AirRabbit
It’s a shame that the crew of that accident airplane in January of 1982 were not aware of the kinds of things regarding airplane operations in icing conditions you listed. However, I would point out, for your careful consideration that most (if not ALL) of this information, these recommended practices, and these scientifically derived experimentation results you just provided were gained a result of the examinations, experimentations, arguments, discussions, decisions, and considerations conducted because there wasn’t sufficient information on these issues very readily apparent, or even available, prior to this accident?
I didn't say the crew in 1982 knew anything about anti-icing fluid. You've cherry picked points I made as an answer to these present tense questions of yours...
Air Rabbit quote;.. but, at the same time, if the wing must be absolutely clear of any accumulation of snow (to see that there is absolutely no ice adhering) wouldn’t that effectively eliminate any takeoff during a snow shower? Is that acceptable to the myriad of operations that take place daily in locations where snow appears during winter operations?.
.. your implication being anti-ice fluid hasn't been invented yet, and therefore, "how can anyone fly in snow?". I was pointing out it has been, and there seemed to be some confusion in various posts with regards to the presence of snow on top of fluid.
It's true 1982 crews didn't have those A/I fluids we enjoy now, relying only de-ice fluid with some assumed (but vague) anti-ice properties when applied as an aftercoat/overspray. That being said, I'll re-quote the main point I did make pertaining to what was known back in 1982..
..and it was already loud and clear that frost, ice, or snow on the wings during takeoff could kill you. At least in my neck of the woods where it was lousy with all 3. It was certainly widely disseminated aviation knowledge, but I realize that doesn't preclude pilots out there making up their own theories that become culture within fenced-off circles, those within convincing themselves it's routine thinking; "This type of wing handles it", "That'll slide off I've seen it before".
Here are some readily-available, published things re winter ops the crew of Palm 90 did know/were paid to know/should have applied if they were familiar with their own Ops Manuals and recommended procedures for thier aircraft at the time of the 1982 accident:
1. FAA regulations. From the report: "The Federal Aviation Regulations are very specific, requiring that "no person may take off an aircraft when frost snow or ice is adhering to the wings, control surfaces, or propellers of the aircraft." The crew knew they had a contaminated wing with frozen precip adhering, yet they took-off it anyway. The Captain made light of the Regs, and yet it's one clearly written in blood long before 1982. Ignorance?..when he said "satisfying the Feds" was he speaking of the act of de-icing but not know that no adhering frost, ice, or snow was the requirement? Or was it feigned, know-it-all parroting of something he'd heard from someone else equally out of their depth. Either way, when they got to the runway they were required to not attempt a takeoff.
2. The Air Florida company Ops Manual mirrored that same Reg, but with relief granted for dry snow if the Captain and person releasing the aircraft agreed conditions precluded adhering. That relief was never sought, and the mod-heavy wet snowy conditions weren't of that nature anyway. So with regards to "clean wing"/contamination", there's no question the crew didn't follow their own Ops Manual either as it existed in 1982. Ignorance of his own Manual?..or disregard for it.
3. Inspection after de-icing. From the Report: "Neither the Air Florida maintenance representative who should have been responsible for proper accomplishment of the deicing/anti-icing operation,
nor the captain of Flight 90,
who was responsible for assuring that the aircraft was free from snow or ice at dispatch,
verified that the aircraft was free of snow or ice contamination before pushback. Ignorance of his own Manual? or disregard for it.
4. Use of reversers. The Air Florida Ops Manual at that time also included Bulletins warning of possible clear ice formation on leading edge devices while using reversers on the ground with snow present. There were also a series of Bulletins and avisories regarding rotation/pitch and roll issues with contamination on the leading edges, and recommended procedures for takeoffs into icing conditions or where contamination may be present. The Captain used the reversers for 30 to 90 seconds at the gate, after de-icing. Ignorance of his own Manual? or disregard for it.
At almost every step where compliance to Air Florida Ops Manual or Regs re winter ops was required there is nothing on the CVR or actions witnessed to indicate the crew was even aware of these requirements, let alone adhered to them. Their actions of using reverse within the confined spaces next to concourse and jetbridge after de-icing was applied, and later trying to position thier aircraft behind Apple's jet blast during taxi to try and melt snow on their own wing, would degrade the minimul anti-ice properties of the de-ice fluid even if that fluid was correctly mixed. These combined, non-approved actions could easily create conditions for ice to form, and this was known information. The F/Os declaration about only needing the inboard portions clean because "with the sweep the rest will slide off after 80" is based on...who knows where he heard that. The Captain's lassaize-faire, non-answer to the F/Os question if there was "anything special" to do for takeoff on that contaminated runway into heavy snow/icing conditions resulting in the F/Os deciding on a "soft field takeoff" solution when there were actual published procedures in their Ops Manual for that situation is another example of apparent ignorance or disregard to applicable procedures.
I mention all this to re-iterate that this crew, on that day and in those particular adverse conditions was virtual green on green. The Captain's experience in bona-fide, winter weather was virtually nonexistant. His previous company, where he had been knocking around south Florida in DC-3s, had been aquired by Air Florida only a few years prior and upgrades were fast. The F/Os commercial aircraft experience in winter ops was even less than the Captains, and his F-15 experience is of dubious relevance..it can fly with an entire wing missing. He exhibited this inexperience by deferring to the Captain's assurances, assurances based on nothing.
Between them there was a big, fat lack-of-experience cheesehole on an unforgiving, wintery day, and in that situation it's critical and incumbent upon any crew to recognize their own limitations and act accordingly. "Accordingly" means conservatively, screwing your flying head down even tighter, and when experience can't guide you the final backstop for safety is strict adherance to Regulation, Manual/SOPs, and applicable recommended procedures for the your specific aircraft. This crew did NONE of those things when faced with conditions unfamiliar to them. They didn't even talk about seeking guidance, and this certainly wasn't one of those rare instances where saving an aircraft means rightfully throwing the Book out. They never had their 1982 Book IN to begin with.
The record shows some of the Captain's proficiency checks went poorly (and failed) due to trouble with the Regs, procedures, systems, and even Limitations of his own aircraft, which is hard to fathom for a new Captain who's nose should be in the books. Those are study-and-preparation issues, and perhaps those subject deficiencies had been rectified, but there's nothing in the Report or CVR to indicate he had prepared himself to gain a working knowledge of his own Air Florida manuals with regards to winter ops, and we heard how seriously he took the regs regarding contamination. Given the series of omissions, non-adherence to Company Policy, and examples of doing things that were known, potential detriments to safety I find it hard to believe the Captain was even aware his Ops Manual contained applicable things he needed to comply with.
"Just to make the Feds happy", "You just need the inboard clear", notions about wing-sweep as it affects shedding..neither of them challenged the other when voicing left-field ideas in areas neither was versed, let alone well-versed in. On the contrary, in both omission and action both exhibited feigned confidence on matters with no experience to draw from, sounding instead like fair-weather pilots revisiting myths told around a Florida crew room campfire back home. The same type of false assurance was exhibited again by the Captain during slow T/O acceleration on a runway aleady accumulating more snow when the F/O raised doubts about it 4 times after mentioning funky engine indications during taxi. Regardless of why it was degraded acceleration, the last chance for the blind to stop leading the blind through a minefield and stopping the show was lost.
You can argue that the de-icing was really icing due to dissimilar mixes and a bad nozzle and that's what caused this accident, it was known that reversers on the ground could cause leading edge contamination, not to mention that swirling your own engine exhaust in the confines next to a concourse and jet bridge would degrade even correctly-mixed de-icing fluid's anti-ice properties or overspray coat. Purposely placing your aircraft into another's jet blast attempting to melt snow accumulations would also ruin any anti-ce properties, and worse, create conditions for re-freezing. Why didn't other aircraft experience the same fate? Those other crews probably weren't using those non-approved procedures or making up their own on the way to the runway that made the situation worse.
You make decent enough arguments on a few points, food for thought anway, but wrapping them in a suggestion that this crew's actions and words represent anything like a barometer of "what was known", done, and disseminated (including to them) re winter ops/contamination/ etc 1982 is a gross misrepresentation. This crew was nothing of the kind, and you whitewashing this crew's inexperience and non-compliance for the sake of focusing on the de-icing issue hints of an agenda.