It is very tempting to second-guess others' decisions if we were not there, but as 411A, JW411 and others put it, if someone voices a concern, no matter what the latest wind reports is, there might be something nasty enough to scare the passengers and FAs, even if it results in just moderate turbulence-or much worse. How about also asking Tower or Dep. Control to check with the previous crew about what it was like? If our decision is to takeoff or land no matter what anybody says or reports, then all the theory we learned about systems, second segment climbs etc does us no good at all. To hell with the phrase "female intuition": if we listen to ours and it keeps us out of trouble, then they can call it anything they want, whatever the soundbyte. Interesting studies began several years ago about cultural effects on decision-making in the cockpit and CRM-that is, whether CRM is possible in many areas of the world. CRM was invented by people in the US and western Europe, "inspired" partly by a DC-8 crash in Portland, OR.
No matter what our company limitations say, combining very gusty winds with a wet runway and/or a chance of a microburst can result in far more than what the engine/aircraft combination can handle. I recently broke off an approach in which the quartering headwind gusted to about 30 knots on a wet runway and fairly thick rain. No traffic was ahead to report anything, but on the next approach just a few minutes later, a corporate jet relayed info and the shower had passed. This is one thing that reserve/contingency fuel is for.
The inbound L-1011 which crashed years ago by the fuel storage tanks at DFW never received the latest wind/turbulence reports, due to a communication gap between approach controllers with a shift change. The CVR had a segment in which the FE stated that his knees were knocking together or legs were shaking, or some such strange confession (very rare for any pilot to admit to, except after landing on an aircraft carrier at night), while they were inbound to the blob on radar, and due to what, the rough ride, strong rain, hail or vertical gusts-more than one?! From what I remember, the cell on radar was either not very large or did not appear very strong, with clear contours. I've heard the tape in recurrent tng. In our US system, all of these guys were experienced pilots, even if one were fairly new. And did the pilots in front understand what he said? Last night, a CRJ made a "pirep" for severe turbulence during final approach less than two miles from a runway here , and maybe it was over before they decided that a go-around was needed (+ and - 25 kts airspeed!!). Luckily the tower controller quickly decided to "turn the airport around" and let traffic land to the north, with weather cells just to the north and west.
