I've managed to wade through Section 141 of the report (Military equipment).
While obviously sanitised, and in parts simplistic, I think it required reading for anyone thinking of criticising procurement delays. It is just page after page of beancounters in the Centre and politicians deferring ISDs and salami slicing budgets by a few million here, a few million there; while ignoring astronomical waste of hundreds of millions, if not billions. And the support they received from, frankly, sycophantic senior staff.
As for the top level criticism of identifying capability gaps (above) the report actually makes a pretty decent job of describing the process, although contracts two steps into one, implying front line fulfills a role undertaken by DEC. That would explain his criticism and he was probably very frustrated at the lack of answers from MoD, which doesn't come across as very helpful, probably down to the fact it no longer requires retention of corporate memory.
I can think of quite a few IPT staff who will see this as vindication. And many others who will recognise their significant contribution to Saddam's war effort. It will be interesting to see what it says about BOWMAN, and if it mentions that a replacement was endorsed, delivered and in theatre the week before the main contract was let to produce obsolescent and even obsolete kit. Now THAT is waste.