Yes Avgas172 fascinating read...
It has got shades of the various Essendon v Tulla mishaps over the years and just like gear up landings will continue to happen while us mere mortals continue to peddle airborne tin and plastic around the place..
Pooh tube grab of T/O the next day...brings a whole new meaning to short field T/O
: [YOUTUBE]
Boeing Dreamlifter Takeoff Jabara Airport Wichita KS - YouTube
By the way grabbed that vid from a Flying Prof blog which gives a credible scenario of how/why this incident may have happened..
:
Landing Dreamlifter at Jabara is Nightmare for Pilots
Copy of some of RT transcript:
Atlas 4241: Good evening, McConnell tower. Giant 4241 heavy is on the vis – er, GPS, RNAV GPS approach 19 left.
KIAB tower: Giant 4241 heavy, McConnell tower. Check wheels down. Runway 19 left, wind 140 at 4, cleared to land.
Atlas 4241: Clear to land, runway 19 left, wheels down. Giant 4241 heavy.
KIAB tower: Giant 4241 heavy, check wheels down.
Atlas 4241: Giant 4241, go ahead.
KIAB tower: Giant 4241 heavy, check wheels down and expect a mid-field turnoff taxiway Delta.
Atlas 4241: Giant 1440 – 4241. We might – We’ll get back to here momentarily, we’re not on your approach.
KIAB tower: Giant 4241 heavy, McConnell is 9 miles south of you.
Atlas 4241: Uh, yes sir. We just landed at the other airport.
Atlas 4241: And McConnell Giant 4241.
KIAB tower: Giant 4241 heavy go ahead McConnell tower.
Atlas 4241: Uh yes sir – uh, apparently we’ve landed at B E C.
KIAB tower: Giant 4241, verify you’re on the ground at Beech Airport?
Atlas 4241: We think so.
And FP's possible scenario on this rather embarrassing incident
:
It’s not entirely clear what happened, but here’s a plausible scenario: After passing the IAF at WITBA, the pilot began a descent, nominally to 3000 ft. The pilot knew he was on an RNAV (GPS) 19L approach, because he read back the clearance that said so, but may have been thinking about a visual approach. Indeed, the recording shows that he started to say “visual approach” rather than “RNAV (GPS) approach”.
At some point, he saw the runway environment of KAAO, which has the same alignment, more or less, as KIAB. Seeing what he expected to see, he discontinued the instrument approach, and flew the approach visually. It was only much later, after he landed, that he realized that he was still short of WARUN, much less KIAB.
The pilot was cleared to fly an RNAV (GPS) approach. That approach clearance requires that he maintain at least 3000 feet until passing the FAF, WARUN. Had the pilot flown the instrument approach as required, there would be no possibility of mistaking KAAO for KIAB, since the approach required him to fly at 3000 ft MSL over KAAO, 1600 above ground level. Upon reaching WARUN, neither KAAO or KBEC could be mistaken for KIAB. So it appears that the pilot simply neglected to fly the approach he was cleared to fly, and instead flew what was essentially a visual approach. Unhappily for him, there are two airports with the same runway alignment along the final approach course. To make matters worse, he failed to have the situational awareness to understand that he was 7 miles short of the correct airport.