Thank you Polax52.
I am not sure what point the "BY" accident at Girona demonstrates? In that accident (I was flying about 200 miles West of GRO that night and remember the proliferation of thunderstorms over the Pyrenees,) the Commander who was PF at the time of the landing accident had 16,700 hours of which nearly 3600 hours were on type. The F/O had 1500 hours of which 1145 hours were on type. As I recall the accident report addressed a lack of
Go around training from below decision height, but nothing relating to the training or experience levels of the F/O that was contributory to the accident? With nearly 1200 hours on type the F/O would be approaching something akin to two years worth of experience, and if he was a cadet at that time, would likely have been on the cusp of no longer being so, as his ATPL would have been close to becoming "unfrozen." However again, nothing in the accident report suggested a correlation between his experience levels and the contributory causes to that accident.
I would be extremely surprised if the IR failure rate was 9 out of every 10 candidates. However if I accept the premise, it would be worth remembering that 25 years ago most of the applicants for that rating would have been "non approved" (todays modular) CPL holders or PPL holders who would, (in those days even more than now,) have made up the vast bulk of applicants. Today the pass rate may be much higher but I doubt the criteria is "
does Mummy have the money" any more than it was then.
I m sure you have noticed that as you have got older and more experienced you have become a safer Pilot. It therefore stands to reason that companies selecting more experienced Pilots will achieve an overall higher standard of safety
I think that we all like to think that, but sometimes experience can be a prop that is used to substitute for awareness. It is therefore something to be wary of. I remind myself every time I walk from the car park into the crew room that almost every accident that ever happened started with a crew doing just this, and thinking they were experienced, safe, and ready for anything. So many, many, accidents since the start of the
jet age and certainly before, occurred to crews with impressively high levels of experience and often in both seats. Sometimes of course that was a part of the problem.
I have been involved with our own cadet programme since it started over 15 years ago. Like many captains, I was very sceptical and wary at the start, of just how this was going to be incepted and how it was going to evolve. It started at about the same time that CRM was becoming a requirement (and growth industry) in the UK, although the USA had brought in these programmes some years previously. The thing that stood out for me with these new cadets, was just how ingrained these CRM concepts were in their
ab-initio training. The ability to question, the flattening of authority gradients, and the awareness of their own limits, was something that particularly stood out. These cadets were fast learners, and in many ways their understanding of the non-technical aspects of the occupation was something that caused"experienced" pilots (such as myself) a reversal of the learning roles. Fifteen (plus) years later, I can say that of all the concerns I have on a day to day to day basis, flying with cadets is a very long way down the list, and for good reason.
As for experience... well, those cadets of 15 years ago are now todays 11,000 hour captains, training captains, and management pilots. What they learned at the start and through the intervening 15 years, continues to provide todays high levels of safety. Provided they continue to maintain high degrees of awareness, self progression and critique, so they pass that on to the generations of pilots that follow up through the ranks. I think there is a certain arrogance and complacency in saying "I am a safe pilot," but if that were true, I am quite certain that todays well trained and mentored pilots are likely to be better.