Reverend Doctor Doug,
The other comment that I was intending to make is in relation to using the take-off procedure in lieu of the published missed approach procedure.
The key issue is in positioning the aircraft during the missed approach to ensure that it is contained within the very, very narrow corridor used to maximise take-off weight. If your missed approach point is about 2 miles from the far end of the clearway and you are in cloud with strong crosswind and suffer a yaw-exacerbating engine failure during the go-round, what are your chances of establishing the aircraft within 1-200m of the centreline at the end of the clearway? From my observations, quite remote!!!
Given that the very, very narrow corridor used to maximise take-off weight may indeed pass between a pair of very steep obstacles, positioning to avoid those obstacles is obviously fairly critical.
OzExPat,
I don't know that ICAO consider missed approaches to be "emergency situations" so much as "unusual". I suspect that there are (and should be) far more more missed approaches conducted for a range of operational reasons than there are engine failures - we would look a bit silly encouraging pilots to make a missed approach rather than an unstable landing if we were then encouraging them to get involved in an emergency situation with a low probability of success.
Nonetheless, you do raise the key issue of missed approach analysis - where to start and what sort of splay to analyse.
There are many questions and many imponderables:
Does the PANS-OPS missed approach design offer sensible lateral containment?
How far down range is the aircraft before it is re-established in a missed approach configuration for which climb data is available or can be determined?
What options exist for safe flight paths below the landing minima and for missed approaches from circling?
Will reduced lateral tolerances for VMC operation provide better options?
What is an acceptable level of risk for operations in difficult terrain, recognising that complete and guaranteed safety for all contingencies will not permit flight operations at all?
I could go on, but suffice it to say that ICAO has not addressed the issue directly as is the case for most regulators. Additional certification data for all engine climbs and OEI missed approaches that go far beyond the present requirements would have to be mandated as a first step - very expensive and likely to be strongly resisted by manufacturers and operators alike. Foe operators, the costs involved in providing "what ifs" are huge and do not stand up to cost benefit analysis in our low margin but extremely price sensitive aviation game. One can provide reasonable rather than perfect advice - in the end, the commander is the risk manager on the spot.
But don't misunderstand my personal view - more advice is always better and should be demanded by flight crews - but the expectations must be tempered with realism.