Carissimi
E’ da un pò che cerco di divulgare un audit condotto più di un decennio fa sulle operazioni di volo della compagnia madre Coreana, ma invano, perchè il file, che conservo in archivio, è troppo pesante.
Ma ho trovato un alternato:
http://www.flight.org/blog/download/...dit_report.pdf
E’ un pò lungo ma vale la pena leggerlo: tra l’altro è molto istruttivo per tutti.
Da allora, al di là della scomparsa della figura del tecnico di volo (peraltro rimpiazzato dal ‘relief crew’), non mi sembra che sia cambiato molto.
Se qualcosa è stato fatto, che comunque qualche risultato l’ha dato, è valso come i classici pannicelli caldi usati per curare una polmonite.
Alcune ciliegine.
- 6. FO flew entire descent with A auto pilot engaged and B flight director selected. FD gave off course indications. When on the LOC/DME approach the FO then set his FD to A. There appeared to be no understanding of the system. This should be a check item and crew must not accept a flight director giving erroneous information. Select the appropriate autopilot and flight director so the information is correct.
- "request visual approach" and "cleared for the visual approach". They must also be taught never to trust ATC implicitly, they also make mistakes. All information must be evaluated from ATC to check it is acceptable. This is called ATC management. The following incident highlights this, but many other incidents were observed that support this finding.
The crew were asked if they had the field in sight. SFO had clear conditions. With out checking with the Captain, the FO said "affirmative" and the tower cleared them for a visual approach. The crews were trying to fly an instrument approach off the QUIET BRIDGE visual approach plate for 28R. NOBODY was looking out, the pilots were all head down trying to read the plate and program the AFCS. The flight engineer saw the problem but would NOT make any input to bring this to their attention. (CRM-all crew MUST be involved) Just by looking out of the window a clear deviation away from the field would have been noted. The a/c went through the ILS localiser of 28R and through the ILS localiser of 28 L. (28L was active with traffic, ATC became very concerned at this stage.) After passing through the localiser of 28 L the crew were still head down trying to program the AFCS and flying away from the field. The deviation was sufficiently large to cause the tower to panic and ask the crew if they had the field in sight. They then told them they were going for the wrong runway and were only cleared for 28R. The ensuing communications resulted in an unstable approach due to late configuration of the aircraft. This incident was totally avoidable. The crew must be aware that once a visual approach is accepted by the crew, the most important instruments on the approach on a wide body jet are the WINDOW and the VSI. ALL crew are responsible for CRM and the safety of the operation. It is not only the Captains responsibility. The FE in this case was quick to point out that the Captains let the side down.
Anche se ci corre l’obbligo di aspettare le risultanze dell’inchiesta in corso prima di farci le corrette opinioni, possiamo dire fin d’ora che nella nostra ‘arte’ non deve esserci “L’obbedienza dovuta” (Capisci a me!). Se qualcosa non ti garba, dillo apertamente e alla terza volta: RIATTACCA!
FLY SAFE
DOVE