Originally Posted by kungfu panda
Should Average Pilot Experience Levels Of Each Airline Be Public?
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I'm not trying to argue the benefit of experience or not but the first issue the media was interested in after both the Asiana accident and the Malaysian disappearance was the experience level of the crews.
It seems to me that Pilot experience is of public interest and to maintain transparency in the industry would it not be reasonable for an experience league table to exist for use by the media?
Originally Posted by Bealzebub
I posted the following answer in another thread, but copy it below.
Quote:
The Colgan captain had around 3,300 hours and the first officer 2,200 hours. On Air France the captain had 11,000 hours and the two f/o's 6,600 and 3,000 hours respectively. Not a single one of these pilots would have been precluded by a 1500 hour minimum tariff. The Colgan captain had a history of numerous failed check rides during his training and was regularly commuting some 1200 miles from his home in Florida. The first officer was also regularly commuting 3000 miles from her home in Seattle. Fatigue was cited as a likely contributory factor.
WOW! Where to begin?
By all media accounts of almost any accident or incident, it would seem that kungfu panda is asking a very logical question. Also, it would seem that the responders on this thread (so far, anyway), understand the direction of “KP’s” question and understand the proper direction that the answer should take. By that I mean that certainly “experience” is a factor that should, in some way, be able to provide some knowledge about the competency of an individual flight crew member. But, again, most of the responders recognize the futility in “hanging one’s hat” on the word experience. The dictionary defines this word as follows:
Experience – the process of doing and seeing things and of having things happen to you; the skill or knowledge that you get by doing something; the length of time that you have spent doing something (such as a particular job).
What is obviously missing is any quantifiable reference indicating the demarcation between “inexperienced” and “experienced.” To that point, Bealzebub pretty much shot down the “specifics” that the FAA have recently adopted in a rather flimsy attempt to appear to have correctly responded to perhaps the most easily recognized issue – very likely chosen on the basis of hoping to appear as being “responsive” to a public that wanted to see a tangible difference in regulatory standards. The experience factor that the FAA settled upon in this “rush to appear to have been responsive,” was likely thought to have been seen as having “raised the bar” for that illusive factor, and thereby, having fulfilled their responsibility. I probably don’t need to point out that the aviation business has much more than a little familiarity with participants observing someone having done something (dare I say “everything”?) the wrong way for at least some, perhaps a major portion (?), of their career – and in addition to those cases where something is not “physically seen” to be “different,” there is a hidden aspect … that of what is “thought,” “interpreted,” “analyzed,” and/or “concluded” prior to any physically recognized action being taken … which can easily confuse or aggravate any on-going issue. In these cases, a particular response to a given set of circumstances may not be recognized by an observer OR the one performing the function … until something goes wrong or partially wrong, and then what has been ‘adopted’ as a ‘satisfactory way’ to accomplish that particular task turns out to be wholly inappropriate, or ineffective, or aggravating the existing circumstance! More on this below…
On the other hand, the comment published by Bealzebub appears to be focusing on something that he may believe should have been directly addressed in that regulatory change - fatigue. It’s my opinion that the only direct regulatory change that could have been even somewhat beneficial to this specific circumstances would be to have changed the rules to require something like a minimum of 10 hours (pick a number) of uninterrupted rest at the location of the flight’s origination. But that opens a whole new set of concerns (a “can of worms” as we say in the Colonies) because someone living in New York or Atlanta or Chicago would still have to endure a pretty decent amount of commute time from their “residence” to the airport – which could easily affect “pre-departure rest” capability. In fact, there are some airplane commutes from other states in the US that take less time than automobile commutes from within the same city! Sure there are weather cancellations of flights, but there are also highway accidents that could result in the same kind of delay. This would leave the only option as a “commuter crash pad” kind of life-style … which often is not much better, if any at all, than “crashing” in the crew lounge at the departure airport. Bottom line, there is little available for the legitimate substitution for wisdom.
Originally Posted by Calmcavok
The regulator should be held to account as each airline abides by the regulator. Case in point, the FAA post-Colgan. But does 1500hrs maketh the pilot, probably not. That's a different argument.
While the first thought is laudable … and hopefully already exists … however, it likely exists to varying extents depending on the airline and the local regulatory authority. However, the second thought (the Colgan-generated flight time minimums to provide adequate “experience”) would only be valid IF there were some way to verify that this number would ensure a leveling of vast amounts of differences – in background, in training processes, in airplanes flown, and almost everything else. The fact is that they are relying on the regulatory requirement for “flight hours” as the understood level of competence, even though they use the word “experience.”
Requiring any specific number of flight hours to ensure that pilots have a specific level of competence, may sound simple and straight-forward, but it is, most certainly, at least questionable, given the degree of variability in backgrounds and the almost limitless variances in the kinds of flight time that exists across the airline industry. I am at a loss to understand how 1500, as a number, does anything other than occupy the space between 1499 and 1501.
Originally Posted by Tourist
The reality of engine failures/fire, smoke in the cockpit, decompression, bird strike, death on board, diversions etc. are never the same as potted exercises.
A very accurate observation … but I would point out that if the instructor is using those exercises to provide merely the awareness of knowledge, little more than that awareness is likely to be achieved. The fact is that there are different aspects of the same task where different types of information processing is required on the part of the individual student pilot. This classification system is “the skill, rule, and knowledge based (SRK) approach.” When used correctly, the system can provide a useful framework for identifying the types of error likely to occur in different operational situations.
In the “knowledge based mode,” the individual carries out a task in an almost completely conscious manner. This would occur in a situation where a beginning pilot was performing the task or where an experienced pilot was faced with a completely novel situation. In either case, the pilot would have to exert considerable mental effort to assess the situation, and his or her responses are likely to be slow. Also, after each control or other action, the pilot has to review the effect before taking any further or supplementary action, which would probably further slowdown the responses to the situation.
The “skill based mode” refers to the smooth execution of highly practiced, largely physical actions in which there is virtually no (at least very little) conscious monitoring. Skill based responses are generally initiated by some specific event, e.g. the requirement to move a switch, to turn off an audible alarm, or the adjustment of a flight control to raise the pitch or aileron control to level the wings. The highly practiced operation of those actions will then be executed largely without conscious thought.
The “rule based mode,” is another category of information processing, and, not surprisingly, is based on established rules. These rules are most typically covered in ground school (either in a classroom or remote) and are often learned as a result of interacting with some form of physical training device, after reading or reviewing those rules understanding or by working with experienced process workers. The level of conscious control is intermediate between that of the knowledge and skill based modes.
I do not believe that every instructor teaching pilots – either ground instructors or flight instructors – should be required to be knowledgeable about nor consciously use this SRK approach. However, I DO believe that the person who is responsible for developing the instructional materials, assembling the instructional curriculum, planning the operational scenarios and their logical sequences (plural), and either instructs or oversees the instruction of the ground and flight instructors should be conversant with and understand these relationships. Additionally, as I’ve said many times on this forum, having an internationally established set of criteria for pilot training, instructor training, and evaluator training should be at the bedrock of any airline training program anywhere in the world.
Originally Posted by Wirbelsturm
Simulator practice is all well and good however we seem to have come to a position where many airline pilots 'practice' hand flying in the real aircraft to 'prepare' for the simulator check. Somewhat back to front in my opinion but the sim check has become more of a hoop jumping/box ticking exercise rather than a tool for the dissemination of useful skills, practice and information.
All IMHO of course.
Sir, you win my award for “Practical Recognition of Airline Pilot Deficiencies” – and I don’t give that out very frequently! As an industry, we seem to have become overly dependent on the simulator to do and provide everything and anything of merit with respect to pilot training. Of course, I remain convinced of the value of simulation – and there are very few other aspects of modern training that are more important or more valuable than a well-constructed, well-programmed, and well-used flight simulation device … provided it is used within its capabilities, and used by well-trained and knowledgeable instructors/evaluators. Unfortunately, because there are many in this industry who are paid on the basis of providing flight crew members “ready to fly the line,” where that readiness is determined by, and sometimes only by, the satisfactory completion of training and having satisfactorily completed a flight evaluation (test), most probably relying on (sometimes exclusively) a flight simulator. Sometimes, such reliance can be narrowly viewed and miss some aspect that may become a weak-link that can develop into a potentially disastrous circumstance.
The kinds of things I’ve observed include what I’ve called “cheat-sheet” values and sequences provided to eager, “would-be” pilots who are only looking to find a definitive way to complete the training or pass the check ride. Unfortunately, those practices cannot regularly detect and/or eliminate wrongly learned or wrongly practiced flight tasks and the basic understanding of those tasks as they should be applied to line operations. Other “cheat-sheet” kinds of circumstances have included the use of the programmed capabilities of the simulator to ensure a satisfactory performance – or have included a “suggested” manner of control application and power settings to accomplish a specific kind of task or maneuver. Other circumstances involve the substitution of one task or procedure for other, required tasks or procedures, on the basis that similar control applications are used – an example might be the substituting of low altitude windshear recoveries for recoveries from stalls or approaches to stall.
Other factors, somewhat less noticeable but may be just as dangerously depended upon, is, as Wirbelsturm has described, demanding that pilots use automatic systems almost exclusively until the pilot is within a short time-proximity of having a recurrent simulator training or simulator test – and then strongly suggesting that manual flight controls be used until after that simulator exposure. While this may not be immediately recognized as a “cheat-sheet” methodology to “verify” pilot competency – it is, clearly, a last-ditch effort to ensure the pilot has an opportunity to become “re-familiarized” with what manual control of the airplane is really like … which, in effect does little more than provide a kind of “cover-up” of any potentially more serious lack of understanding of recognition, analysis, decision, and responsive action that simply has to take place 100% of the time when sitting at one of the pilot control positions on an airplane flight deck.
We certainly don’t need, and would, no doubt, be foolish to depend upon, pilots with a skill set that is “spun-up” only occasionally, and then only to ensure that the pilot will be able to complete the training or pass the check.