The key problem with SAR-H was the intransigence of the IPT. UK Air Rescue pulled out for a considerable number of reasons, many of which were deal-breakers. Skulduggery through leaks was way down the list. Just a couple of the nuttier non-negotiable ones were:
The consortium carrying the risk of any Law changes over 32 years (would be funny when you consider who the customer was and who enacts Law changes if it wasn't so untenable);
The consortium agreeing to penalties for non-performance which would bankrupt the company in 9 days in the event of a fleet type grounding (thought possible over 32 years and in hindsight if you'd picked the EC225.......) which had to be backed by parent company guarantees (which none of the shareholders as listed companies would ever sign up to).
This explains why the cost was so high - every commercial company builds in "risk money" according to what they are being asked to sign up to. Even aside the deal breakers above, the general penalty ratchet was enormous and needed so much redundancy of equipment to make the risk low enough that the asset utilisation became not much of an improvement over Mil policy. Also add in the Falklands compulsion and it was easy to see why it was unaffordable as demanded.
At the end of the day a mature commercial operator just looks to make a reasonable market profit of 10-15%, not gouge the customer, particularly on a long-term baseload contract like this. The operations folk take equal pride as their Mil cousins and everyone wants to keep the customer happy. The IPT (and it seems a trait of the Mil procurement world, driven by some mega defence contractors) came from a defensive position first - "we're here to avoid being screwed" rather than letting naturally successful businesses with high service levels get on with doing it their way at much reduced cost through asset efficiency.
Last edited by Non-Driver; 2nd Jan 2013 at 12:36.