It was my understanding (not from the BBC program) that the Russian check pilot insisted on following ATC instructions, because that is the rule in Russia.
The underlying problem is that TCAS has been brought into the avaiation system without a clear understanding of how it works to those on the ground and in the air. Nor has it been properly integrated into ATC procedures. Furthermore, the ICAO rules on TCAS are open to different interpretations - perhaps why the Russian wanted to follow ATC instructions instead of TCAS?
I thought I understood TCAS, until I attended a 2 day briefing, and my eyes were opened - wide.
TCAS works, and works well - however, it is imperative that once a pilot commences an RA, that s/he inform ATC immediately, and that ATC DO NOT ATTEMPT to resolve the problem once an RA has been declared. It is this last bit which is very difficult for a controller to accept, and to follow. After all, controllers spend their whole time actively trying to prevent flights banging into each other, and never to just sit and watch it happen. However, once a TCAS RA is commenced, both pilots must follow it and ATC must keep quiet - then it will work.
There is still a huge lack in training controllers to do this, and in making clear operational instructions that they must do so. I doubt Peter X had received such instruction, otherwise I am sure he would have told the Russian pilot "follow your TCAS" and not tried to intervene.
It is also very worrying to hear controllers speaking of telling pilots about potential traffic which may cause a TCAS RA, and suggesting/implying the pilot should then avoid following it, if forewarned. A pilot
must follow an RA. If he doesn't TCAS will detect the lack of change of profile and instruct the other pilot to a greater deviation. Most nuisance RAs (as they are called) can be resolved by asking a pilot to reduce his rate of climb/descent, so that TCAS does not generate the RA in the first place.
When I attended the TCAS briefing, I was disappointed that many of the controllers feel affronted by TCAS, and that it is a suggestion that they have failed in their job. Well sadly, sometimes it is, but that can't be a bad thing if it stops people being killed, can it? It should be appreciated, though, that TCAS works with information which a controller does not have, and which is more up-to-the-second than the information displayed on the ATC screen. Nuisance RAs which are a problem, can be resolved by a more active profile management by the flight crews, and improvements to the FMS software to reduce rates of climb/descent when close to the target level.
Better TCAS information and training for controllers and pilots is essential, especially in an increasingly crowded sky, to avoid a repitition of what happened at Ueberlingen.