Merged: Senate Inquiry

[Sarcs]

Bored vs Board vs Bureau

Hope you don’t mind “K” but your excellent post got swamped by the Boratous contribution on the Truss thread and I dearly wanted to pick up where you left off so…

Take a bow industry; take two, if it pleases.

The patterns which emerge from the submissions are clear; it's interesting though that only the 'professional pilot' groups had anything significant to say about the ATSB, others made mention but the core issues were taken head on and best addressed by the following: - AFAP - : - AIPA- : -VIPA.

The ATSB submission, like Oliver simply asks for more porridge and can be as easily dismissed as the pathetic (bloody disgraceful) – press release – doled out as an 'interim' report on the ATR incident. Annexe 19 - indeed.

There was also a notable ASRR submission from the UNSW Aviation Faculty that focussed entirely on the damning findings of the Senate PelAir (AAI) inquiry, here it is in full: ASRR sub 160

SUBMISSION TO THE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION REVIEW
January 2014

Abstract:
The need for the Aviation Safety Regulatory Review arises because of systemic deficiencies and inadequacies in the present system. This submission makes the case that the systemic failures identified by the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Report entitled "Aviation Accident Investigations", and dated May 2013, may have occurred because of inadequate supervision of the activites of both CAA and ATSB. In this submission, it is argued that both CASA and ATSB will function better in future if overseen by Boards of Directors which have similar influence and control over their Executive Directors as occurs in the commercial world. The Directors of such Boards should be chosen for their expertise and independence. The reporting line between the organisation and the Minister should be that the Executive Director Reports to the Board, and the Chairman of the Board reports to the Minister. In this way the Minister will be able to influence the general direction of responsibilities, but not be able to unduly influence the agencies into making decisions which are not backed by technical knowledge, expert judgement and data.

The role of CASA is arguably too general, in that CASA has executive, enforcement and judicial powers in matters of aviation law and contravention thereof. This can and arguably has led to conflicts of interest within the organisation. It is recommended that a separate body, with expertise in judicial and enforcement matters, be charged with recommending a different structure to devolve some powers to other commonwealth agencies.

In the case of ATSB, the organisation should be resourced suitably to conduct their investigations independently and in a timely manner. The recent example of the Pel-Air investigation (ATSB report) in which systemic regulatory and management issues were apparently ignored, could perhaps be avoided by the use of a more formalised process. If CASA processes themselves are a contributing cause of risk, then ATSB must be able to so conclude without fear or favour. Improving aviation safety must be the prime objective.

The existing Memorandum of understanding (MoU) between CASA and ATSB and/or its interpretation is inappropriate as it appears to have unduly influenced ATSB independence. The MoU should be discarded or re-written.

It is the opinion of the writers, having canvassed a wide rage of industry personnel, that the industry has lost significant respect for both CASA and ATSB.

It is essential that restructuring occur to ensure both organisations become once again suitably effective, and to renew this respect This can only be achieved by restructuring and implementing Boards of management and changing responsibilities and reporting lines.

1. Introduction

The need for the Aviation Safety Regulatory Review arises because of systemic deficiencies and inadequacies in the present system. The Review (as defined by the Principal Objectives and Outcomes) would arguably not be needed if, in the past, there was suitable oversight of the core agencies, being the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

It is assumed that the reader will have a detailed knowledge of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Report entitled "Aviation Accident Investigations", and dated May 2013, hereafter referred to as the 'Report". This Report provides essential reading as background to the Outcomes expected in the Review.

A thorough reading of the Report and the submissions has led the authors of this submission to believe that the Executive Summary thereof provides a reasonable summary of matters and events. In particular there are troubling statements in the Executive Summary, three of which are quoted here as they appear to underpin systemic issues in both agencies.

The Executive Summary, page xx, states in part "What is clear is that CASA's failure to provide the ATSB with critical documents, including the Chambers Report and CASA's Special Audit of Pel-Air, which both demonstrated CASA's failure to properly oversee the Pel-Air operations, contravened the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in place between the two agencies and may have breached the terms of the Transport Safety Investigations Act 2003 (Chapter 7). The committee takes a dim view of CASA's actions in this regard."

The Executive Summary p xxi states in part "To simply focus on the actions of the pilot and not discuss the deficiencies of the system as a whole is unhelpful. It is disappointing that CASA and the ATSB continue to assert, in the face of evidence to the contrary, that the only part of the system with any effect on the accident sequence was the pilot". This follows the earlier statement, page 1x, "The committee takes and different view and believes the ATSB processes have become deficient. .. .'

While these are only three examples, the Report, plus the numerous detailed recommendations of the Report, suggest that there are systemic deficiencies within the management of both agencies. Addressing these deficiencies will assist significantly in the improvement of the management of aviation safety in Australia, and provide a way forward to satisfy the Outcomes of the Review.

2. The Regulatory Structure of CASA and ATSB

The Commonwealth Department of Aviation was created in 1982 to manage civilian air transport activities, these being formally held by the Department of Transport. In 1988 the Civil Aviation Act was passed, establishing the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). The investigative functions were further devolved in 2003 with the Transport Safety Investigations Act which established the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). It is expected the reader is familiar with the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (CAA88) and the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (ATSI2003) to understand the roles and responsibilities of the organisations.

2a) The Civil Aviation Safety Authority {CASA) CASA's responsibilities are prescribed in CAA88 Section 9. The following is a short summary list
1. Developing and disseminating clear and concise aviation safety standards
2. Developing effective enforcement strategies to secure compliance with the safety standards
3. Conducting comprehensive surveillance of the aviation industry
4. Conducting regular reviews of safety to monitor the aviation industry's performance and to identify safety trends and risks
5. Issuing operational certificates to aviation organisations
6. Issuing licences, aircraft registration and other permits
7. Carrying out timely assessment of international safety developments
8. Encouraging the aviation industry to maintain high safety standards through education, training and advice
9. Making aviation industry management and the general aviation community aware of the importance of safety and compliance with the rules
10. Promoting full and effective consultation and communication with all people and organisations that have an interest in aviation safety.

CASA is managed by a Director of Aviation Safety, and while there is a Board, at present the reporting line of the Director of Aviation Safety is directly to the Minister, not to the Board (Report 2.26). A policy of Reporting directly to the Minister may result in the Minister unduly influencing matters, to the extent of possibly ignoring technical facts or professional safety judgements which imply that a contrary position is in the interests of safety. A proper structure would be for the Director of Aviation Safety to Report to the Board, who reports to the Minister.

CASA's functions include the responsibility for overseeing and implementing the development of safety policy, for legislation, for policing, for making decisions about guilt or innocence of those which it accuses of contravening legislation and in setting penalties. The separation of powers of the Executive, the Judiciary and the Enforcement arms of government as occurs in criminal law does not exist in CASA. Few other legal systems in the world (except perhaps those of dictatorships) have such all-encompassing responsibilities (and in effect total control) over a system. It appears that CASA's diverse responsibilities may well result in internal conflict, or role confusion, unless very carefully managed and overseen by a Board with suitable expertise. There is a case to move the policing responsibility (and perhaps personnel) to the Federal Police, as it is federal legislation that is being policed. Certainly this is a complex matter that should properly be reviewed by a body of experts.

It is arguable that, in any case, the present Board members are insufficiently expert in aviation matters to effectively oversee strategy and operations, particularly given CASA's diverse responsibilities. There is no mention of aviation as an area of expertise for any of the current CASA Board Members listed in the "Biographies of Board members" on the CASA website. A stronger oversight might well have ensured a more focused and timely writing of the "new" Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, some of which have not been seen in first draft form despite that process being active for over 15 years. The complexity of some of those regulations that have been rewritten is sufficiently high that individuals and organisations may not comprehend all the detail, leading perhaps to inadvertent contravention.

There is ample evidence in the literature and on the websites of, for example, the Australian Institute of Company Directors (www.companydircetors.com.au), and the Global Network of Director Institutes (Global Network of Director Institutes (GNDI)), that there is need for Company Board members to be chosen on the basis of merit, independence and integrity, including an understanding of the dynamics of the business and marketplace, and that Boards with a diverse membership are most effective. This concept provided perhaps a useful model.

We believe that the CASA Board has not provided, or not been able to provide, sufficient oversight of CASA to ensure its multiple roles role have been executed in a way which is expected by the stakeholders (the industry, the public and government). It is therefore important that the CASA Board be strengthened by adding additional members with aviation expertise, and that the Director of Aviation Safety report to the Board. Issues of potential Conflict of Interest can be handled in the usual ways by disclosure and by member omission from decision-making which affects that member's own affiliations.

In addition, to ensure that the Directors role is maintained within the confines of the strategy set by the Board, contact with the Minister should be via the Chairman of the Board.

2b) The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) ATSB has a Chief Commissioner and two Commissioners. As described in the ATSB website, none appear to have any technical expertise in accident or safety investigation, and none in aviation operations.

There is no Board. Arguably this lack of oversight can (and perhaps has) led to actions and outcomes, some of which form the basis of the criticisms of the Report. The forming of a Board which includes a wide range of technical expertise would help ensure that ATSB keeps within its remit of undertaking and reporting objectively on any safety issues. The ATSB independence is essential, as it is a technical committee, which should not be manifestly able to be influenced by politics. Should those issues involve CASA (or any other federal or state agency) then it is logically clear that ATSB must be able to make that case and report it without fear or favour, to ensure the travelling public is best served in matters of safety.

Contact between the Chief Commissioner and the Minister should be via the Chairman of the Board.

The Pel-Air Report is not of sufficient quality to be useful for the improvement of aviation safety, or to engender confidence in the Industry.


Consideration should be given as to whether the NTSB of the US or other national agency should be given the task of undertaking a fresh investigation and writing an independent report ATSB should only undertake this under revised management.

3. Conclusion

The authors have avoided the temptation to write in detail about the many issues raised in the Report, and re-iterate our belief that the Report is a balanced view of facts and judgements. We are comfortable with all of the recommendations of the Report, although many will automatically or subsequently be addressed by the implementation of Boards with appropriate membership and responsibilities.

The separate recommendation by Senator Xenophon that a separate administrative person (an Inspector General of Aviation Safety) be implemented to oversee both CASA and ATSB might be useful as an interim measure while the new Board structures are being considered and implemented, but is probably not necessary once Boards have been established. In any case management by an individual or overview by an individual cannot bring the benefits of breadth of experience and expertise which overview by a well-constituted Board should bring.

While we have not specifically addressed each point of the published Terms of Reference, we believe our generic discussion is of value across most of the principal objectives.

There you go a balanced, sensible, well reasoned argument for the ATsB to ditch the bureau concept and adopt the board concept. Sure would beat the hell out of this embuggerised BASR approach currently being deployed by the ATsB/CAsA senior management stooges.

Perhaps the Miniscule, while the TSBC is in town, should get a briefing from the Canucks on how the board system works (i.e. Pros &Cons)??

SOB Miniscule...

MTF...