Do we spend too much time training for emergencies and not enough time on other practical applications?
I would like to see some personal experiences and statistics comparing hours flown against real-life emergencies. It is now 34 years since I first went solo, and after 12,000 hours of flying, with 10.300 on helos and 9,500 of that in single engines, I have had the following emergencies:
Engine failures: None
Transmission emergencies: None
Hydraulics / electrics / queer bits: None
The worst thing that has gone wrong was an N2 governor high side runaway in a BK 117, and a few engine chip detectors in a B 206.
Yet over all these years, I have taught, and been taught, engine failures, autos, hydraulics off, hot lights, fire lights etc over and over. Sure, if the 5-h1-t ever hits the fan, a pilot needs to know the correct actions. But I have seen, and been involved in, many incidents during training for these emergencies, the cost of which would far outweigh the cost of a real prang every few years.
For example, we used to practice night touchdown autos in B 206 - this is similar to practicing bleeding, as the margin for error is exceedingly small and is easily used up by a ham-fisted Bloggs before the incredibly talented instructor can rectify the situation. Spread a skid here, chop off a tail there, but we must take these to touchdown instead of power terminating them, says Da Boss. Only way to be sure, he says.
What do you all say? Too much emphasis? Just enough? Not enough?
