I found, after working for various airlines, that there was no black & white answer. Often it rested on the whim of the DFO. There was an Ops manual legal minimum, and often it was sufficient. Sometimes not. The disappointment I had was that many SFO's coming up for command had no idea how to decide this taxing question. If the C.P. was an absolute 'minimums' man then crews were brow beaten into thinking this was always OK. The company said they'd accept some diversions. The statistical cost of a few per year was less than 300kgs extra every sector. That can be a valid opinion, and an understandable one. However, captains, nay crews, should be educated how to make sensible decisions AND be encouraged to do so. I always looked not only at the weather but the time of arrival and the expected approach. It irked me that an F/O would take minimum plog fuel into an airport because the weather was OK, even when that airfield had no radar and the wind dictated a visual or even circling approach to the non-IFR runway, and it was a busy time. And there might be a host of other reasons to take a bit extra. Equally they did not know how to calculate how much extra. If 300kgs was allowed with no questions, then 500kgs was considered sufficient extra. That gets you 2 holds or 1 circuit. They didn't ask "what do I want to do with the extra fuel and then calculate it" They just stuck a finger in the wind.
Equally there were captains who just took burn + 3000kgs no matter what. That's often wasteful, and more importantly sometimes not enough. It is those people who create the minimums policy from C.P.'s. It shows they do not appreciate the financial aspect of the operation. Solid education and a fair monitoring system should find a correct balance.
I once flew long-haul to some very basic Caribbean islands. The DFO insisted on plog fuel because the contingency of 5% was 45 mins over such a long flight. No matter that the jet stream was 150kts head wind: no matter the NAT track system did not guarantee planned level: no matter that the weather forecast for destination was trying to predict 24 hours in advance from when it was published: no matter that it was a non-radar NPA approach and the diversion was another island that then closed shortly after our planned arrival time. Considering to use the contingency fuel as 'extra' was crass. However, on the return leg into central Europe with so many diversion airfields en-route before TOD, minimum plog fuel was usually more than enough. Education & experience + courage of convictions. That seems to be lacking these days.
To create a culture of disrespect and mistrust that leads to a sense of bullying helps no-one. That goes for both sides of the matter.
Last edited by RAT 5; 22nd Apr 2014 at 12:35.