PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - KA A320 does unfavorable diversion
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Old 29th Aug 2016, 21:18
  #36 (permalink)  
Gnadenburg
 
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Eden Valley
Posts: 2,158
Received 92 Likes on 41 Posts
KA's a training airline turning cadets into commanders inside of 5 years and the Capt in this event is brand new. Not even enough experience to be unleashed into the contract world. There would be some patience with the decision making process in this event and nobody here has considered enroute weather. This route has had some seriously spectacular turbulence events at KA.

The patience management has afforded this captain hasn't been witnessed here on pprune and the racial undertones of some posters is an ugly disgrace. Especially when some of the comments show a pretty modest capability themselves. You can sit pretty in a legacy carrier but I doubt you would keep your job in most airlines diverting to an ERA with a single HYD overheat on an A320.


The o/heat hydraulic caution comes on at >95c. Aviation hydraulic fluid auto ignites at around 475C. You've turned the pumps off as part of the ECAM, the hydraulic fluid is just sitting there now. How will it ignite without some other warning giving you a clue? Wheel well fire, engine fir
I remember when this type of good guff was taught. Some guys above have been watching too many WW2 movies; even under pressure due system damage, in mist or spray form, the flashpoint of modern HYD fluids three times the ECAM value overheat value .

Non-technical skills are an emerging issue under the pressure of rapid upgrades. I've mentioned this before, just recently, on another thread where the pilots of KA have been scrutinized for their decision making under pressure. CRM has not evolved nor kept pace with the industry locally- it was well behind when I started here and progress has only been TEM. The decision making template taught seems flawed lacking thorough crew assessment of risk- the CLEAR model- and is little more than a decades old, elemental OODA loop, that is out of place in the modern operation with new factors at play such as less autonomy and more operational control and media hyper-sensitivity. Now consider a culture of self-induced fuel pressure due paranoia and a reporting culture so badly shutdown that the ability to learn the lessons of others is at a modest level. To pick up in these areas would need external assistance.

Last edited by Gnadenburg; 30th Aug 2016 at 03:31.
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