In broad terms, the Nomad's operational profile was as, obviously, a twin with exceptional short field performance in and out unprepared strips capable of delivering a couple of sections of equipped troops or substantial and bulky materiel. And that it did with aplomb ...the SASAR had no complaints with it(!).
AS to single engine performance, at MGTOW it struggled a bit but then is there any other aircraft in that class which doesn't(?).
'A crash near Tenterfield' .. as i said, in 1992/3 at Cheviot Hills near the town of Drake (Nth NSW) west of Casino and not far from Texas.
The assertion that aerodynamic flutter was responsible for the crash is complete nonsense. We were unable to positively ascribe a 100% certain cause however, we readily ruled out flutter causing airframe dismemberment because; 1) ALL of the airframe was at the same place (ie, no part of the aircraft came adrift prior to collision with the reentrant down which the aircraft collided and 2) this was a very low speed accident. So forget flutter.
The most likely cause was due to an engine fire/failure of #2 engine wrongly handled by the flying pilot (PNGDF) at very low level on a max-performance departure out of the field into which he (and the two other aircraft in the flight) had flown. Strong evidence for that finding was metallurgical evidence which indicated clearly that #2 engine was making some but much less than (appropriate) than #1 and that soot was found in places under the cowls which were otherwise untouched by the post-crash fire.
It was initially postulated that the Senior Instructor (the 'SI') seated in the right seat may have pulled #2 by way of test on departure by closing the RH low pressure cock or that he may have suffered a cardiac or cerebral infarct (he was a big man, after all) but I ruled those out in light of evidence that witness marks on the stops of the low pressure cock were definitely caused at impact being located on the opposite sides from where, in the test i ordered, they would have occurred if the cock's operating lever had been moved to the 'off' position prior to impact. Secondly, i led a lot of evidence from other QFIs (Qualified Flying Instructors) and line pilots who'd flown with the SI to the effect that that was not his practice.
Moreover, I had another aircraft adopt the deck angle which A303 would have adopted upon departure out of the strip and there was no way a RH seat occupant would have slump forward if incapacitated at that time.
As to control surface flutter assertions, i led evidence from a QFI and practicing aeronautical engineer who had been tasked to investigate quite a number of pilots' snags including reports of flutter which he was unable to replicate. [One snag alleged that the aircraft was unable to achieve VR (at Mt. Isa from memory); the aircraft was tested by the QFI/engineer and demonstrated to be complete rubbish. Likewise a concocted complaint that the control wheel "pumped" during cruise!]
During the Inquiry, i showed film of an N22 stabilator shaking markedly. Quite impressive except at the time, only one engine was operating and on full power at that .. of cause it shook!
During the A303 Inquiry, i also reviewed the aircraft which crashed when undergoing development flying under DSTO control when it lost its stabilator. Clearly the cause of that accident was due to a certain organization failing to inspect the aircraft before hand-over to DSTO, which would have detected a crack in the stabilator main spar for which there was an available, simple and effective repair scheme already on the shelf.
The Nomad was/is a good aircraft.