Originally Posted by Doves
It's really moving the ardor with which you defend the actions of the crew of Air Florida Flight 90 which crashed into the Potomac January 13, 1982.
Nevertheless you will agree with me that the following illegalities were committed:
I will be more than happy to “agree” with you when you post something that is accurate. I’ve often said that I’m not writing to defend the flight crew. They certainly made errors. However, the errors they made did not cause the accident. I’ve been quite clear about what, in my sometimes not-so-humble-opinion, it was that actually caused this particular accident … it was the exact same thing that almost caused the B-737 to crash in Oslo, Norway on that same day, January 13, 1982.
Originally Posted by Doves
They did not insert Engine Anti-ice after start, and did perform the periodic engine run up.
The only place that indicates the flight crew did not use engine anti-ice is the CVR and transcript thereof … as I’ve pointed out earlier … that transcript clearly shows the response to the challenge-response checklist item “Anti-ice?” was recorded and published as “(OFF)” … and you will note the presence of parentheses around the word. If you had bothered to check what those parentheses meant, you would have found that they mean “questionable text.” In other words the committee that was listening to the actual CVR were not able to determine what was said to that particular checklist challenge item. The fact is that choosing to have the transcript show that response as “(ON)” should have been just as valid as having the transcript read the way it does. In that there are only two positions in which those switches could have been placed, those being either OFF or ON, when you cannot determine what was said – and the transcript is presented the way it is presented to show the reader that the response is UNKNOWN – how do YOU know that what was chosen to be placed on the transcript was, in fact, the actual position of those switches?
Originally Posted by Doves
They tried invain to push back (the tug connected) through the use of reverse (thus raising clouds of snow and slush).
No. The crew did not attempt to use reverse thrust to push back. The practice was apparently to start the engines at the gate, and then push back. This was attempted, but the tug being used was unable to acquire sufficient traction to push back the airplane, particularly “up” the slight incline that existed at that gate (see the accident report). Recall, the airplane had just been “deiced” and as a result the ramp around the airplane – which also had been subjected to prolonged sub-freezing temperatures – and because the Trump deicing vehicle was improperly repaired and was not functioning properly, a fairly extensive amount of water was sprayed all over it, very likely resulting in a much greater than anticipated accumulation of ice – making the traction available to the tug to be much less than normal. Additionally, as I’m sure you are likely knowledgeable of such things, engines at idle thrust still produce a forward thrust component – and the ground crew, the tug driver, and the flight crew attempted to neutralize this forward thrust component by opening the thrust reversers while keeping the throttles in the idle position. Again, the tug attempted to push back … and, again, was unsuccessful. The decision was made to shut down the aircraft engines and obtain a larger, heavier tug, one equipped with tire chains to attempt the push-back. This was accomplished. After the push-back was completed, the crew again started the engines. Here’s the quote from the Accident Report:
“Witnesses estimated that both engines were operated in reverse thrust for a period of 30 to 90 seconds. During this time, several Air Florida and American Airlines personnel observed snow and/or slush being blown toward the front of the aircraft. One witness stated that he saw water swirling at the base of the left (No. 1) engine inlet. Several Air Florida personnel stated that they saw an area of snow on the ground melted around the left engine for a radius ranging, from 6 to 15 feet. No one observed a similar melted area under the right (No. 2) engine.
Note that there is no indication of “raising clouds of snow and slush” as you’ve indicated.
Originally Posted by Doves
They knew they had snow on the wings, so that they approached the preceding DC9, in the vain hope that their jet engines would swept it away.
Undoubtedly, you are referring to a single comment made between the pilots during their lengthy taxi process, and you have determined that the description of what was happening was as a result of a determined effort of the pilots. There were a total of 2 comments to which you may be referring:
1. (1546:21)
“Tell you what, my windshield will be deiced' don't know about my wing”
2. (1551:54)
“Don't do that Apple, I need to get the other wing done ((sound of laughter)).”
In the first example, if you are at all familiar with the taxi process from the ramp to what was then Runway 36 (now Runway 1) you know it involves crossing runway 3 (now runway 4). In that the accident airplane was following behind a New York Air DC-9, when that DC-9 added power to cross that runway, given where the DC-9 engines are mounted and the fact that even more engine thrust would be needed to climb the slight incline to cross the runway than would be needed to begin taxiing again, it is likely that the thrust encountered by the accident airplane was noticeably more, and that thrust was commented on by the Captain who could just as easily – and very likely – meant it as a satirical comment – just as you might say – “just my lucky day” when you find out from your operations that the airplane you’re changing to when at JFK is on the other side of the airport!
In the second example, and again, as you may already know, the waiting area between runway 3 and runway 36 is a larger area where airplanes can wait without blocking access to the entrance to runway 36, and most airplanes park in that space angled away from blowing exhaust directly on the airplane behind them in line. However, when an airplane begins to move – either to move up to the next space in that waiting area or to taxi onto the runway, additional thrust is used, and through the turn, blows all that additional exhaust directly on the airplane waiting in that area. Additionally, as the end of that comment there are the words “sound of laughter,” indicating that the flight crew was commenting in a jocular (or frivolous) manner – indicating to many readers that the flight crew was not very serious about their jobs – I’ll call your attention, once again, to the fact that even the committee who listened intently, very likely for hours, still could not determine exactly what was recorded on the CVR, and that is why those words are contained in those parentheses.
Originally Posted by Doves
They started the take off run 50 minutes after the de-icing.
…just as did Apple 58, taking off immediately prior to the accident airplane, AND as did Six Eight Gulf, taking off immediately after the accident airplane.
Originally Posted by Doves
They accepted a very little separation with the landing traffic despite the poor visibility and the snow storm. (If they had to abort the takeoff? If the others were to go around?)
They did, indeed, accept the clearance onto the runway to hold (1558:58) … they also accepted the takeoff clearance (1559:24) – even acknowledged it (1559:26) – almost a full 30 seconds after they were cleared onto the runway to hold … but they were not advised of the position of the landing traffic until the next radio call from the tower (1559:28) advising them that landing traffic was “two and a half out for the runway.” Of course, as, again, you would also know, when the visibility is as low as it was that day – putting the responsibility on the flight crew for visually checking final for landing aircraft is a bit much … as the only folks who know about that sort of information are the guys in the tower … who apparently didn’t think that this day presented anything different from the way they regularly moved traffic at that airport.
Originally Posted by Doves
They underestimated the irregularity of the engines parameters for takeoff
How do you know if there was an irregularity, or if there was one, how do you know that they actually saw what it might have been? The investigators presume that the questions the F/O had raised were because of an engine anomaly – but for a full 20 seconds after the F/O’s first question, neither he or the Captain could find anything that they thought might be “anomalous” with the engines – at least neither of them said anything or did anything that indicated they recognized anything out of the ordinary.
Originally Posted by Doves
They had found that the acceleration was so poor that they had reached 120 knots after 45 seconds.
Really? 45 seconds after what? As for the acceleration rate ... it may have been the fact that they both were attempting to find what it was that caused the F/O to ask the first question that they didn’t notice the acceleration rate – or it may have been that they had very little outside cues (due to the very limited visibility) with which to make a speed change observation and it was that fact that prevented them from assessing anything about the acceleration.
Originally Posted by Doves
They began to rotate as per “the soft field” (I began to hear such an expression only since I'm instructing in general aviation) and then starting the rotation well before Vr.
To show that this statement is in error, all you have to do is read the CVR transcript. The V-speeds were briefed to be V1 = 138 knots, VR = 140 knots, and V2 = 144 knots. The CVR transcript also shows that the Captain calls out “Vee One” (1600:31) and then 2 seconds later calls out “Easy.” There are many professional aviators who sincerely believe that the comment “Easy” was in response to what appeared to be a very quick rotation (likely occuring when the F/O began his rotation, precisely at VR speed) – and then subsequently learning about the B-737’s tendencies to rotate rather quickly and with some force when the wings were contaminated with a very small amount of contaminants. Then some 5 seconds after that (1600:37) the Captain calls out “Vee Two.”
Originally Posted by Doves
I'm sorry but I have to tell you that History has been written.
Well, at least someone’s version of history was written, that is for sure. But I think that the conclusions reached were at least as much for expediency as anything else. I am certainly not going to generate accusations that might get me or this forum into trouble … because what we are discussing was, indeed, 30 years ago. Also, there has been a lot of education that has taken place as a result of all the discussions centered around this particular accident – which, as anyone should recognize, is a good thing. But, and as I’ve said several times now on this thread, my intent here is not intended to impugn the fine reputation or the integrity of the NTSB or of the dedicated and professional employees at the Safety Board. If someone else desires to determine who or what may have been either hurt or benefited from another “version of history” being written – let them have at it. My only motive has been a continuing effort to describe the actions of the flight crew from a slightly different perspective while providing what I believe to be clarifying information regarding the cause of the accident and, to the best I am able, set the record straight– as much as one can this long after the fact.