New ATC Documentary on BBC2

[BIK_116.80]

fourthreethree,

....the last two times I have needed to give emergency avoiding action was solely due to....TCAS. False RA's which the pilot is obliged to act upon are the scurge of my life, especially when the a/c concerned climbs outside atc restrictions int opposite traffic which is seen by TCAS as less of a threat than the the traffic atc is keeping it clear of.

I’m interested to learn precisely what you mean by “False RA”.

Do you mean :

(1) The TCAS system was malfunctioning – ie operating outside its technical specifications – and issued an RA that should not have been issued if the TCAS was performing correctly; or

(2) The TCAS system was performing as advertised and correctly issued an RA in accordance with its technical specifications?

Mr Big,

....situational awareness is of great importance.

I agree.

But listening to the radio is not the ONLY way to obtain situational awareness information.

Fourthreethree,

Yes datalink could work faster than a human. As far as I'm aware thats not under discussion. The point is that if it fails, and it will then the controller needs to be able to take over, which would not be possible with your scenario.

It’s not possible now – at least not with the same airspace capacity.

When the UK ATC computers fail (as they have done) the whole airspace comes to a grinding halt. No one is allowed to take-off and those that are already airborne suffer lengthy holding. When things come back online the target sector flow rates are a mere fraction of what they usually are. The current airspace capacity is only possible because of the computers. Datalink will be no different.

garp,

Europe is leading the way it should be told or if you want to hear it from the FAA itself :

According to one FAA official....[etc]

I would not dispute that the FAA do have some of the most out-dated ATC computer systems on the planet. It’s a legacy from being first into the technology – there are now an enormous number of old, 1960s and 1970s computers that regularly break down, are difficult to maintain (both hardware and software) and which are long past their use-by date.

Thankfully, the private-sector development work that Boeing are doing in the area of air traffic management eclipses anything that is even on the drawing boards of the governments of Europe or the USA.

Point Seven,

On the subject of datalink, I don't think that anyone can be in any doubt that it IS the future. Whether we like it or not, eventually all controllers will no longer fill the role that we have now, but we will act as system monitors and only intervene when things get out of hand.

I very much agree.

I'm not talking about next Wednesday, but in the future it will happen, it has to.

I wasn’t talking about next Wednesday either. I agree that it has to happen.

How else are we going to reduce controllers workloads sufficiently to accommodate the massive predicted increases in traffic?

You aren’t. The only other option is to acquiesce to the NIMBYs demands to tax the hell out of aviation (as if it isn’t already ) so that no one can afford to fly. I guess that’s one way to solve the airspace capacity problem! (Not my preferred way, mind you.)

Datalink will remove a lot of "chores" that do not have massive safety bearings (initial flight plan clearances, changes in routings etc.) and allow controllers to concentrate on keeping planes apart. WHEN the technology allows then maybe we can start to let it take over a bit more but there remains a lot of work to be done.

Agreed.

....it was a FALSE RA anyhow

See above.

Lon More,

After you've read that lot come back and tell us we're reinventing the wheel.

I’ve read it.

You’ve re-invented the wheel.

There is much new development work yet to be done on the technology and procedures that surround datalink in order to allow it to work well in a terminal environment – the pilot and controller interfaces for example, the interfaces with yet to be developed automated ATC computer systems and with the more automated and more integrated airborne avionics of the future.

But before Europe starting work on all the sexy stuff they invested heavily in developing a new and incompatible basic communications protocol at a time when suitable technology already existed and was already in use.

Many states (inc. Germany still?) have frequencies allocated to their own language, normally only for VFR.

Last time I flew IFR into Nuremburg the controllers were speaking Deutsch to aircraft that wanted to speak Deutsch and were speaking English to aircraft that wanted to speak English. It worked just fine.

Five official languages (plus American) It doesn't require fluency, but just understanding the words, climb, descend and turn, may be enough to save your life.

Precisely!

I can only understand a few words of German - the numbers and a few other aviation related terms - but that was enough for me to have a fair idea of what was going on.

For many reasons, with 4-3-3 on TCAS. Unfortunately it does not provide situational awareness but seems to be encouraging the opposite.

Like any technology – the massive amount of situational awareness information available from TCAS is only ever as good as the operator using it.

And there are many different types of TCAS displays – some allowing much greater situational awareness than others.

Some of the cheap and nasty retro-fitted TCAS units (the type that replace the round-dial electro-mechanical VSI with a combined LCD VSI/TCAS display) have a maximum traffic display range of just 12 nautical miles, with a reduced range of 6 nm being pilot-selectable. Other combined VSI/TCAS displays have a maximum range of just 15 nm. It’s fine when flying at relatively low speed in a terminal environment - but these displays are of only limited value when enroute.

The better TCAS displays overlay traffic information on a moving-map navigation display and have a TCAS traffic display range of at least 40 nm.

As a bare minimum, most TCAS systems will display traffic within a window of +2,700 feet to -2,700 feet. But the better units also allow the flight crew to select +/-9,900 feet. On some units +/-8,400 feet is pilot selectable.

If a particular TCAS display has maximum display parameters of +/-2,700 feet, or if the flight crew has neglected to select -9,900 feet when such a selection is available then the TCAS display will not show traffic that is (for example) 3,000 feet below – at least not until that traffic becomes a TA or RA.

It’s also possible (but highly unusual) to fly around with no TCAS traffic displayed – with just the TA/RA aurals.

So there are a few variables. If you want the best possible TCAS derived situational awareness then get a TCAS display that goes to 40 (or more) miles and +/-9,900 feet and always ensure that you use the most appropriate display settings. You wouldn’t, for example, want +9,900 feet selected if you were in a 3,000 feet per minute descent. Displaying traffic that is more than 2,700 feet above will only serve to clutter the display and might mean that you don’t notice other more relevant traffic that is below you.

Take as an example a reporting point where 3 inbound routes converge for Amsterdam, EEL. Take an inbound flight descending to fl260 to cross EEL at level. After the usual, do we have to start down now, do we have to be level at EEL (Really, it's on the tape) descent commences 4.500 to 5000 fpm. Passing FL265 the aircraft levels off then starts to climb and turn !!! Reason TCAS alert on traffic maintaining FL250.

Hardly surprising.

If you issue a descent clearance with a crossing constraint without specifying “descend now....” or “when ready....” then why is it unreasonable for the flight crew to seek clarification?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that more often than not a flight crew that make the query will be told “descend when ready”.

If controllers always specified “when ready” or “descend now” when issuing a descent clearance with a crossing constraint then there would be no uncertainty, and the flight crew query would be redundant.

In any case, why was it imperative to leave the descent instruction so perilously late that just the very briefest of delays from two simple flight crew queries (which could just as easily have been two other stations transmitting simultaneously, or whatever) would necessitate a 4,500 – 5,000 feet per minute rate of descent in order to meet the crossing constraint? Isn’t it the case that the dangerously late descent instruction was the point at which the wheels fell off the separation wagon in the Lake Constance disaster?

The resulting RA that you describe is clearly the result of a high closure rate - both vertically and laterally. TCAS works in terms of the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. TCAS is not interested in the concept of “cleared level” because there is never any absolute guarantee that an aircraft will actually stop at its ATC-assigned level. As long as the crews don’t fly against an RA then TCAS will keep the planes apart without any regard for who is cleared to what level.

A slightly more un-nerving variation on the theme is the TCAS “crossing RA” where the descender is issued with a TCAS RA to increase descent THROUGH its cleared level and the conflicting traffic below is issued with a TCAS RA to climb or to increase climb ABOVE or THROUGH its cleared level. The two aircraft pass not only through their own cleared levels but the aircraft also vertically pass each other. A crossing RA can be most disconcerting for everyone involved - but it will still result in a miss as long as the crews don’t fly against the RA.

A crossing RA is almost always the result of an irresponsibly high rate of climb or descent when close to a cleared level. The adequacy of flight crew training in this area is open to question. The UK has mandated the fitment of TCAS in certain aircraft. Although there is mandatory flight crew training, many operators treat it as no more than a box-ticking exercise. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that flight crew knowledge about TCAS is woefully inadequate - self-induced RAs due to excessive vertical rates when close to a cleared level (and even the occasional crossing RA) prove it. Will the problem go away? No.

One might also question the timing of descent clearances with crossing constraints that are issued so impossibly late that the flight crew can only come back with “we’ll do our best”.

....questioning of instruction to turn,: traffic info then given response is, “We see him on TCAS”

It’s entirely possible that at the precise moment when the flight crew asked for confirmation of the turn instruction the conflicting traffic was not clearly displayed on their TCAS display. This could happen for any number of reasons (see above).

But would you prefer that the flight-crew NOT question an instruction that doesn’t sound right – for whatever reason?

How about the flight crew that was inbound to Amsterdam on a heading of approximately east and expecting runway 18C that misunderstood a verbal heading instruction as 255 degrees. Should the flight crew question that? Well one flight crew didn’t – they just flew the right turn (as they believed they had been instructed and as they had read back), putting them head to head with following traffic!

The three people that all pressed their push to talk at the same time prevented the controller hearing the incorrect read-back. As far as the flight crew were concerned they had read back the heading instruction and had not been corrected by the controller. Had the flight crew queried it they would have realised that it was for another aircraft.

Flight crew must be encouraged to clarify any instructions that don’t seem right – for whatever reason.

Fourthreethree,

Or maybe if certain pilots learned to use their TCAS it would also help.

Agreed - please see above.

As heard a few days ago......

Maas “XYZ123 descend FL300”
XYZ123 “Er Maastricht confirm we have traffic on TCAS 1000 feet below?”
Maas “Negative sir traffic is 1000 feet above”
XYZ123 “Ok, roger descending FL300”

Again, would you prefer the flight crew to NOT query your descent instruction if they believed (for whatever reason) that there was traffic below?

Isn’t it better for the flight crew to double check and look like a bit of a goose than not ask the question at all?

Aren’t we all playing the same game here?

Slippers,

On the subject of Datalink, although I have no experience of it, I can't see that it can be quicker than verbal communication.

I imagine that from the time that I decide I want to give an instruction in my head, I would have to:-

click on an a/c, select the type of instruction, click on climb or descend, click the desired level, select any level by restriction, confirm the instruction and then send. The pilot would then have to see the instruction and then send an acknowledged reply which I would then also have to see.

How would that be quicker than saying “C/S descend FL250 level by LOGAN”, “Roger descending FL250 Level by LOGAN, c/s”

Please correct me if that is not how it works.

Doing it that way wouldn’t be any quicker. Your rate of data entry is clearly the weak link in the chain.

And you’re right - that’s basically how datalink has been used on Pacific routes for nearly ten years.

But that type of controller interface is now old hat and we need to look to the future.

The great advantage of datalink is that it can transmit vast quantities of explicitly addressed data very quickly and very reliably with automatic confirmation that the correct recipients have received the correct data.

Datalink is not the be all and end all in its own right – datalink is an enabling technology that will allow an ATC computer to communicate directly with an airborne avionics suite – or a thousand airborne avionics suites. And the ability to do that has enormous potential to increase safety, efficiency and capacity.

But please don’t imagine for a minute that there will be a human sitting at a keyboard or manipulating a mouse trying to input detailed instructions for hundreds or thousands of aircraft. There wont.

The human air traffic controller’s job will change from one of micro-managing a handful of aircraft, “controlling”, to one of overseeing the automated handling of vast numbers of aircraft – “managing”.

On the subject of fully automated ATC, when will we learn that humans are NOT good system monitors. Our concentration levels always lapse when we are asked to do boring and monotonous tasks like checking that a computer is doing it's job properly.

Agreed. And the main reason for that is that for the overwhelming majority of the time the computers do a fabulous job and don’t need human intervention.

History is littered with disasters caused by this very fact.

It is.

But the question we should be asking ourselves is not whether there will be disasters due to lack of human ability to reliably monitor ATC computers - the question we should be asking is whether the rate of those disasters will be more or less than what the rate would be if we continue with the current labor-intensive ATC methods that rely on fallible humans processing enormous volumes of data to formulate a plan and then correctly communicate instructions to other fallible humans via an unreliable asynchronous VHF voice link.

I think that on that measure the scales are tipped in favour of a more automated ATC process – particularly so when you consider the vastly greater traffic densities that will be required in the future.

Humans are far better when they have to think about what they are doing, formulating plans and actively problem solving. Sure we make mistakes, but we are also in a far better position to spot and correct those mistakes if it is us that have made them!

Again, the question is not what type of work humans are best at – the question is what is the best overall solution for the management of air traffic.

Is it preferable to have the detailed tasks performed by humans simply because it allows human ATCers to be working to their greatest potential, or would it be better to use a more automated system if it could achieve better ATM performance in terms of safety, efficiency and capacity?

Garp,

As you can see there are benefits to the system [datalink] and it's needless to say that things will improve in the coming years. Still I'm convinced that voice will remain essential with the present ATC systems for the coming decades.

Agreed. Unfortunately technological progress is never as fast as it needs to be. As Point Seven said – we’re “...not talking about next Wednesday”.

ModernDinosaur

If messages for other aircraft are also displayed, surely there is a much greater risk of “mis-reading” an instruction intended for someone else....

Although different datalink systems do many things differently one of the things they have in common is the ability to address messages to a specific aircraft.

Executive instructions from ATC are explicitly addressed and are delivered only to the particular aircraft that is directly affected.

You wont have to wade through pages and pages of data to find a message that was directed to you.

....controlled airspace over the whole of the UK from surface to orbit PROVIDED that all aircraft (including GA) have an equal right to fly......I'd expect something like 95% of airspace below FL100 to be class-E or class-D with comprehensive secondary radar cover and staffed to provide RIS/LARS to all, with class-C (or even class-B) airspace around the busier airports. Hmmm - sounds a bit like the US....

I’d expect that too.

Unfortunately there are two problems.

Firstly, the status quo in the UK is that the vast majority of “airways” are class A – no VFR allowed. I can’t see any sensible justification for this. Why couldn’t this airspace be class B, for example? In class B VFR is allowed but everything is still separated from everything else. Then again, what’s wrong with class C? Class C is still a known traffic environment and everyone needs a clearance. Why couldn’t the airways be class C?

The controlled airspace issue is further complicated because in the UK many people incorrectly assume that “controlled airspace” necessarily means class A. I’ve lost count of the number of people who’ve sternly told me that one is not allowed to fly in “controlled airspace” unless one has an instrument rating. They don’t seem to realise that the class D control zone surrounding their local airport is controlled airspace! (Not to mention class B and class C.)

The other problem is that there has been chronic under investment in the UK’s aviation infrastructure for decades – same as the railways.

Someone’s got to pay for it and no one is putting their hand up.

A group of airlines tried but most of them have now written off their investment in NATS as a bad joke that resulted from a flawed decision that seemed like a good idea at the time.

Controlled airspace (whether class A, B, C, D or E) exists to reduce the risk that fare paying passengers will be involved in a mid-air collision. But I agree that it’s a bit useless if it doesn’t go where the planes go! The airway system exists to service the needs of air traffic - not the other way ‘round.

Jerricho,

I invite you (and I'm sure other ATCO's would agree here) to come and watch a radar of a very busy Terminal environment, where there are so many pressures of using minimum separation standards.

Yep - been there done that, thanks. And I do agree that the pressures are enormous.

Even though the vast majority of air traffic controllers are highly intelligent, highly skilled and highly motivated people they find themselves needing to utilise a dangerously large proportion of their available brain power whilst performing a safety critical function under enormous pressure.

It’s hardly the sort of task that we should be entrusting to mere humans!

I'm sure you would get mighty p*ssed off if somebody told you how to do your job.

These sound like the words of someone who is so engrossed in micro-managing the detail that they cant see the forest for the trees.

I’m always open to new suggestions because I know that there’s more than one way to skin a cat.

When it’s all said and done most airline flight crew are obliged to follow their company’s standard operating procedures. Flight crew are told how to do their job.

Just the same as air traffic controllers are told how to do their job. I’m referring to MATS Part 1 and the multitude of different inter-unit interface agreements, amongst other criteria.

In regard to datalink and more automated ATC processes it’s quite obvious that the rulebook will require significant revision. I’m talking in terms of re-writing the rule book – not how to comply with the current one that has been constrained by technology and which has remained largely unchanged for decades.

I do have a question reference datalink. Let's look at a final approach situation where the a lander suddenly burst a tyre and spills it on the runway. What will happen to the 6 jets following. How will missed approach/breaking off instructions be issued? I'm interested in hearing BIK's thoughts on this one!

Would an icon that said “RUNWAY CLOSED – DELAY NOT DETERMINED” suit you?

A human air traffic controller detects that an aircraft is stuck on the runway and clicks an icon. The automated ATC computer has been continuously calculating a go-around plan for all the inbounds every few seconds. The ATC computer issues aircraft specific explicitly addressed go-around instructions via datalink. All the inbounds are automatically assigned a holding fix and level.

Flight crews can continue to hold or they can nominate a diversion airport via datalink. If they request to divert the automated ATC computer will generate a clearance to the alternate including enroute, STAR, time to leave the alternate’s inbound holding fix and the landing runway.

When the disabled aircraft has been removed from the runway the human air traffic controller can click on a “RUNWAY OPEN” icon and the automated ATC computer will issue each of the inbounds with an aircraft specific explicitly addressed time to leave the holding fix and instrument approach clearance.

Just as an aside as well about technology supposedly making our lives easier, look at the trial of FAST (Final Approach Spacing Tool) by LHR approach. Playing that things rules was dangerous, and many people showed better landing rates than the machine....

Dare I suggest it – garbage in garbage out. Any computer system can only ever be as good as its software.

We must ensure that any future automated ATC system is developed by a team of the very best and brightest computer specialists, ATCers and flight crew.

Please rest assured that at Boeing that is precisely what is happening.

radar707

Avoiding Action is rarely used because we've let separation erode.

It is mainly used outside controlled airspace because of pop up traffic or fast moving military traffic whose intentions we do not know and starts to do a dirty dive right towards your aeroplane....

Why are you attempting to provide a separation service involving unknown traffic outside controlled airspace?

Or perhaps more to the point, why does your employer require you to attempt to provide a separation service involving unknown traffic outside controlled airspace? What a silly state of affairs!

If the traffic density and/or traffic type in a particular area does genuinely need a separation service then the area should be designated as controlled airspace.

I know that UK ATC units can provide RAS / RIS / FIS to participating traffic in an unknown traffic environment outside controlled airspace – but what other country attempts to do this? Is this just another quaint ICAO difference?

RAS does nothing more than provide the appearance of a separation service – it’s a feel good measure that is big on vibe and small on substance. And as your post amply demonstrates, attempting to provide RAS in an unknown traffic environment is not only hugely labor-intensive, but it relies entirely on the great skill, careful judgement, and faultless performance of a fallible human air traffic controller. At best, all of that sounds rather optimistic. At worst, it’s nothing more than a perilous ruse.

And is it really all that sensible to have military aircraft conducting combat manoeuvres amongst the tax-payer carrying civilian aircraft in class G airspace?

OK, let’s think about this. Civilian aircraft (the big ’uns and the little ’uns) need a convenient place to fly but they don’t want to get run-down by a combat aircraft in a mid-air collision.

The military would ideally like an area all to themselves for their exclusive use, free from the hazard and distraction of civilian aircraft, where all traffic is known and the chaps can “roger” and “tally-ho” to their heart’s content.

And what’s the current situation? An enormous compromise that suits no one.

The military fly their combat manoeuvres in class G, but the area is designated an “Area of Intense Air Activity”, warning civilian pilots not to fly there – unless they want to. AIAA or not – it’s still class G.

The defence forces exist to protect the taxpayers, not imperil them – which is precisely what they do when they fly combat manoeuvres in class G airspace.

The civilian pilots (big ’uns and little ’uns) fly through these AIAAs and either cross their fingers and hope for the best, relying on the big-sky theory (which works extremely well for 99.99% of the time), or they talk to someone on the radio and obtain a half-baked separation service (RAS) in an unknown traffic environment outside controlled airspace.

No one is doing anything illegal – but it’s a very big compromise from both perspectives.

I’m sure that those who conceived this compromise perceived it as being the best of both worlds.

But I suggest that in reality what we actually have is they very worst of both worlds.

The military will, at times, need to reserve an area of airspace for their exclusive use. Why not allocate suitable restricted areas? They don’t have to be permanent – they could be only at certain published times of the day on certain days of the week (like the AIAAs are now), or they could be activated by NOTAM. The restricted areas don’t even have to be in the UK. Many civilian and military pilots already spend a significant proportion of their training time outside their home country. Does it really make sense for military pilots to conduct combat training manoeuvres in the densely populated airspace over a densely populated small island? I think not.

Alternately, why not designate all of the airspace that is currently an AIAA as class C airspace. When the airspace is required for military operations it can be allocated, either wholly or in blocks, to military users. In effect – nothing more than obtaining a clearance. When the airspace is not required for military operations civilian traffic can obtain a clearance to transit or operate with a more realistic expectation that they are not going to be run down by fast moving military traffic.

The question is simple – is it safe for civilian light aircraft and small airliners to fly in class G AIAAs whilst military aircraft are conducting combat training manoeuvres?

If the answer to that question is YES then why are we having this discussion?

By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe - anyone is allowed to fly there at anytime. If it wasn’t safe to fly there then the government would not have classified it as class G.

But if, as many viewers seem to be suggesting, the answer is NO then we need some way of POSITIVELY ensuring that separation is maintained. The only real way is to have a known traffic environment – either a restricted area or some class of controlled airspace.

....if you like I can refuse to provide you with a Radar Advisory Service and just give you a Radar Information Service....

If the traffic is outside controlled airspace then why are you required to attempt to provide it with any service? It’s not a known traffic environment – leave ’em alone.

....or if I'm really busy giving avoiding action to IFR traffic under a Radar Control Service in Class E airspace against pop up traffic 12 o clock 1 mile no height information....

Now we are getting to the heart of the problem.

Why has this traffic only just popped up? And why is there no pressure altitude information?

The UK authorities have mandated the carriage of TCAS in certain aircraft.

But they have not mandated that all other aircraft must carry and use a transponder with altitude reporting.

It’s a half-hearted solution that in reality is just window dressing.

I’m told by various UK-based air traffic controllers (civil and military) that 85+% of the non-squawking (or squawking but with no altitude information) traffic that are asked to “squawk mode C” come back with a verifiable altitude that is within vertical navigation tolerances within just a few seconds. It would seem that the vast majority of (mainly light, but sometimes military) aircraft that are flying around without squawking have this stuff fitted but switched off!!!!

I’m told by various aero-club and flying school instructors and students that they make a regular practice of flying around with their transponder’s altitude output switched off so that they “don’t get caught being somewhere we are not supposed to be”. This is an entirely ridiculous state of affairs. If they are not where they are supposed to be then that is PRECISELY the time when it is imperative that surrounding traffic know EXACTLY where they are!

There needs to be a law that mandates that if an aircraft is fitted with an altitude reporting transponder that it must be switched on with altitude reporting enabled. Such a requirement would have no cost impact on airspace users.

Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not.

....or that fast moving military traffic you've no chance of seeing

See above about military aircraft in class G.

But the main reason I wouldn’t see it is I will be head inside looking at the TCAS display – particularly if I am in cloud at the time. But even that’s a bit of a waste of time if other aircraft refuse to switch on their altitude reporting transponder.

We do a bloody good job stopping aeroplanes banging into each other, a darn sight better than any computer could do via datalink.

Any existing computer system? Yes.

Any future computer system? We’ll see.

ferris,

CPDLC....it's use in the Pacific is a great improvement. OVER HF. However, the oz experience showed that where VHF is available, it is far more preferable to use that.

The preferred European datalink protocol is VDL-2 which uses VHF.

I can certainly see the day where CPDLC will be used in preference to VHF. You know when that day will be, BIK116.8? The day they take human pilots out of the loop. So be careful what you wish for.

You seem to imply that I should fear the advance of automation because of some unspecified desire to perform continuous and repetitive detailed tasks associated with operating an aircraft.

I don’t.

Or perhaps it’s that you believe that I should for some reason be motivated to resist safety, capacity and efficiency enhancing technological advances for the sole purpose of conspiring to keep as many pilots employed as is possible.

I’m not.

I don’t believe that the primary reason for the existence of the aviation industry is to provide employment for pilots or for air traffic controllers (or anyone else).

You may be a rabid controller-hater....

Air traffic controllers are often highly intelligent, highly skilled and highly motivated people. Some of my best mates are air traffic controllers (or former controllers).

What I do hate is inefficiency.

....but guess what? All that vitriol you spit at us (computers will be able to do it better than you etc) applies equally to pilots.

I agree. The less we rely the variable performance of humans and the more we automate both processes the better. Safety, capacity and efficiency will all improve.

So when we are both out of a job, with the ATC computer directly feeding sequencing instructions into the onboard FMS, you'll be able smile smugly and say “I told you so!”. Be careful what you wish for.

Sounds great – I can’t wait! I look forward to the time off!

But as we both know the reality will be nothing like that.

It is certainly true that there has been a significant reduction in the number of flight deck crew required to operate a large airliner.

In the bad old days airliners required a captain, a co-pilot, a flight engineer, a navigator, and a radio operator. And if you flew very long flights you had to carry two of each!

Thankfully, aircraft technology and airborne automation have improved to the point that now even the very largest airliners are operated by a flight deck crew of just two.

Over the last few decades airliners have gone from requiring five crew - to four - to three - to two. You really don’t have to be Einstein to predict what the next step will be!

The military are already making great progress with the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles. Technology that is initially developed for military purposes has a habit of eventually finding its way onto civilian aircraft. Perhaps there might be two more steps to go!

Bring it on I say!

The aviation industry does not exist simply to provide employment for pilots or air traffic controllers.

All that being as it may.....even if one were to take a rather left-wing socialist “make work” attitude towards the aviation industry in the belief that it exists primarily to provide employment for the greatest possible number of people, the anti-automation argument still seems to fall flat.

A more automated ATC, with a network of ATC computers automatically generating clearances and issuing them to an automated airborne avionics suite via datalink with the aircraft being left alone to fly itself in LNAV and VNAV will be a great thing for the workers.

Air traffic “controllers” will become air traffic “managers”. They wont have to get bogged down with the detailed micro-management of a small number of aircraft. Air traffic managers will oversee the automated control of a much larger number of aircraft at a much greater traffic density. There will be very little to do but put your feet up and drink coffee (I say – that sounds frightfully familiar.... ).

And don’t believe for a moment that there will be a smaller total number of controllers required. The compound growth in air transport movements will cause an enormous increase in traffic density (isn’t that what the whole TV show was about?) and there will be just as many (if not more) of your comrades employed – but each one of them will be one or two orders of magnitude more productive.

ps. What language would you like the CPDLC instructions to arrive in? English, French, Basic, Java.............

All of the above – pilot selectable – by the (one and only, for now at least) pilot.