The silence is deafening. Rumour has it that there is a lot to talk about.
I personally found the reaction to Aser’s comments a bit tight, even if he was mistaken on some details. The accident he refers to was a grave lesson in how not to do offshore operations; namely, on-the cheap. And if he had first-hand knowledge of that operation then his concern to shout up the need to do things properly is understandable.
There is a trend in German Bight and Baltic right now for operators who have had their traditional experience base in the onshore world to try and get a slice of the offshore windpark pie. In fact, that's almost a direct quote from the OLT/NHC boss who said (whilst referring to a desire to expand beyond the current HEMS/rescue service they are offering, into future personnel transfers) "The cake is big".
Is it? I heard a different: That contracts are short-term; that there is considerable market uncertainty, and that there is very strong competition on price - with one operator offering the AW139 at less than €50 a minute (for personnel transfer to platforms). Now I'm no bean counter, but that sounds unsustainably (laughably?) cheap to finance offshore operations for all they entail. How big will that cake be if it is a race to the bottom (no pun intended) just to get market share?
So how can you save money and be competitive on price? You can fly single pilot; you can fly with two pilots up front but only one of whom has a type rating; you can employ people for buttons (or nothing!) who want offshore experience, or make offset deals on the type-rating; you can employ military pilots “moonlighting with approval”; you can accept that bankruptcy is part of the game, re-shell your company, and start again.
I thought these kind of tactics were common parlance (and part of the endemic weakness) in the onshore sector, but that the North Sea sector was largely spared such de-stabilising and dangerous nonsense.
Perhaps the LBA and contract providers should conduct due diligence of all potential bidders, including their pricing structure, financial sustainability, employment practices, adherence to operational minima, maximum take-off weights, performance planning, proper scrutiny of duty and rest periods and so forth.
With respect to this accident, it is awful and my condolences go to the families and colleagues. As an important provider of HEMS services, you should expect that DRF had a properly type-rated, IFR qualified, operationally experienced and current crew. As to the BK117 being suitable for only a bit offshore, the lack of a gear-up warning system was probably the final nail in the coffin.
TT