Jaffa:
"F/Os were always out of the systems loop on the 707 727 and Classic."
Not quite. On the B727, due to its cockpit geometry, if the FO twisted around inboard and then looked aft he could clearly see the panel. I would imagine, given the similar cockpit layout, the B707 was the same. In the B747 the far longer FE panel was aligned fore & aft, so that the FO's eyeline was parallel to the face of the panel, i.e. he really couldn't see it. Compounding this, the B747's landing gear was more complex (body gear steering, body/main gear leg tilting etc), all with a plethora of lights at the aft end of the FE panel (on the B727 they were ALL on the forward panel).
Certainly in Cathay, if there was a problem the FO was usually designated to fly the aircraft while the Capt and FE sorted out the problem. So yes, the FO was more or less out of the systems loop (on the B747). Ansett did not (when I was on it anyway) operate the B727 like this.
"The gear lights on the classic systems panel are easily seen from the L seat."
Visible, but I'd argue about the use of the word "easily".
"Those two little airlines Ansett and TAA started with the jets in the sixties. Through the seventies and eighties they worked up ways of doing things which, by the mid eighties, were resulting in operational and safety statistics so far in front of the rest of the world that for a period in the mid eighties the rest of the world was going out there and flying with them to try and get a drift on how it was done."
I agree, more or less. You can make statistics say anything, I think the key here is your adjective "little". You could easily end up claiming that an airline flying 10 hours a year and doesn't lose a hull is safer than an airline that flies 10,000,000 hours and loses one hull.
Ansett (and I presume TAA)
did indeed operate to very high standards; their procedures were excellent (notwithstanding my earlier remarks about how poorly they integrated the FE) and a they enjoyed a quite remarkable level of cockpit standardization. I'm not sure what you mean by "worked up ways..."; certainly in the Ansett case other people's procedures were "cherry-picked" to achieve the result (Ansett didn't suffer from the "not invented here" syndrome - well not in the mainline operation, anyway). Could you give me an example please of "the rest of the world...flying with them.. to get a drift on how it was done"? Just how did Ansett/TAA fit "the rest of the world" in? And, without for a second demeaning Ansett (and TAA) standards, let's not forget the safety record was greatly helped by a very benign operating environment; very little traffic, good weather most of the time and an ATC system that (a) spoke understandable English and (b) were there to help. A further factor was the "Operational Control" system (the ability of ATC to close aerodromes due weather, for example); annoying and heavy-handed at times but it certainly contributed to safety.
4Greens:
Ansett's problem was trying to become an international carrier from a domestic operations base. It needed a lot more organisation than was in place
They already were a (very minor) international operator; arguably the problems stemmed from the rushed introduction of a new and complex type rather than needing "a lot more organization". Let's not forget either that a significant change had occurred in the status of Ansett's Flight Operations Dept in 1989. Previously, they were relatively independent; they primarily maintained standards without interference from Head Office. Abeles and MacMahon were clearly frustrated by this; Flight Ops resistance to the madcap notion of having an FE on the A320 is but one example of Flight Ops Dept's seeming (to them) recalcitrance. After 1989, certain key individuals had gone and Flight Ops was moved from the Astro-jet Space Centre complex at Melbourne Airport to Head Office in Swanston Street, where they were, literally and figuratively, much more "under the thumb". They were simply expected to toe the line and keep the airline operating smoothly; I can well imagine no-one having the nerve to stand up to Abeles and tell him the B747 introduction time line was ridiculously short.