Not often I disagree with Jim, but in this case, while I absolutely agree that the FASGW element is crucial, I'm not as sanguine about losing GWS60.
There remains a thought (which tends to originate in Capability Mgmt land) that multiple ways to achieve an outcome - ie sink a ship - are inefficient and duplication should be reduced where ever possible. Fine in theory, right up until the point someone says the principal anti-ship weapon is submarine delivered Spearfish and........?? Errr, the RAF/FAA/USN/Someone else? There are seven - count 'em - boats and they can't be everywhere. Last I looked, neither the FAA or the RAF have any real "heavy" ASuW capability - at least right now, which leaves us with the Homer Simpson ASuW plan.
All the stuff about the littoral and the issues with targeting are absolutely valid, but that tends to fixate on a particular threat and capability level, where GWS60 probably isn't the answer. Trouble is, that there is a re-emergent big-ship element elsewhere, which doesn't get countered by little FASGW. Aside from anything else, the threat of a GWS60-type range/throw weight / multiple arrival, forces some caution on a potential opponent. If there's nowt on the rails, that no longer applies.
For the sake of the cost a new buy of RGM84 and some logistic support, we're binning a capability without replacement. Which actually shows just how tight the bunce is at the minute. Distinctly sub-optimal.
ISTR the USN chucking some RGM/AGM84 about in Op El Dorado and associated precusors and certainly during Desert Storm. OK they didn't really have anything else, but nothing says "F8ck right off now please" quite like 200 kg of blast/frag HE.