When this accident occurred,I was in Jakarta on the Haaj. There were 12 aircraft on our ops, all "classic" B747s sourced from a number of airlines and in turn the ground and flight crews sourced from an even bigger number of organisations. So there was a wide range of experienced people there.
When we heard of the accident, a number of crew who were also in our hotel gave a theoretical scenario based on their intimate knowledege of that particular airframe. It was, engine oil loss due to a long standing problem with studs on (I think) an oil pump, followed by engine shutdown, followed by ADP not coming on in auto for which it was well known.
Couple this with all the other Swiss cheese holes with part of crew with very limited experience on type and long haul, merging of cultures, pressure to get the aircraft back to Sydney and a new aircraft in an established operation which had at the time a very limited appreciation of the role of the FE on long haul ops and I suspect that most of us would have found it overwhelming.
Interestingly, when the domestic pilots and FEs started to filter into QF B747 long haul, some and I specifically say some, were reluctant to understand the integrated crew role of the FE on the B747. So this problem was not an AN problem alone but more a cultural problem of how, no matter how much we think we know, we never know it all.
We can all be wise after the event.
Wunwing