Dispatching with an inoperative APU alongside dealing with high outside temperatures was an RST module less than one year ago. Crews were trained in use of ground carts, external air, keeping doors open, recirc fans on, use of SPs for hot weather operations. I distinctly remember my instructor discussing up loading extra fuel and running a pack whilst single engine. Dont remember this in any course literature though!!!
Problem is FR have a policy of keeping pax on aircraft for 2 to 3 hours when awaiting slot improvement. You add the issue of EIN not having steps to facilitate doors remaining open (ie the L2 door), no external cart capable of running packs and the possibility of being too bloody noise sensitive for a prolonged s/e taxi.
Easy to say ops shouldn't have dispatched this aircraft from PMI, however I often note that the ops controller can overlook this (not enough manpower) or simply no other aircraft available to dispatch. Pretty sure engineering at PMI is next to non existent as well.
The crew would have been more than aware of the SVQ incident. I'm not sure of the whole facts, however I wouldn't regard this as being black and white. IALPA might blame corporate attitude. They may cite that the commander had been placed under pressure. I dont know? More incidents such as fender benders, declaring fuel emergencies and cooking pax may actually expose this? MOL may be arguing that not all publicity is good publicity