Originally Posted by
Dan Winterland
In my opinion, this crash is a classic SI case.
If the only tool you have is a hammer, it all looks like a nail.
If you are at night, and trying to visually acquire the airport, and realize "this is AFU" and call for a Go Around, the first thing you do is GET ON THE GAUGES! You set GA attitude as power comes on and you, or the dear old Otto, holds it. Since these guys were in manual, the objective is to set the go around attitude, and hold it. As your C/P changes configuration via flaps or gear up in due course, you still fly on the gauges, and your primary reference is your pitch and roll indicating instrument, with cross check on your airspeed and VSI to make sure your GA is within bounds.
I don't know how well trained this crew were in doing a go around, but I saw Agricus' post and believed his point: pilots behind the aircraft shortly after GA decision. Flying visual wasn't a choice, flying with a proper instrument scan is the ONLY choice in IMC missed appproach, and Night IMC missed approach. It appears from the information that their condition was night/IMC.
If you don't stick to the basics, you'll get behind the plane. If behind the plane, it is possible to overcontrol when trying to correct.
Dan, the issue is Instrument Scan. Is the devleopment and application of one not considered a core competency of a professional pilot? Does the pilot force of a given airline get sufficient reps in instrument flying to keep the scan skill current, and not rusty?
You mitigate the problems of those illusions by flying on your instruments, regardless of what you "feel" in the seat.
EDIT:
I don't know enough about 737 to guess intelligently, but IF they had a malfunction in the pitch trim motor/system, and had a trim hardover or runaway during this maneuver, how easy is it for FDR to figure that out?
