scrapped shortly after the RAF got their hands on it. There was I remember, rumours around that time, strong ones, that the government had told the RAF that it must get rid of a fast jet aircraft type to save money. There was concern for the Jaguar, then the FA2 got axed. It still amazes me that the RAF can justify having 3 aircraft types for the same role (GR4, GR7, Jaguar) with two of them (GR7 and Jag) being so broadly similar in combat capability.
What we do not know is what brokering/political manouevring went on behind the scenes. I am sure that the Admirals did not give up the FA2 without a fight, but as Admiral West said in WEBF link, money is tight. If the RN wanted to keep FA2 it may well have had to axe something else in its place, so only 1 LPD instead of 2, or a reduction in Type 45 capability, or no AEW upgrade for the Sea King AEW 2.
The AEW capability for CVF is also something that has had little talked about. All the talk is off JSF. Let us remember that JSF will be able to take off from CVF with full weapon load, fly about 600nm to a target, bomb it, fight in and out, and return to CVS. That is a vast amount of airspace that you need an asset that can provide "picture" and C squared over. A helicopter simply cannot do it. When the MoD and RN have talked about "future proofing" the ship - ie conventional take off and landing capability, I feel they are hedging their bets that the only asset that will be able to do this in about 2010-2015 will be an upgraded E2 Hawkeye.
With regard to RoE and BVR - it is worth noting that despite RoE restrictions, the three Mig 29 kills in Kosovo were all BVR engagements. For those like myself who have been drilled time and time again during exercises in RoE it is suprising how quickly you can meet your engagement criteria when you go to war posture (roughly something like this brings back memories):
A) Not conforming to airway
B) No valid Mode 4
C) Flying attack profile
D) ESM correlation
E) Not responding to warnings on 243/121.5
F) Prior intelligence (ie SF in ditch at end of enemies runway giving you take off time - bit of maths and suprise suprise they turn up 80nm from you within 2 mins of your estimation of their ToT).
More worringly the CVF is still a very very long way off. A lot can change. We will have had, almost certainly, a change of government between now and 2012. If the Tories were to win the next election (IMHO no bad thing in grand scheme of things) it could well jepeordise CVF - history tells us the first thing tories do when re-elected is slash defence spending to fund other things.
But for the time being organic AD capability for the RN is gone, and it may never return. Perhaps a thread on how to bridge the capability gap in the period 2006-2012?