Can any DC-10 pilots out there tell me how many seconds earlier would it have required for climb power to be applied for the aeroplane to have also cleared the peak and not resulted in CFIT. It seemed to me that from the "whoop whoop pull up" on the CVR transcript it took a long time to react and advance the levers to the forward position and begin to raise the nose. I got the impression Collins may have thought he was being warned of gentle raising terrain and the not the steep incline of a mountain. After all, he did have NO IDEA of where he was.
It doesn't take a DC-10 pilot to say that it is not "power" initially that will clear a mountain, but pitch - especially if (as you say) it only needed 500'.
From the report:
1.16.3 The performance of the GPWS was evaluated and it was assessed that the warning was in accordance with the expected performance in the “terrain closure” and “flight below 500 feet without flaps and undercarriage extended” modes of the equipment (modes 2A and 4 respectively). The profile of the terrain prior to the impact was reconstructed in Air New Zealand’s DC 10 simulator and the performance of the aircraft was evaluated to determine if the collision could have been avoided in response to the warning and that the warning was in fact given at the maximum time before impact that could be expected.
1.16.4 The flights in the simulator indicated that experienced pilots would not have avoided a collision and that the warning given was in accordance with the design specifications of the GPWS.
With sufficient rehearsal it was possible to fly the aircraft away from the approaching slope when an extreme manoeuvre was initiated in response to the onset of the GPWS warning
which I interpret as realistically the GPWS was never going to save the day... My guess is the much more modern EGPWS would
if it had the correct terrain database (NB the Norwegian C130 accident with EGPWS was not helped by no data N of 60N where it was)
NoD