Rather than lecturing our betters (they're my betters as well as yours) on whose posts they should read, young WEBF, and rather than larding your posts with endless links, perhaps you should read the posts made by M2, who has direct experience of the SHar's contribution and capabilities in recent real world ops, and those of Proone, who succinctly and lucidly explained to you how the world has changed. It's great that our contribution to these debates is tolerated, but let's not lose sight of the fact that they are professionals. You're posting on the basis of admirable sentiment and an enthusiasm based on your reading of history, and there's nothing wrong with that. I don't have your courage (and I don't have the military experience) to make my own mind up on issues like this, and I merely re-present what seems to be the consensus among those pros I've spoken to.
The air threat you outline ("what if it had happened in Sierra Leone") would not require a radar/BVRAAM capability. RoE nowadays often force a reliance on shorter range weapons, like AIM-9 and ASRAAM. Where a radar/BVRAAM capability is required it can be provided by land based assets or by allied aircraft.
It's all about priorities and spending limited resources wisely. It's a harsh world with no room for sentiment and historical gratitude. We must spend limited money on the core, 'must have' capabilities - which SHar may have been when the Cold War raged, and ASW groups needed to operate in Blue Water, threatened by 'Backfires' and missile launching 'Bears' and 'Badgers'. It's not in an age of littoral warfare and coalition ops, any more than Sea Eagle was, or WE177. Retaining these big ticket Cold War relics is not the way forward when budgets start being trimmed. Retaining the SHar does not NOW represent a wise use of resources.
As a POI, I believe that ASRAAM hasn't yet been reinstated on the GR9, though this would be relatively easy.