Hi,
RetiredF4:
Saves time in analyzing the situation and
helps initiating the necessary steps. Reducing (or even eliminating) IMHO important "uncertainty". Surprises can bring problems.
Murphy's Law "rounds the picture".
That sudden manual flying chewed up most of the crews attention and was hindering in identifying the cause of the problem (UAS). This cause could have been multifold including the WX situation/ turbulence.
"Stressing" Human Factors
The system knew that the speed became unreliable, but the indication to the crew was the the handover to manual flying in some expected turbulent WX situation without communicating the known information (UAS) of the reason for the handover.
Currently the System has the information (GIGO "feature"). This is an "insider information". Not
immediately given to the crew. And could be. The Airbus paper mentions the pilots NEED to do the scan to identify the issue. IMHO this can be improved:
There is lots of room for improvement, not only on the training issue.
I think so (in this "UAS aspect").
IMHO MIL crews are trained to work around the unexpected event / problem, as they canīt plan a military mission and the asociated tasks in great detail, and if they can do it, it anyway comes different to the planning in the end due to a multitude of possible factors including bad guys trying to shoot holes in your plane.
But air transport crews are best trained in handling standard and non standard situations acording to SOPīs and CRM. To implement those procedures the identification of the problem has to be quick and simple and is a prerequisit to implement the correct procedure. The ECAM is the best example for that need.
Useful comparison.
The first necessary step " maintain aircraft control" was already hindered by the unknown cause of the problem and the lacking manual handling skills. Would the cause UAS have been known from the beginning, his handling might have been simplified as PJ2 sstates by doing nothing. But instead they failed in " maintaining aircraft control" , did never "analyze the situation" and could therefore not "take proper action".
might!
It comes down to a misidentification of a problem (UAS), which could have been communicated to the crew by a clearer and more expedite way
could
by a clearer and more expedite way
K.I.S.S. principle IMHO is MANDATORY for the
"interface"
Specially in "difficult conditions" (WX, IMC, etc.) in order to stay more distant to the "FUBAR threshold"