but with the promise of clearing “during the morning.
the SOPP assured the pilots the fog was “in the distance” and later that it was on the field but was “shallow” and moving away. They were told to expect a visual arrival.
It seems to me that once the aircraft had gone past the PNR the situation was well handled. TAIC identified SOP's as the reason that the aircraft ended up in that situation as the main issue but I think it is more complicated than that. For example, introducing more restrictive SOP's around continuing past PNR does what?.....it guides the Captain in his/her decision making. Decision making? Now we're getting to the crux of it......
A long hard look at how the RNZAF provides it's pilots with the information/experience, processes to make important decisions may well conclude with the finding that the RNZAF is doing these things to the highest standard. Equally, it may well find one or two areas where the provision of further support/training could improve the product (RNZAF pilot). Just as important as the decision making training is the cultural environment in which the important decisions are made. The RNZAF failed dismally to create a positive safety culture on 3 Sqn prior to the ANZAC day 2010 Iroquois crash and admitted as much in the aftermath. I imagine they have since improved the overall safety culture and have created an environment where conservative decisions are met with respect and acceptance and analysed properly rather than an environment where they are automatically tossed in the " man-up" category.
Assuming that they have moved with the times and are actively managing their own culture from the top down, a good hard look at the reasons why the 'decision making error' of continuing past PNR was made could well result in making an excellent Airforce even better.