RNZAF 757 Emergency Antarctic Landing report
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RNZAF 757 Emergency Antarctic Landing report
Courtesy of Aviation Week
Engineering Judgment Key In 757 Forced Landing In Antarctica
Foresight and cool-headed teamwork by pilots of a Royal New Zealand Air Force Boeing 757-200 likely saved their aircraft, 11 fellow crewmembers and 117 passengers—including scientists from New Zealand and the U.S. and New Zealand’s minister of foreign affairs—from a crash-landing in near-zero-visibility conditions at a remote science outpost at the bottom of the Earth in October 2013.
The account is detailed in a New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) “landing below published minima” report, which is accompanied by recommendations aimed at preventing similar occurrences in the future.
The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) “40 Sqdn.” operates the 757 and Lockheed C-130 Hercules out of its base in Auckland, providing regular flights between Christchurch and the McMurdo research station in Antarctica as part of a joint logistics pool with the U.S. The arrangement started in 1965, and the 757 joined the fleet in 2010. Whereas the C-130 has several landing options at McMurdo, some requiring skis, the 757 at that time of the season was limited to operations at Pegasus Field and its single 10,000 X 150 ft. runway on permanent ice. The incident flight was the second of three 757 flights scheduled to provide support for the early summer season at McMurdo, with three further flights planned at the season’s end in February and March.
Due to the length of the flight—about 4 hr., 45 min.—procedures called for computing two “point-of-safe-return” thresholds, a worst-case scenario where the aircraft with both engines operating must fly low due to a pressurization problem (PSR-2d), and a less conservative case using both engines at altitude (PSR-altitude). The crew, a captain/instructor, captain-in-training, co-pilot and second captain, decided to use the more conservative PSR-2d, which would occur 2 hr., 47 min. into the planned 4-hr., 40-min. flight. Weather would be a key element in that decision, with the crew receiving real-time and forecast weather over satellite links provided by the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command’s Office of Polar Programs (SOPP) based in Charleston, South Carolina, and at McMurdo.
The flight had already been delayed two days by weather, and a 7:00 a.m. briefing on Oct. 7 called for “presence of mist with some cloud on the ground,” but with the promise of clearing “during the morning.”
After more weather briefings, the aircraft departed Christchurch at 9:57 a.m. Nearing the PSR-2d time, the crew was becoming increasingly concerned about fog in the vicinity of Pegasus based on updated weather reports. However, the SOPP assured the pilots the fog was “in the distance” and later that it was on the field but was “shallow” and moving away. They were told to expect a visual arrival. The aircraft passed the PSR-2d and, 41 min. later, the PSR-altitude, with forecasters noting that fog was several miles or more away from the airfield.
Weather updates received at 1:45 p.m.—past the point of no return—showed “cloud on ground” with a broken layer of clouds at 300 ft., below the 360-ft. minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the instrument approach to Runway 33. A satellite phone call to the SOPP verified that fog had now formed over the airport.
Committed to a landing attempt, the pilots strategized the arrival, selecting a GPS approach but setting the MDA at 410 ft., due to an unusable section at the beginning of the runway, and asking the airport to turn the approach and runway lights to the brightest setting. The aircraft descended into the cloud bank at 700 ft. altitude and continued down to the MDA, but with no visual sign of the runway, a condition that requires a go-around. The crew climbed to clear air 5,000 ft. and entered a holding pattern for 2 hr. as they waited for conditions to improve, as forecasted. The weather, however, continued to deteriorate, so the pilots set up a second approach, reducing the MDA to 100 ft., an altitude they felt would still provide a safety margin above obstacles around the runway. Passengers and remaining crew were briefed on the situation and seated near the various emergency exits.
At the new MDA of 100 ft. on the second approach, the pilots again did not see the ground; but, during the go-around that followed, a second captain positioned in the observer’s seat in the cockpit saw “several markers and some lights” about 50 ft. to the right of the aircraft. The crew decided that what he had seen were the runway centerline approach lights, meaning the 757 had been about 50 ft. left of centerline on the approach.
The information was somehow familiar—the captain and two other pilots had flown the first flight of the season to Runway 33 in good weather on Oct. 3 and had calibrated the GPS approach and taken pictures. At that time, they had determined that the runway centerline was offset to the right of the inbound course by about 50 ft., a likely consequence of the ice shelf moving since the most recent calibration the previous season. The GPS approach was considered valid, as a new calibration had not yet been conducted.
Using that knowledge and confirming what the second captain had seen against photos that the captain-in-training had taken of the approach on Oct. 3, the crew set up another GPS approach offset to the right by 50 ft. When reaching 110 ft., the co-pilot saw the approach lights and the captain was able to confirm the aircraft was lined up, turn off the autopilot and flare for landing. The 757 stopped with 4,000 ft. of runway remaining and 3,000 kg of fuel, enough for one more approach. The fog cleared 90 min. later.
The TAIC says that, given the weather information and reassurances from the SOPP, the crew was “justified” in continuing beyond the two PSRs and was then left with “no other option” than to land in Antarctica “regardless” of the weather. “The fundamental safety issue arising from this incident was not the decision by the crew to pass the PSR and descend the aeroplane below the MDA in order to make a successful landing,” the TAIC states. “The issue and question is why the aeroplane ended up in that position when the crew had followed standard operating procedures.”
In response, the RNZAF changed its procedures, lowering its cloud base minimums for the 757 flights and adding a requirement that reported or forecast visible moisture below the minimums must be considered, with crews “ultimately being satisfied that the drivers that may cause these conditions to worsen will not be present for arrival.” The 757 procedures were also modified to require that GPS approaches be validated on the first missions of the season.
Engineering Judgment Key In 757 Forced Landing In Antarctica | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week
Engineering Judgment Key In 757 Forced Landing In Antarctica
Foresight and cool-headed teamwork by pilots of a Royal New Zealand Air Force Boeing 757-200 likely saved their aircraft, 11 fellow crewmembers and 117 passengers—including scientists from New Zealand and the U.S. and New Zealand’s minister of foreign affairs—from a crash-landing in near-zero-visibility conditions at a remote science outpost at the bottom of the Earth in October 2013.
The account is detailed in a New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) “landing below published minima” report, which is accompanied by recommendations aimed at preventing similar occurrences in the future.
The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) “40 Sqdn.” operates the 757 and Lockheed C-130 Hercules out of its base in Auckland, providing regular flights between Christchurch and the McMurdo research station in Antarctica as part of a joint logistics pool with the U.S. The arrangement started in 1965, and the 757 joined the fleet in 2010. Whereas the C-130 has several landing options at McMurdo, some requiring skis, the 757 at that time of the season was limited to operations at Pegasus Field and its single 10,000 X 150 ft. runway on permanent ice. The incident flight was the second of three 757 flights scheduled to provide support for the early summer season at McMurdo, with three further flights planned at the season’s end in February and March.
Due to the length of the flight—about 4 hr., 45 min.—procedures called for computing two “point-of-safe-return” thresholds, a worst-case scenario where the aircraft with both engines operating must fly low due to a pressurization problem (PSR-2d), and a less conservative case using both engines at altitude (PSR-altitude). The crew, a captain/instructor, captain-in-training, co-pilot and second captain, decided to use the more conservative PSR-2d, which would occur 2 hr., 47 min. into the planned 4-hr., 40-min. flight. Weather would be a key element in that decision, with the crew receiving real-time and forecast weather over satellite links provided by the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command’s Office of Polar Programs (SOPP) based in Charleston, South Carolina, and at McMurdo.
The flight had already been delayed two days by weather, and a 7:00 a.m. briefing on Oct. 7 called for “presence of mist with some cloud on the ground,” but with the promise of clearing “during the morning.”
After more weather briefings, the aircraft departed Christchurch at 9:57 a.m. Nearing the PSR-2d time, the crew was becoming increasingly concerned about fog in the vicinity of Pegasus based on updated weather reports. However, the SOPP assured the pilots the fog was “in the distance” and later that it was on the field but was “shallow” and moving away. They were told to expect a visual arrival. The aircraft passed the PSR-2d and, 41 min. later, the PSR-altitude, with forecasters noting that fog was several miles or more away from the airfield.
Weather updates received at 1:45 p.m.—past the point of no return—showed “cloud on ground” with a broken layer of clouds at 300 ft., below the 360-ft. minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the instrument approach to Runway 33. A satellite phone call to the SOPP verified that fog had now formed over the airport.
Committed to a landing attempt, the pilots strategized the arrival, selecting a GPS approach but setting the MDA at 410 ft., due to an unusable section at the beginning of the runway, and asking the airport to turn the approach and runway lights to the brightest setting. The aircraft descended into the cloud bank at 700 ft. altitude and continued down to the MDA, but with no visual sign of the runway, a condition that requires a go-around. The crew climbed to clear air 5,000 ft. and entered a holding pattern for 2 hr. as they waited for conditions to improve, as forecasted. The weather, however, continued to deteriorate, so the pilots set up a second approach, reducing the MDA to 100 ft., an altitude they felt would still provide a safety margin above obstacles around the runway. Passengers and remaining crew were briefed on the situation and seated near the various emergency exits.
At the new MDA of 100 ft. on the second approach, the pilots again did not see the ground; but, during the go-around that followed, a second captain positioned in the observer’s seat in the cockpit saw “several markers and some lights” about 50 ft. to the right of the aircraft. The crew decided that what he had seen were the runway centerline approach lights, meaning the 757 had been about 50 ft. left of centerline on the approach.
The information was somehow familiar—the captain and two other pilots had flown the first flight of the season to Runway 33 in good weather on Oct. 3 and had calibrated the GPS approach and taken pictures. At that time, they had determined that the runway centerline was offset to the right of the inbound course by about 50 ft., a likely consequence of the ice shelf moving since the most recent calibration the previous season. The GPS approach was considered valid, as a new calibration had not yet been conducted.
Using that knowledge and confirming what the second captain had seen against photos that the captain-in-training had taken of the approach on Oct. 3, the crew set up another GPS approach offset to the right by 50 ft. When reaching 110 ft., the co-pilot saw the approach lights and the captain was able to confirm the aircraft was lined up, turn off the autopilot and flare for landing. The 757 stopped with 4,000 ft. of runway remaining and 3,000 kg of fuel, enough for one more approach. The fog cleared 90 min. later.
The TAIC says that, given the weather information and reassurances from the SOPP, the crew was “justified” in continuing beyond the two PSRs and was then left with “no other option” than to land in Antarctica “regardless” of the weather. “The fundamental safety issue arising from this incident was not the decision by the crew to pass the PSR and descend the aeroplane below the MDA in order to make a successful landing,” the TAIC states. “The issue and question is why the aeroplane ended up in that position when the crew had followed standard operating procedures.”
In response, the RNZAF changed its procedures, lowering its cloud base minimums for the 757 flights and adding a requirement that reported or forecast visible moisture below the minimums must be considered, with crews “ultimately being satisfied that the drivers that may cause these conditions to worsen will not be present for arrival.” The 757 procedures were also modified to require that GPS approaches be validated on the first missions of the season.
Engineering Judgment Key In 757 Forced Landing In Antarctica | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week
RNZAF 757 Emergency Antarctic Landing report
Interesting read.
Just wondering is there anything (short of cost of course) percluding the setup of a full cat III setup there? Given the absolute lack of diversion option it might still be a sensible investment
Just wondering is there anything (short of cost of course) percluding the setup of a full cat III setup there? Given the absolute lack of diversion option it might still be a sensible investment
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Continuing towards an isolated airfield with with shallow fog in the vecinity? it might meet military rules of engagement but it seems very sporty for a 757 with over 100 people on board. Minimums are just that, minimums. Nothing precludes the commander to have a quiet word with himself. If you are going to proceed without a plan B your plan A better be absolutely rock solid. It does not take many years of flying to know that fog can be unpredictable, it may appear sooner or it may linger longer; any mention of it should give an experienced crew pause for thought. The fact that they complied with minimum legal requirements, while a good reason to change those requirements, seems a poor excuse to get yourself into such a mess.
I would have been less than pleased if I had been a passenger.
I would have been less than pleased if I had been a passenger.
Last edited by calypso; 22nd Mar 2015 at 20:37.
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agreed calypso - this incident should be seen as a shot across the bow for all organisastions making flights down there
the incident report smelt of a 50/50 bet in my mind, which the passengers should never have been put in
the incident report smelt of a 50/50 bet in my mind, which the passengers should never have been put in
"Passengers and remaining crew were briefed about the situation and seated near the emergency exits".
Why? Presumably in case the aircrew allegedly in charge of this mess crashed into the ice at 150 knots or so!!!
You'd think all this time after Mt Erebus, Antipodean operators would show a bit more respect for Antarctica.
Changed their SOP's?? I should CoCo!!!
Why? Presumably in case the aircrew allegedly in charge of this mess crashed into the ice at 150 knots or so!!!
You'd think all this time after Mt Erebus, Antipodean operators would show a bit more respect for Antarctica.
Changed their SOP's?? I should CoCo!!!
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If the investigating authority found the crews actions in proceeding beyond the point where they had any other option but to land in Antarctica justified, how is it that people on here still think they know better?? Do we have a bona fide sky god in our midst, in Mr Calypso?
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RNZAF 757 Emergency Antarctic Landing report
To me the error would appear to have been made when the aircraft was purchased.
If one of its tasks is to support a remote airfield nearly 5 hours away with no aids and unpredictable wx the chosen aircraft should be able to carry return fuel ( or be capable of AAR if the Aussies are prepared to lend tanker support).
If one of its tasks is to support a remote airfield nearly 5 hours away with no aids and unpredictable wx the chosen aircraft should be able to carry return fuel ( or be capable of AAR if the Aussies are prepared to lend tanker support).
A very similar incident to this one that occurred to a Virgin and Qantas 737 in Australia.
Investigation: AO-2013-100 - Weather related operational event involving B737s VH-YIR and VH-VYK at Mildura Airport, Victoria on 18 June 2013
The Virgin crew did something very similar in coming as low as possible to check how far offset from the centreline they were then conducting another approach and flying it to the runway.
Investigation: AO-2013-100 - Weather related operational event involving B737s VH-YIR and VH-VYK at Mildura Airport, Victoria on 18 June 2013
The Virgin crew did something very similar in coming as low as possible to check how far offset from the centreline they were then conducting another approach and flying it to the runway.
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I think there are certain difficulties in accepting widebodies down there. Everything else dont have 13 hours endurance. C17 can do it but there is a cost attached
Ps actually I know there are both 319ACJ and BBJ been utilized but I doubt they have enough endurance with reasonable payload to avoid point of no return if you count in 2 landing approach attemps in
Ps actually I know there are both 319ACJ and BBJ been utilized but I doubt they have enough endurance with reasonable payload to avoid point of no return if you count in 2 landing approach attemps in
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If proposing that one should avoid taking risky bets with the weather in an isolated aerodrome leading to placing your aircraft and passengers in danger unnecessarily makes me a Sky God in your mind then so be it. You might find there are plenty of us around.
The investigating authority might have further information not available to us or might be under other pressures or vested interests. We can only comment here on the information that has been published.
The investigating authority might have further information not available to us or might be under other pressures or vested interests. We can only comment here on the information that has been published.
RNZAF 757 Emergency Antarctic Landing report
Well calibration should be obviously performed in a much regular / intensive basis than other places but I still believe it would be an option (I'm pretty sure ice is not moving that fast 
)
)
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I think, that in the circumstances, the crew did just fine.
Do you want a sure thing? Don't go to the antarctic .
Its not like they were flying into a 5000' strip in the middle of chicago and breaking minimums.
IF they landed, long, it would have worked out.
Lights in sight , they landed. Sure, they busted minimums.
The only questionable thing was the guy who kept saying the fog would go away.
Do you want a sure thing? Don't go to the antarctic .
Its not like they were flying into a 5000' strip in the middle of chicago and breaking minimums.
IF they landed, long, it would have worked out.
Lights in sight , they landed. Sure, they busted minimums.
The only questionable thing was the guy who kept saying the fog would go away.
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What about the installation of a good old fashioned PAR. These can be more or less portable. Designed for the military, so ideal for that location and if the operator is good, and the handling pilot is "good" at basic IF the aircraft could be landed on the center line in virtually zero vis. If a/c are proceeding past their PNR's the situation is critical by anyone's estimation.
I've done PAR's with talk down by ex Eastern block radar operators and they were excellent. Obviously had a lot of practice at talking down fighters with next to no fuel.
I've done PAR's with talk down by ex Eastern block radar operators and they were excellent. Obviously had a lot of practice at talking down fighters with next to no fuel.
RNZAF 757 Emergency Antarctic Landing report
What strikes me when reading this is that to pass comment you need to be familiar with the locale.
For example, as a Brit I came to Canada thinking I'd experienced flying in winter weather before. I quickly realised that our Canuck friends are slightly more au fait with it than we are in Britain. It would be easy, as a Brit pilot, to read a report describing a similar incident in Canada and wonder why the hell they were operating in such conditions in the way they often do.
It is too easy to apply our own experiences to a situation and pass judgment based on them but I'm willing to bet the crew in this incident were not idiots.
Whilst we may look at this report and think we would have done things differently it is largely immaterial unless you are an RNZAF 757 Captain who has routinely operated into Antarctica.
I could be way wide of the mark of course and I'm sure many will disagree but I think it is too easy to sit in the comfort of an armchair and criticise when you probably don't have the full picture.
BV
For example, as a Brit I came to Canada thinking I'd experienced flying in winter weather before. I quickly realised that our Canuck friends are slightly more au fait with it than we are in Britain. It would be easy, as a Brit pilot, to read a report describing a similar incident in Canada and wonder why the hell they were operating in such conditions in the way they often do.
It is too easy to apply our own experiences to a situation and pass judgment based on them but I'm willing to bet the crew in this incident were not idiots.
Whilst we may look at this report and think we would have done things differently it is largely immaterial unless you are an RNZAF 757 Captain who has routinely operated into Antarctica.
I could be way wide of the mark of course and I'm sure many will disagree but I think it is too easy to sit in the comfort of an armchair and criticise when you probably don't have the full picture.
BV
but with the promise of clearing “during the morning.
the SOPP assured the pilots the fog was “in the distance” and later that it was on the field but was “shallow” and moving away. They were told to expect a visual arrival.
A long hard look at how the RNZAF provides it's pilots with the information/experience, processes to make important decisions may well conclude with the finding that the RNZAF is doing these things to the highest standard. Equally, it may well find one or two areas where the provision of further support/training could improve the product (RNZAF pilot). Just as important as the decision making training is the cultural environment in which the important decisions are made. The RNZAF failed dismally to create a positive safety culture on 3 Sqn prior to the ANZAC day 2010 Iroquois crash and admitted as much in the aftermath. I imagine they have since improved the overall safety culture and have created an environment where conservative decisions are met with respect and acceptance and analysed properly rather than an environment where they are automatically tossed in the " man-up" category.
Assuming that they have moved with the times and are actively managing their own culture from the top down, a good hard look at the reasons why the 'decision making error' of continuing past PNR was made could well result in making an excellent Airforce even better.
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Bob Viking is spot on. For 99% of the people this forum, their comments will be pure speculation..... well-intentioned speculation no doubt but speculation nonetheless.
Unless you've flown in the Antarctic. Unless you're familiar with the CONOPS down there. Unless you know McMurdo & Pegasus Field. Unless you know how fickle the wx can be. Unless you know how poor the forecasts usually are (it's a very big place with very sparse data). Unless you have intimate knowledge of the RNZAF's B757 SOPs & how their PNR/ PSR procedures cater for the inevitably sketchy wx forecasts on the ice..... I could go on.
Feel free to ask questions but perhaps think twice before passing sanctimonious judgement on the decisions & actions of a professional crew whose working environment you probably know very little about.
Unless you've flown in the Antarctic. Unless you're familiar with the CONOPS down there. Unless you know McMurdo & Pegasus Field. Unless you know how fickle the wx can be. Unless you know how poor the forecasts usually are (it's a very big place with very sparse data). Unless you have intimate knowledge of the RNZAF's B757 SOPs & how their PNR/ PSR procedures cater for the inevitably sketchy wx forecasts on the ice..... I could go on.
Feel free to ask questions but perhaps think twice before passing sanctimonious judgement on the decisions & actions of a professional crew whose working environment you probably know very little about.
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The most extraordinary feature is the difference between the local forecast /obs while the a/c was en route, and the experience in the cockpit.
A wittier man than I might be tempted to enquire whether the ground observer/forecaster was due to leave on the 757's return leg?!
A wittier man than I might be tempted to enquire whether the ground observer/forecaster was due to leave on the 757's return leg?!
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It's Antarctica.
It's not a commercial airline.
Antarctica requires greater risk appetite than some city in Europe.
It is perfectly acceptable to take risks in the interests of Science/development.
It's not a commercial airline.
Antarctica requires greater risk appetite than some city in Europe.
It is perfectly acceptable to take risks in the interests of Science/development.