Why Gun Ammo and not Cruise Missiles for the Zumwalt?
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Why Gun Ammo and not Cruise Missiles for the Zumwalt?
I am amazed at the cost of technology and the purchasing practices of the US DOD....particularly the US Navy.
The new Zumwalt Class has a gun that can fire a directed Round to a range of Seventy-Three Miles but at a cost of 800,000 US Dollar per Round. I suspect there shall not be much practice firing at that rate.
Should the Navy looked for a cheaper alternative than what they did with the Zumwalt....say more conventional ships that cost far less than the Three Billion US Dollars as do the Zumwalts, but equipped with Rockets and Missles rather than the sophisticated gun system?
Some extra VTOL Aircraft or even Missile carrying Helicopters would seem one of the Alternatives.
Navy reportedly balks at $800k projectiles for new warship | Fox News
The new Zumwalt Class has a gun that can fire a directed Round to a range of Seventy-Three Miles but at a cost of 800,000 US Dollar per Round. I suspect there shall not be much practice firing at that rate.
Should the Navy looked for a cheaper alternative than what they did with the Zumwalt....say more conventional ships that cost far less than the Three Billion US Dollars as do the Zumwalts, but equipped with Rockets and Missles rather than the sophisticated gun system?
Some extra VTOL Aircraft or even Missile carrying Helicopters would seem one of the Alternatives.
Navy reportedly balks at $800k projectiles for new warship | Fox News
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"Some extra VTOL Aircraft or even Missile carrying Helicopters would seem one of the Alternatives."
Some obvious advantages of the chosen approach vs. the one you mentioned are the following:
- total independence from weather conditions
- minimum reaction time (projectile moves much faster than a cruise missile and much-much faster than a VTOL or heli)
- no countermeasures currently exist to hit a flying (big) bullet (while a cruise missile is an easy target to say nothing of a VTOL or heli)
- VTOLs and/or helis onboard would ruin the whole concept of stealth as they shine like a full Moon on a radar screen, plus require extra space, personnel, etc.
- the projectiles are not cheap but still cheaper than Tomahawks in a (foreseen) damage equivalent if produced in a relatively large number (not in hundreds like now) and if LockMart cuts bonuses for their management :-)
Some obvious advantages of the chosen approach vs. the one you mentioned are the following:
- total independence from weather conditions
- minimum reaction time (projectile moves much faster than a cruise missile and much-much faster than a VTOL or heli)
- no countermeasures currently exist to hit a flying (big) bullet (while a cruise missile is an easy target to say nothing of a VTOL or heli)
- VTOLs and/or helis onboard would ruin the whole concept of stealth as they shine like a full Moon on a radar screen, plus require extra space, personnel, etc.
- the projectiles are not cheap but still cheaper than Tomahawks in a (foreseen) damage equivalent if produced in a relatively large number (not in hundreds like now) and if LockMart cuts bonuses for their management :-)
Last edited by A_Van; 13th Nov 2016 at 14:01.
Hole
According to Ben Rich's 'The Skunk Works' book when Lockheed built the Sea Shadow prototype he addressed the fact you had to be careful not to make it quieter than the background reflection - otherwise there could be a hole in the return.
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The plan is that (expensive) system delivers the (just as expensive) rounds to the target 70+ miles away in a near vertical approach. This pretty much eliminates anything positioned in difficult to reach terrain. I think it's also able to fire multiple rounds with different trajectories/velocities so they all arrive on target nearly simultaneously. Ouch.
Islandlad,
I mentioned this on another thread. In the book it mentioned that on a modern synthetic display, the ship couldn't be seen. Then along came an aged analogue world operator who switched the display to raw radar, fiddled with the gain, sig. noise ratio and other controls, and there in the middle of the wave top clutter was a hole where the ship was. I now understand that it is possible to enhance /attenuate the ships returns so that it blends into the wave returns, regardless of the sea state.
I mentioned this on another thread. In the book it mentioned that on a modern synthetic display, the ship couldn't be seen. Then along came an aged analogue world operator who switched the display to raw radar, fiddled with the gain, sig. noise ratio and other controls, and there in the middle of the wave top clutter was a hole where the ship was. I now understand that it is possible to enhance /attenuate the ships returns so that it blends into the wave returns, regardless of the sea state.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Another example of the death spiral - a unique gun and ammunition which was affordable over a fleet of 29 is not for a fleet of 3 ships. According to Defense News it has stayed within budget and performed perfectly during all development and trials, but as the planned buy went down the cost per round accordingly went up to amortise costs.
I understand they are trying to find an alternate round common with another gun which can be used. God knows what the cost of that program will be, but presumably it's a different budget.....
I understand they are trying to find an alternate round common with another gun which can be used. God knows what the cost of that program will be, but presumably it's a different budget.....
The USN tried to cancel this whole program. Originally sought 30 vessels to replace the DDG 51`s but cost escalation was killing them.
I live only 10 miles from BIW, where the DDG 1000 is built and our local senators pushed the DOD to continue with a limited purchase and now with only 3 vessels in the class everything to do with the operating of the vessel has increased dramatically.
I would not be surprised if they were put into early storage or have major changes made to make the operable.
I live only 10 miles from BIW, where the DDG 1000 is built and our local senators pushed the DOD to continue with a limited purchase and now with only 3 vessels in the class everything to do with the operating of the vessel has increased dramatically.
I would not be surprised if they were put into early storage or have major changes made to make the operable.
Some striking similarities to the Seawolf(SSN) Program:
Originally Posted by wiki
The Seawolf class is a class of nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN) in service with the United States Navy. The class was the intended successor to the Los Angeles class. Design work began in 1983. At one time, an intended fleet of 29 submarines was to be built over a ten-year period, later reduced to twelve submarines. The end of the Cold War and budget constraints led to the cancellation in 1995 of any further additions to the fleet, leaving the Seawolf class limited to just three boats. This, in turn, led to the design of the smaller Virginia class. The Seawolf class cost about $3 billion ($3.5 billion for USS Jimmy Carter) making it the most expensive SSN submarine and second most expensive submarine ever after the French SSBN Triomphant class
SASLess
Compared to, for example, Harpoon the range of this gun and the guidability of LRLAP are quite favourable. Had the rounds ended up costing tuppence-ha'penny, it'd be terrific. But it's not surprising that they're expensive; they're essentially a gun launched cruise missile with the added complexity of having to make it all survive being fired from a 155mm barrel = pricey components.
Perhaps it's just fundamentally cheaper to have a small jet engine and a tank of fuel, no 100s of G firing shock, and call it a cruise missile. The cost of the electronics in such a thing are pretty small these days.
One justification for continuing - it's easier to carry a lot of shells than a lot of missiles. If they anticipated having to engage a lot of targets, shells-as-good-as-missiles would be a useful trick. Trouble is I can't think where all those targets would be coming from in this day and age. Cowes Week?
Should the Navy looked for a cheaper alternative than what they did with the Zumwalt....say more conventional ships that cost far less than the Three Billion US Dollars as do the Zumwalts, but equipped with Rockets and Missles rather than the sophisticated gun system?
Perhaps it's just fundamentally cheaper to have a small jet engine and a tank of fuel, no 100s of G firing shock, and call it a cruise missile. The cost of the electronics in such a thing are pretty small these days.
One justification for continuing - it's easier to carry a lot of shells than a lot of missiles. If they anticipated having to engage a lot of targets, shells-as-good-as-missiles would be a useful trick. Trouble is I can't think where all those targets would be coming from in this day and age. Cowes Week?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Something Wrong With Our Ships These Days
Warships will be left without key missiles | News | The Times & The Sunday Times
Royal Navy warships will be left without anti-ship missiles to protect them because of a shortage of money, it was revealed yesterday.
The long-range Harpoon missile will be retired from service from all frigates and destroyers in 2018 without being replaced, according to the defence news service IHS Jane’s. Further denting capability, the Royal Navy’s helicopter-launched Sea Skua missile is due to go out of service at the end of March. This will leave the helicopter fleet similarly vulnerable pending the introduction of a new range of lightweight anti-ship missiles on the Wildcat helicopter in late 2020.
IHS Jane’s said that the Harpoon missile had a maximum range of 80 miles and could use radar to search a designated area for its target. The Royal Navy will still have naval guns to protect its destroyers and frigates but they have a far smaller range of about 17 miles.
A spokesman for the Navy said: “All Royal Navy ships carry a range of offensive and defensive weapons systems. Backed by a rising defence budget and a £178 billion equipment plan, upgrade options to all our weapons are kept under constant review.”
Royal Navy warships will be left without anti-ship missiles to protect them because of a shortage of money, it was revealed yesterday.
The long-range Harpoon missile will be retired from service from all frigates and destroyers in 2018 without being replaced, according to the defence news service IHS Jane’s. Further denting capability, the Royal Navy’s helicopter-launched Sea Skua missile is due to go out of service at the end of March. This will leave the helicopter fleet similarly vulnerable pending the introduction of a new range of lightweight anti-ship missiles on the Wildcat helicopter in late 2020.
IHS Jane’s said that the Harpoon missile had a maximum range of 80 miles and could use radar to search a designated area for its target. The Royal Navy will still have naval guns to protect its destroyers and frigates but they have a far smaller range of about 17 miles.
A spokesman for the Navy said: “All Royal Navy ships carry a range of offensive and defensive weapons systems. Backed by a rising defence budget and a £178 billion equipment plan, upgrade options to all our weapons are kept under constant review.”
Contextually I worry about one of these not both.
Harpoon is a weapon which sounds awesome, but is actually a total mare to consider using outside of total war in the GIUK or North Atlantic. Unless you have an outstanding ISTAR package, and a means to be confident that you are firing at a target that is definitely a bad guy, then its more hassle than its worth. Its been in service for 30 years, and its worth noting that the RN has operated big anti-ship missiles since 1973. In all that time its the one missile type that the RN has never fired operationally. Similarly, none of our partner nations have too, and the only time that I'm really aware of big anti ship missiles being fired since 1973 is in 1982 and a bit during the Iran-Iraq war.
I'm not trying to do down their importance, but in the environments we operate in, and the hugely cluttered littoral waters, Harpoon (and Exocets) is a missile that is simply not the solution.
The lack of a Skua sized missile is more worrying, and one I suspect will be fixed quickly. My personal view is that this is the likely anti-ship missile use of the future, along with guns as its much easier to positively identify and track targets. In a future operating model of tight ROE, and the need to be certain of your target, I think Skua sized weapons are the answer.
So overall, I'm comfortable with the loss of Harpoon and I think few professionals will mourn its passing. I earnestly hope we get a Skua replacement in ASAP.
Harpoon is a weapon which sounds awesome, but is actually a total mare to consider using outside of total war in the GIUK or North Atlantic. Unless you have an outstanding ISTAR package, and a means to be confident that you are firing at a target that is definitely a bad guy, then its more hassle than its worth. Its been in service for 30 years, and its worth noting that the RN has operated big anti-ship missiles since 1973. In all that time its the one missile type that the RN has never fired operationally. Similarly, none of our partner nations have too, and the only time that I'm really aware of big anti ship missiles being fired since 1973 is in 1982 and a bit during the Iran-Iraq war.
I'm not trying to do down their importance, but in the environments we operate in, and the hugely cluttered littoral waters, Harpoon (and Exocets) is a missile that is simply not the solution.
The lack of a Skua sized missile is more worrying, and one I suspect will be fixed quickly. My personal view is that this is the likely anti-ship missile use of the future, along with guns as its much easier to positively identify and track targets. In a future operating model of tight ROE, and the need to be certain of your target, I think Skua sized weapons are the answer.
So overall, I'm comfortable with the loss of Harpoon and I think few professionals will mourn its passing. I earnestly hope we get a Skua replacement in ASAP.
Not often I disagree with Jim, but in this case, while I absolutely agree that the FASGW element is crucial, I'm not as sanguine about losing GWS60.
There remains a thought (which tends to originate in Capability Mgmt land) that multiple ways to achieve an outcome - ie sink a ship - are inefficient and duplication should be reduced where ever possible. Fine in theory, right up until the point someone says the principal anti-ship weapon is submarine delivered Spearfish and........?? Errr, the RAF/FAA/USN/Someone else? There are seven - count 'em - boats and they can't be everywhere. Last I looked, neither the FAA or the RAF have any real "heavy" ASuW capability - at least right now, which leaves us with the Homer Simpson ASuW plan.
All the stuff about the littoral and the issues with targeting are absolutely valid, but that tends to fixate on a particular threat and capability level, where GWS60 probably isn't the answer. Trouble is, that there is a re-emergent big-ship element elsewhere, which doesn't get countered by little FASGW. Aside from anything else, the threat of a GWS60-type range/throw weight / multiple arrival, forces some caution on a potential opponent. If there's nowt on the rails, that no longer applies.
For the sake of the cost a new buy of RGM84 and some logistic support, we're binning a capability without replacement. Which actually shows just how tight the bunce is at the minute. Distinctly sub-optimal.
ISTR the USN chucking some RGM/AGM84 about in Op El Dorado and associated precusors and certainly during Desert Storm. OK they didn't really have anything else, but nothing says "F8ck right off now please" quite like 200 kg of blast/frag HE.
There remains a thought (which tends to originate in Capability Mgmt land) that multiple ways to achieve an outcome - ie sink a ship - are inefficient and duplication should be reduced where ever possible. Fine in theory, right up until the point someone says the principal anti-ship weapon is submarine delivered Spearfish and........?? Errr, the RAF/FAA/USN/Someone else? There are seven - count 'em - boats and they can't be everywhere. Last I looked, neither the FAA or the RAF have any real "heavy" ASuW capability - at least right now, which leaves us with the Homer Simpson ASuW plan.
All the stuff about the littoral and the issues with targeting are absolutely valid, but that tends to fixate on a particular threat and capability level, where GWS60 probably isn't the answer. Trouble is, that there is a re-emergent big-ship element elsewhere, which doesn't get countered by little FASGW. Aside from anything else, the threat of a GWS60-type range/throw weight / multiple arrival, forces some caution on a potential opponent. If there's nowt on the rails, that no longer applies.
For the sake of the cost a new buy of RGM84 and some logistic support, we're binning a capability without replacement. Which actually shows just how tight the bunce is at the minute. Distinctly sub-optimal.
ISTR the USN chucking some RGM/AGM84 about in Op El Dorado and associated precusors and certainly during Desert Storm. OK they didn't really have anything else, but nothing says "F8ck right off now please" quite like 200 kg of blast/frag HE.
I mentioned this yesterday on the 'Red October or Chilly November thread'. Putting aside the significant tactical implications - vessels will have to move in closer to engage targets, thereby increasing risk to longer range return fire, which significantly increases the strategic risk to the RN when you only have a small number of vessels – this is represents the further continued running down of a the RN (and RAF) at a time when commitments are increasing.
To blithely dismiss it as we continually monitor developments and operational requirements as part of our increasingly well funded equipment programme both fails to capture the tactical and strategic risk, reinforces the notion that capability are acceptable and leads to the obvious question of why are we taking such capability holidays given the allegedly increasing equipment budget and now oft trumpeted world’s 5th largest defence budget.
Their statements just don’t add up and need to be challenged. If it’s a funding issue the politicians and mandarins need to shut up about increasing budgets; if it’s an operational decision, whoever made it needs to be held to account and the decision fully scrutinised given that it verges on negligent
To blithely dismiss it as we continually monitor developments and operational requirements as part of our increasingly well funded equipment programme both fails to capture the tactical and strategic risk, reinforces the notion that capability are acceptable and leads to the obvious question of why are we taking such capability holidays given the allegedly increasing equipment budget and now oft trumpeted world’s 5th largest defence budget.
Their statements just don’t add up and need to be challenged. If it’s a funding issue the politicians and mandarins need to shut up about increasing budgets; if it’s an operational decision, whoever made it needs to be held to account and the decision fully scrutinised given that it verges on negligent
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A little background info is in order. Congress mandated over a decade ago that USN find a replacement for the retired battleships which provided naval gunfire support (NGFS). DD-21 was USN's answer to that mandate and DD-1000 takes over that mandate after DD-21 was cancelled. The BAE Systems advanced gun system of the DD-1000 obviously cannot completely replace the 16 inch guns of the retired battleships, but they are capable of providing "impressive" gun fire support. And not all the artillery ammo is expensive. Sure, the guided projectiles are pricey, but dumb projectiles are also available which are much cheaper.
As for missiles, DD-1000 has extensive missile capability. She's outfitted with 80 Mark 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, which are considerably larger than the usual Mark 41 VLS cells. That means she can carry and fire any land-attack or anti-ship missile in the USN inventory. And 80 such missiles is a lot of missiles.
Her armaments/magazine design is also unique to enhance survivability. Rather than a concentrated magazine that if penetrated and explodes will tear the entire ship to pieces, DD-1000 has a distributed magazine system with armor on the inside of the magazine rather than outside. The idea is that if the magazine takes a hit, it will explode outward and leave a large hole, but the ship's structure and systems will remain (largely) intact. And with multiple widely distributed magazines she will not only survive, but be able to continue the fight. That's the idea anyway. Only time and an actual engagement will prove if the idea works or not.
As for missiles, DD-1000 has extensive missile capability. She's outfitted with 80 Mark 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, which are considerably larger than the usual Mark 41 VLS cells. That means she can carry and fire any land-attack or anti-ship missile in the USN inventory. And 80 such missiles is a lot of missiles.
Her armaments/magazine design is also unique to enhance survivability. Rather than a concentrated magazine that if penetrated and explodes will tear the entire ship to pieces, DD-1000 has a distributed magazine system with armor on the inside of the magazine rather than outside. The idea is that if the magazine takes a hit, it will explode outward and leave a large hole, but the ship's structure and systems will remain (largely) intact. And with multiple widely distributed magazines she will not only survive, but be able to continue the fight. That's the idea anyway. Only time and an actual engagement will prove if the idea works or not.
I seem to recall that the 155 caliber weapon is a child of that joint requirement, so that it is compatible with Army and Marine 155 ammo.
I also recall that the Iowa class, before retirement, had both RAP rounds and Copperhead that had extended ranges. It would make sense for Zumwalt to have a similar capability.
I also recall that the Iowa class, before retirement, had both RAP rounds and Copperhead that had extended ranges. It would make sense for Zumwalt to have a similar capability.